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In August 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit decided Winstar Corp. v. United States.' That case held that the
federal government breached contracts with a number of thrift institutions
when Congress, in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and En-
forcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),2 abrogated the right of the institutions to
take "supervisory goodwill" into account when computing their capital
1. 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
2. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183. The abrogation of supervisory goodwill was
affected by § 301 of FLRREA, which amended § 5(t) of the Home Owners' Loan Act to
impose special capital standards on thrift institutions. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t) (1994)
(requiring uniformly applicable capital standards).
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position for purposes of federal rules that require depository institutions to
maintain their capital at certain specified minimum levels.3 Winstar, to-
gether with other cases pending in the United States Claims Court that raise
the same issue, has substantial financial implications for the federal govern-
ment and the affected institutions; estimates of the total amount at stake
range from $12 to $15 billion.4
The Winstar decision centered on contract issues posed by the case.
The court held that the government had entered into contracts with the
thrifts, that those contracts had conferred on the thrifts a continuing right to
include supervisory goodwill in capital, and that the statutory enactment of
FIRREA constituted a breach of the contracts.5 Earlier decisions of the
federal courts of appeals had held that the thrifts had no right to injunctive
relief because the statute and legislative history suggested that Congress had
intended to abrogate the agreements.6 In those cases, the thrifts contended
that the congressional action amounted to a taking of property without due
process of law. For the most part, the early courts of appeals decisions
refused to decide this question on the jurisdictional ground that the question
belonged before the United States Claims Court.' The Claims Court, when
faced with the issue, also refused to decide the constitutional question,
finding the nonconstitutional breach-of-contract ground an adequate basis for
decision! In affirming the Claims Court decisions, the Federal Circuit
largely followed the lower court opinions.
3. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531, 1540-44 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996). The current minimum capital standards for thrifts are set
forth at 12 C.F.R. §§ 567.1-.2 (1995). Capital standards are described in greater detail at
infra notes 248-52 and accompanying text.
4. See Justin Fox, Thrifts Readying Goodwill Claims; U.S. Seen Unlikely to Settle Up
Fast, AM. BANKER, Sept. 6, 1995, at 4; Jaret Seiberg, Goodwill Claims Look Solid, Lawyers
Agree, AM. BANKER, Sept. 13, 1995, at 4.
5. Winstar, 64 F.3d at 1540-44.
6. See infra notes 312-25 and accompanying text (discussing earlier court decisions).
7. The single exception was Transohio Say. Bank v. Director, 967 F.2d 598 (D.C.
Cir. 1992), in which the court reached the constitutional question because of a circuit prece-
dent that the court believed required it to determine the adequacy of the money damage
remedy. The court held that the government action did not constitute a taking. See infra
notes 312-20 and accompanying text.
8. See Statesman Say. Holding Corp. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 904 (1992), aff'd
sub nom. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116
S. Ct. 806 (1996); Winstar Corp. v. United States (Winstar I), 25 Cl. Ct. 541 (1992), aff'd,
64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996); Winstar Corp. v.
United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 112 (1992), aJ'd, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted,
116 S. Ct. 806 (1996).
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In the immediate aftermath of the Winstar decision, lawyers familiar
with the issue and the industry agreed that the result reached was sound and
expressed the expectation that the thrifts ultimately would prevail.9 A num-
ber of uncertainties, however, remain. The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in the case."0 There are reports that Congress may respond in
ways that will defeat or limit the rights of the thrifts to recover on the judg-
ments." There is considerable question concerning the source of funds to
satisfy the judgments. In theory, the amounts should come from the Judg-
ment Fund, but legislation has been introduced to pay damages from the
funds of the Resolution Trust Corporation, in part in an effort to ensure an
accurate historical record of the true cost of the thrift industry bailout of the
late 1980s and early 1990s. 2 Should the thrifts ultimately prevail, complex
questions lurk in the future concerning the entitlement of bondholders or
other claimants to amounts received by the thrifts or by their shareholders
pursuant to the court rulings.
Furthermore, although industry lawyers publicly express the view that
the decision is a sound one, there remain substantial questions, not necessar-
ily about the result reached in the case, but about its rationale and, in partic-
ular, its abstention from resolving the constitutional "takings" question. For
in the cases, the action of the government to which the thrifts pointed as the
source of their rights was not a specific contractual arrangement with any
government body, but rather the regulators' action in approving a transaction
involving the thrift, ordinarily-a "conversion" of a mutual thrift into a stock
thrift or an acquisition of one institution by another. 3 The "undertaking" by
the government was thus an undertaking in a regulatory role and not an
undertaking in a proprietary role or any other role as a contracting body.
The congressional action at issue in the cases, therefore, was only a change
in regulations, overriding a prior change in the position of the regulators.
As this change caused serious losses to the affected institutions, the issue
involved really is a takings question - whether the action of Congress
constituted an impermissible "regulatory taking" of property without the just
compensation required by the Fifth Amendment.
9. See Fox, supra note 4, at 4; Seiberg, supra note 4, at 4.
10. United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996).
11. See Seiberg, supra note 4, at 4.
12. See Fox, supra note 4, at 4.
13. On conversions of mutual thrifts to stock thrifts, see infra notes 154-57 and accom-
panying text. On assisted acquisition, see infra notes 143-53 and accompanying text. On the
role of these kinds of assisted transactions in the process of resolving the thrift industry and
its problems during the 1980s, see infra notes 165-73 and accompanying text.
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This Article examines the supervisory goodwill cases from the stand-
point of whether the congressional action involved constituted a taking under
the Supreme Court's contemporary and evolving decisional law concerning
the Takings Clause. There are several reasons for this undertaking. First,
and most plainly, the resolution of the cases themselves is not yet settled.
The Winstar decision has been appealed to the Supreme Court, and that
Court may have to decide the matter. Furthermore, given the magnitude of
the amounts involved, some congressional action regarding the issue is quite
possible. To the extent any such action would have the effect of curtailing
the rights of the thrifts, that action might in turn be subject to a challenge
under the Takings Clause. A close examination of the takings issue with
respect to Congress's original action can lend some guidance to Congress in
taking further steps on the matter.
Second, there are other issues growing out of FIRREA and subsequent
banking legislation that raise takings problems. Indeed, the Claims Court
has held one provision of FIRREA, the so-called "cross guarantee" provi-
sion, unconstitutional, but that decision was reversed by the Federal
Circuit.14 In addressing these issues, it is useful to look at the thrift legisla-
tion as a whole and to examine the context in which the crisis underlying it
emerged and the legislation developed. The supervisory goodwill issue is
the most far-reaching and controversial aspect of the FIRREA. legislation; it
therefore provides the best framework for analyzing general questions posed
by the legislation under the Takings Clause.
Third, and along similar liies, there are a significant range of issues in
pending litigation growing out of FIRREA (and subsequent legislation) that
do not involve Takings Clause analysis, but that also are informed by an
analysis of the legislation's background. These include issues concerning the
standard of care imposed on officers and directors of financial institutions,15
14. Branch ex rel. Maine Nat'l Bank v. United States, 31 Fed. CI. 626, 637 (Cl. Ct.
1994), rev'd, 69 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The cross guarantee provision requires that if
one of two commonly controlled institutions requires assistance from the FDIC, the other
solvent institution is required to reimburse the FDIC for the amount of assistance it provides.
The provision is codified as § 5(e) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA), 12 U.S.C.
§ 1815(e) (1994).
15. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Frates, 52 F.3d 295 (10th Cir. 1995); FDIC v. Bates,
42 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1994); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir.
1994); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Miramon, 22 F.3d 1357 (5th Cir. 1994); Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 1993); FDIC v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532 (9th
Cir. 1992). The Chapman decision is in some conflict with the decisions in Bates, Frates,
Miramon, and Gallagher (a decision of the same circuit). In any event, all five of these cases
are inconsistent with Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cityfed Fin. Corp., 57 F.3d 1231 (3d Cir.
1995). All involve the survival of either a state law or federal common-law, simple negli-
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the requirement of exhaustion of remedies under the claims process for failed
institutions,16 the substantive rights of the deposit insurance bodies as receiv-
ers of the institutions,' 7 the right to a jury trial in connection with administra-
tive enforcement proceedings, 8 and a number of others. Most of the litiga-
tion involved also has followed a pattern that the supervisory goodwill cases
typify. In the early phases of the post-FIRREA litigation, which took place
when public attitudes about insider abuse and fraud were intense, the chal-
lenges to the statute met with little success in the federal courts. As time has
passed, however, the trend of litigation has begun to shift against the govern-
ment and the regulatory agencies and in favor of the private parties.
All of these issues involve, at a fundamental level, an interpretation of
the interface between the powers of the administrative state and the property
rights of private parties who are involved, in an economic way, in a complex
regulatory environment. The Takings Clause issue, as it has emerged from
the Supreme. Court's decisions in recent regulatory takings cases, presents
perhaps the most fundamental basis under existing doctrine for examining
these problems. And again, an examination of the background and develop-
ment of the FIRREA legislation, as it pertains to the doctrinal issues as well
as the fundamental problems, is useful in developing a framework for look-
ing at these problems generally.
Finally, the entire area of regulatory takings has implications throughout
the federal law governing banking institutions, as well as other areas of
administrative law. It is part of the thesis of this Article that, difficult as the
problems presented may be, the role of the takings law should and can be
broadened, rather than narrowed, as it applies to complex regulatory envi-
ronments. An examination of the background and development of the thrift
crisis and the FIRREA legislation reveals a justification for invoking consti-
tutional restrictions with respect, at least, to the most stringent provisions of
that legislation. The story thus told may have wider implications in other
areas of regulatory law.
gence basis for proceeding against officers and directors of failed insured depository institu-
tions in the wake of § 11(k) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k)
(1994), which provides a statutory gross negligence standard.
16. See Whatley v. Resolution Trust Corp., 32 F.3d 905 (5th Cir. 1994); Brady Dev.
Co. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 14 F.3d 998 (4th Cir. 1993); Marquis v. FDIC, 965 F.2d
1148 (1st Cir. 1992); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Mustang Partners, 946 F.2d 103 (10th Cir.
1991); Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 582
(1991).
17. E.g., Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
18. See Cavallari v. Comptroller of the Currency, 57 F.3d 137, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1995).
THE THRIFT CRISIS AND THE CONSTITUTION
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses two concepts that
may be unfamiliar to counsel working in the field, but that inform the inter-
pretation of the thrift crisis and the legislation to which it led - set forth
in Part I. The interpretation of the crisis and the legislation in turn informs
Part Ill, which analyzes the capital forbearance cases themselves, with
emphasis upon the manner in which takings analysis bears upon the question
those cases pose.
L Two Concepts
A. Premium Value of Entities
Institutions, especially those characteristically recognized as business
entities, possess premium or enterprise value. This means that the enterprise
valued as an entity exceeds the value of its assets summed together. The
existence of this value is linked to "profit" or the "profitability" of the
enterprise (as an economic, not an accounting, concept). The existence or
presence of the value, however, is not dependent upon the enterprise's being
"profitable." Insolvent enterprises have premium value, as the history of the
thrift crisis plainly shows. In insolvent enterprises, the liabilities of the
enterprise exceed the aggregate (gross) value of its assets (including its
premium value). Ordinarily, however, there is still positive premium value,
in that the net "cost" to an acquirer in taking over the whole institution (the
amount the acquirer will have to be paid in exchange for the assumption) is
typically less than the excess of the liabilities over the value of the assets
summed individually. The difference is the premium value of the insolvent
institution, which will often (if not always) be positive.
This observation probably strikes the average practitioner engaged in
transfers of control of financial institutions in particular, and business entities
generally, as obvious. Yet from the standpoint of theoretical economics -
the principles synthesized by Leon Walras on the Continent and Alfred
Marshall in Great Britain in the late nineteenth century, still the bedrock of
most convdntional economics"9 - the propositions expressed are radical.
Conventional economics posits that entities exist in equilibrium, and at
equilibrium, economic actors enjoy "zero profits. "10 The zero profit hypoth-
esis derives from the conception that economic decisionmaking essentially
19. See generally ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (9th ed. 1961); LEON
WALRAS, ELEMENTS OF PURE ECONOMICS: OR, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL WEALTH (William
Jaffe trans., 1954).
20. For a modem, straightforward mathematical presentation of the hypothesis, see
JAMES M. HENDERSON & RICHARD E. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 107-10 (3d ed.
1980).
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involves substitution at the margin - consumers substitute goods in reaction
to price changes so that they buy specified bundles among which they are
indifferent; producers substitute inputs to achieve outputs determined by
their resources. Increases in the price of a factor provoke substitution and
drive down demand, counteracting the price increase; decreases provoke
substitution enhancing demand, countering the decrease. The process of
substitution drives out profit.
Positing the existence of permanent profit positions is "Schumpeterian,"
a faith in a "disequilibrium" economics. For Schumpeter, capital and enter-
prise are distinct; enterprise gains are different from capital gains.2 There
is thus both explanation of and justification for the premium value of enter-
prises. Similarly, if much less clearly, for Coase, there is a process of
substitution at the margin of organization forms' - organization replaces
the market, and regulation may replace both,' which generates a "product."
Again, the conception suggests both explanation and justification. With
classical assumptions, profit, explainable solely by reference to imperfec-
tions, has net social cost. With Schumpeterian or Coasean assumptions, the
opposite is the case. The actual circumstance may be ambiguous: Multina-
tional enterprise theory proceeds from attacks on the phenomenon of multi-
nationalism as a product of (costly) structural, firm-specific advantages,24
proceeds through an explanation based on transaction costs (under which the
phenomenon is unambiguously net positive),' and proceeds to the "Dunning
eclectic" model, which explains the phenomenon as both, i.e., agnostic as
to social product.26 Some of the legal literature on takeovers is similarly
21. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 953-58, 1067-75
(1954).
22. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, ECONOMICA 386, 393, 405 (Nov.
1937) (stating that "[a] firm ... consists of the system of relationships which comes into
existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur .... A firm
becomes larger as additional transactions (which could be exchange transactions co-ordinated
through the price mechanism) are organised by the entrepreneur .... [This analysis enables
us to state more exactly what is meant by the 'marginal product of the entrepreneur'").
23. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1944).
24. See generally STEPHEN HYMER, THE INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS OF NATIONAL
FIRMS: A STUDY OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1976). This study was an MIT doctoral
dissertation written in 1960. After it began to attract scholarly attention as an unpublished
work, the tract was published by MIT Press in 1976.
25. See generally PETERJ. BUCKLEY & MARK CASSON, THE FUTURE OF THE MULTINA-
TIONAL ENTERPRISE (1976); John McManus, The Theory of the International Firm, in THE
MULTINATIONAL FIRM AND THE NATION STATE 66 (Gilles Paquet ed., 1972).
26. See generally John H. Dunning, Trade, Location of Economic Activity and the
MNE: A Search for an Eclectic Approach, in THE INTERNATIONAL ALLOCATION OF ECO-
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agnostic, both as to the net cost question and as to the question of explana-
tion, though without denying the existence of the value. 27
Regulatory systems unquestionably, and in obvious ways, may enhance
(but probably cannot create) enterprise value. Restrictions on entry render
permitted entry more valuable. Regulatory systems are correspondingly
appropriative by nature. Modulated, they may employ privately created
value in pursuit of regulatory objectives.
Premium value is a crucial concept in understanding the evolution of
banking law and policy of which the thrift crisis was a dramatic part. It is
also important to understand, at least generally, that premium value is both
an ambiguous and a controversial concept in economics. For the pattern of
the thrift crisis, and the problem of the capital forbearance cases, involves
an early phase in which the regulators delayed closing thrifts by arranging
acquisitions and by allowing the thrifts to count supervisory goodwill as
capital, which was essentially an accounting device that allowed premium
value to be counted as an asset. FIRREA sharply reversed this policy.
Although it is commonplace now in, for instance, the trade press to state that
"nobody really wants to defend supervisory goodwill, an intangible asset that
is to a balance sheet what a hole is to a doughnut, 8 the matter is a subject
of some controversy because the value does exist - a fact confirmed by the
market for the institutions themselves. The concept is ambiguous and con-
troversial, but it is a concept, and the policy abrogated in FIRREA was a
policy well within the ambit of reason. An understanding of the concept's
ambiguities and its importance informs the constitutional question of the
fairness of the sharp policy shift that greatly damaged unprepared private
parties.
B. Regulatory Space
In the early 1980s, British interest group theorists began to identify
historical "parenthetic" periods, which were defined by identifiable shifts in
the roles played by arld'relationships among dominant interest groups in
capitalist economies. Charles & Maier expressed the point most succinctly,
finding that "between an earlier age of estatist interests that waned during the
course of the late eighteenth century and an era of 'collective' or interest
group rivalry that arose toward the end of the nineteenth century lay an
/
NOMIC AcTIvrrY (Bertil Ohlin et al. eds., 1977).
27. See Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair
Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235 (1990).
28. Robert M. Garsson, Capitol Account: Annunzio Got It Right on Goodwill Cases,
AM. BANKER, Sept. 15, 1995, at 3.
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interval of relative parliamentary insulation from the needs and pleas of the
marketplace"; "[t]his era was the zenith of Bagehot's parliament and of his
informed public opinion; to borrow a suggestive, if overdrawn image: the
liberal parenthesis."29 This notion proved to have substantial explanatory
power for the study of the relationship between organized interest groups and
the state. Colin Crouch, convinced of the role and importance of national
identity in defining and conditioning such relationships, saw deeper implica-
tions in the idea: "Without doing too much violence to individual cases it is
possible to speak of a 'parliamentary parenthesis' as a universal phase in
Western European societies, starting some time in the eighteenth or nine-
teenth centuries and lasting until the final quarter of the nineteenth."' For
Crouch, however, the idea conditions another, that of "public space" or
"political space" - the "range of issues over which general, universal
decisions are made within a given political unit, particularly decisions which
are seen by political actors to affect overall social order."31 For the liberal
state, it is "a crucial feature ... that political space is monopolized by
specialized political institutions: legislature, executive, and judiciary. '
Prior to the parliamentary parenthesis, political space was shared; the state
"typically ... left several aspects of social regulation to guilds, Stidnde and
similar corporate bodies."33  Similarly afterwards, "organized economic
interests became increasingly important. "' Different societies, however,
were different in the degree to which the parliamentary idea took hold, and
this gives rise to Crouch's central thesis:
[T]he longer the interval, or the sharper the breach, between the destruc-
tion of ancient guild and Stdndestaat institutions and the construction of
typically 'modem' interest organizations, the more committed did the state
become to liberal modes of interest representation, and the less likely to
tolerate sharing political space; the less likely were modem organizations
to target their ambitions on participation of that kind; and the less likely
were neo-corporatist institutions to become established.35
29. See Charles S. Maier, 'Fictitious bonds ... of wealth and law': On the Theory and
Practice of Interest Representation, in ORGANIZING INTERESTS IN WESTERN EUROPE: PLU-
RALISM, CORPORATISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITIcS 27 (Suzanne Berger ed.,
1981).
30. Colin S. Crouch, Sharing Public Space: States and Organized Interests in Western
Europe, in STATES IN HISTORY 177, 177 (John A. Hall ed., 1986).
31. Id. at 179-80.
32. Id. at 180.
33. Id. at 181.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 182.
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For Leigh Hancher and Michael Moran, Crouch's concept of public
space lends itself to a concept descriptive of the role played by nonpublic
parties in contemporary economic regulation as an alternative to the long-
running debate about "capture" in regulation - an idea that "betrays an
assumption that there is a sphere of public regulatory authority which ought
to be inviolate from private influence."36 From Crouch, they "likewise
speak of a 'regulatory space' whose dimensions and occupants can be under-
stood by examining regulation in any particular national setting, and by
analysing that setting in terms of its specific political, legal, and cultural
attributes. "'
This concept of regulatory space is imagistic ("an image being used to
convey a concept"3 s) and to an extent "diffuse,"" but it has core meaning.
It is spatial in that it refers to a range of issues that the public has chosen to
subject to public decisionmaking, as the term "public space" is used by
Crouch.' The spatial image conveys the central idea concerning the role of
the private parties in the regulatory process: The regulated do not capture the
process, but compete, within the space that is the metaphor for the process,
to occupy the space. Thus, "the play of power is at the centre of this pro-
cess," and "[d]iscovering who has power in regulation involves paying close
attention to the relations between the organizations which at any one time
occupy regulatory space."41 But the "idea of space ... encourages us not
only to examine relations between those who enjoy inclusion, but also to
examine the characteristics of the excluded" because "economic regulation
* . . [is] . . . a set of power relationships dominated by large organizations
.. organized in administrative hierarchies whose method of doing business
is shaped by standard operating procedures," which "rather than individual
choice, is the dominant influence in deciding who is taken into, or kept out
of, regulatory space. "42 Fundamentally, however, the idea is driven by the
reality of economic organizations, their internal structure and culture, and
the external relations among them: "[T]he most important relationships in
economic regulation are relationships between organizations"; "the key
36. Leigh Hancher & Michael Moran, Organizing Regulatory Space, in CAPITALISM,
CULTURE AND ECONOMIC REGULATION 271, 274 (Leigh Hancher & Michael Moran eds.,
1989).
37. Id. at 277.
38. Id.
39. Ross Cranston, Book Review, 1992 PUB. LAW 173.
40. Hancher & Moran, supra note 36, at 277.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 277-78.
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matters requiring explanation - inclusion and exclusion, the relative power
of the included, the scope of regulatory issues - will be illuminated in terms
of the characteristics of the operating organizations. "43
In synthetic aspiration and value judgment ambiguity, the concept of
regulatory space in relation to interest group analysis mimes Dunning's
eclectic model in relation to premium value in multinational institutions.
The eclectic model synthesizes a value-negative model (Hymer structuralism
predicated on classical price theory) with its value-positive rejoinder
(Buckley-Casson transaction cost savings) when both predecessors show
empirical weaknesses. By combining value-negative and -positive predeces-
sors, the eclectic theory is value-ambiguous. The notion of regulatory space
synthesizes a dominant received conception, which in this case is the value-
positive predecessor (the liberal ideal of a domain of decisionmaking monop-
olized by "public" and "representative" offices) and its value-negative antith-
esis (regulatory capture), when both predecessors fail to explain the factual
milieu. The resulting pictorial concept is necessarily vague and is necessar-
ily value-ambiguous.
Nevertheless, the concept of regulatory space is both manageable and
useful. Joni Young has applied it to the accounting aspects of the thrift
crisis.' Under Young's analysis, the "story" of the role of accounting in the
crisis is "a prologue and three acts. "' The prologue concerns the early days
of the crisis when "accounting 'facts' were deployed to suggest the need for
action to assist the ailing savings and loan industry"; "a 'right' accounting
was one that was held to reveal the financial condition of both individual
organizations and the industry in order to provide 'facts' useful in regulatory
decision making. "46
The first act is the period of the thrift crisis (about 1981 to 1984 or
1985) when regulators sought "to buy time for troubled savings and loan
organizations. "' Within that time, "the [Federal Home Loan Bank Board]
altered [regulatory accounting practices] in an effort to 'conceal' the finan-
cial condition of the ... industry ...to avoid closing those thrifts that
would have required regulatory action under the old rules"; "a 'right' ac-
counting shifted from an accounting used in decisions about whether to
intervene into the operations of specific organizations to an accounting that
43. Id. at 278-79.
44. See Joni J. Young, Getting the Accounting "Right": Accounting and the Savings and
Loan Crisis, 20 ACCT., ORGANIZATIONS & SOC'Y 55 (1995).
45. Id. at 58.
46. Id.
47. Id.; see infra notes 56-74 and accompanying text.
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provided a justification for regulatory inaction." 48 The second act (roughly
1985 through 1991) involved recognition of the necessity for closing many
institutions: "ITihe definition of a 'right' accounting was changed .... A
'right' accounting was redefined as one intended once .again to reveal the
organization and to help justify assessments of organizational insolvency. 49
The final act (since about 1991) involves questions about generally accepted
accounting principles: "[A] 'right' accounting continued to be defined as one
intended to reveal the organization and to justify assessments of organiza-
tional insolvency," but "additional demands were also placed upon account-
ing practices," involving a "more expansive disciplinary role for accounting"
that would "discipline the regulator as well as the regulated entity. "50
The exegesis of the crisis in Part Il of this Article bears out this identifi-
cation of phases in the thrift crisis as it unfolded over fifteen years. This
discussion substantiates the utility of the regulatory space idea even though
the actual tactics, strategic moves, motivations, and actions of the various
parties involved are vastly more ramified, complex, interesting (and perhaps
also value-positive) than Young's picture presents. Both Hancher and
Moran and Young depart, however, from Couch's programme in describing
nationally specific and identifiable divergent patterns of "shared public
space." Appreciating the implications of the thrift crisis and the wave of
regulatory development of which it is part, however, is enriched by a return
to the Crouch hypothesis because it elucidates aspects of the question of the
fairness of congressional policy shifts at the height of the thrift crisis.
Reference to the comparative aspects of the concept of regulatory space
provides a framework for explanation of the thrift crisis and the larger
developments in banking law and regulation of which it is a part. A princi-
pal consequence of that series of developments, and to a considerable extent
a principal motivation, has been to render the American financial system
more like the system of other industrialized nations, notably Japan and
Germany. In recent years, Crouch and other Anglo-American theorists,
particularly at the wake of the end of the Cold War, have recognized that
"the obvious competitive power of the capitalisms of Germany and Japan is
not fortuitous," but "directly related to the features of the German and
Japanese political economies which the Anglo-American economic tradition
cannot encompass, and which commentators brought up in that tradition find
alien, or shocking, or both":5
48. Young, supra note 44, at 58.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Colin Crouch & David Marquand, Introduction to ETHICS AND MARKETS: CO-
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[I]t is only because that struggle [between capitalism and socialism] has
loomed so large for so long that we have failed to see that, in most other
respects, the "neo-American" and "Rhenish" models are not merely differ-
ent, but antagonistic .... The subtleties of "Rhenish" capitalism elude the
familiar categories of the mainstream Anglo-American economic
tradition.52
The dominant trends in the evolution of banking law and regulation
have involved what might be called the "Rhenification" of American bank-
ing. From early 1980 onward, the industry has been transformed. First,
interstate banking, though fully authorized by federal legislation only in
1994, became a reality by virtue of state initiatives beginning in the early
1980s.53 Second, the power of institutions to engage in nonbanking activi-
ties, particularly securities and insurance, gradually has been broadened by
regulation, though not by express congressional sanction.' Finally, the
OPERATION AND COMPETITION WITHIN CAPITALIST ECONOMIES 1 (Colin Crouch & David
Marquand eds., 1993).
52. Id.
53. Interstate banking was restricted by the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding
Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(d) (1988), which provided that no bank holding company
was permitted to acquire a bank in a state outside the holding company's home state unless
expressly permitted to do so by state law. Prior to 1972, no state enacted a law to this effect.
During the 1970s, certain states enacted laws permitting acquisitions by out-of-state holding
companies in limited circumstances, such as allowing acquisitions of failing banks or special
purpose banks. See Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Gov. of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472
U.S. 159, 163-64 (1985). In 1982, Massachusetts enacted a law permitting holding compa-
nies from other New England states to acquire Massachusetts holding companies so long as
the home state of the holding company had enacted a law that permitted acquisitions of that
state's holding companies by Massachusetts holding companies. In 1983, Connecticut passed
a similar law. The "regionality" and "reciprocity" features of these laws were upheld against
constitutional challenge in Northeast Bancorp. v. Board of Gov. of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472
U.S. at 163-64. This led to a wave of similar enactments throughout the nation. See Stanley
I. Langbein, Congress Adopts the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Act, 1 BANK
AND T m AcQUISITION UPDATE 2 (Dec. 1994). Ultimately, the Douglas Amendment was
amended by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, P.L.
No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338, to permit acquisitions by one state's banks of state bank holding
companies without regard to "region" or "reciprocity," effective in September 1995.
54. Under the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994), banking institutions may not
affiliate with companies that are "engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, pub-
lic sale, or distribution . . . of ... securities." Id. The principal legal initiative expanding
bank securities powers came when the Board interpreted this provision to permit bank holding
companies to operate so-called "section 20 subsidiaries," which are permitted to engage in
securities activities so long as their revenue from activities in which the bank itself is not
pernitted to engage is limited to five percent of gross revenue. The Board's action was upheld
in Security Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Gov. of Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.), cert.
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power of the regulators, especially the deposit insurer, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), has been expanded very significantly by
legislation that now vests truly sweeping potential power in the agency. 5
Part II of this Article explores the thrift crisis as an episode in the
Rhenification of the United States financial services sector. The dominant
consequences of the legislation of the period were two-fold. First, they
unified the depository institution industry under the umbrella of the commer-
cial banking industry; the 1989 legislation essentially spelled the beginning
of the end of the thrift industry as a separate sector dedicated to financing
housing. The essential winner was the commercial banking industry, and at
that, not the entire industry, but rather its elite or "large bank" segment.
The second dominant consequence was to create a deposit insurer with
powers that are truly extraordinary, but to date mostly latent.
Both the process and the outcome suggest cause for constitutional
vigilance. Sectors of the economy are in the process of destruction, in part
by legislative or regulatory acts, and a state agency of considerable power
is emerging. Both are "Rhenish" qualities. The effort here is not to attack
the developments or to suggest their dismantling, but to suggest ways in
which the judicial process and an emerging understanding of the Constitution
can temper the process, thereby preserving Anglo-American values in a
system that, because of economic necessity, bears properties that, at least on
their surface, exist in some tension with those values.
II. The Thrift Crisis and the Rhenification of the
United States Financial Services Sector
A. The First Thrift Crisis and the Garn-St Germain Act
1. The Road to Garn-St Germain
The thrift crisis first began to emerge in 1979. From 1966 to 1979,
interrupted by periods of wage price controls (1971-73) and recession (1969-
70 and 1974-75), the rate of inflation in the United States had accelerated,
and in response, monetary officials gradually had raised interest rates. By
denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988). The powers of bank holding company subsidiaries to engage
in insurance activities are greatly circumscribed by § 4(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act,
12 U.S.C. § 1843(8) (1994), but insurance activities of banks have been facilitated by the
banks themselves through liberal rulings of the Comptroller of the Currency, which were
involved or upheld in United States Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, 508 U.S.
439 (1993), and NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810 (1995).
55. The principal expansions of the powers of the deposit insurers were effected by the
provisions adopted under the Garn-St Germain Act, discussed at infra notes 134-64, and by
FIRREA, discussed at infra notes 222-47.
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late 1979, the federal funds rate - the rate on interbank funds lent over-
night 6 - had reached 13.25 percent.' In early 1980, the inflation rate
measured by monthly price indices spiked to an annual rate near 18 percent,
the highest in United States history. Additionally, the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (Board)58 raised interest rates to record levels,
with the federal funds rate reaching 17.61 percent in April 1980.59
56. The federal funds rate is an "intermediate" short-term interest rate, generally slightly
higher than certificate of deposit rates paid by banks and well lower than the prime rate - the
benchmark of what banks charge on loans. Typically, the funds rate is slightly higher than the
rate on short-term Treasury instruments, which tend to be slightly higher than comparable term
certificate of deposit rates. Normally, longer term instruments bear higher rates to compensate
lenders for the loss of liquidity, the heightened risk of loss over the longer term, and risks of
interest rate fluctuations. In inflationary, precontractionary periods, short-term rates may spike
to compensate for immediate term inflation, and the rates then may "invert," with short-term
rates rising above long-term rates. This occurred during the early 1980 period leading to the
recession of mid-1980.
57. See Robert J. Nash, National Association of MSBs: Legislative Changes are Required
to Meet Mortgage Money Crisis, AM. BANKER, Dec. 3, 1979, at 11.
58. The Board of Governors establishes monetary policy under the Federal Reserve Act
(Reserve Act). It is also the "appropriate federal banking agency" under the Reserve Act for
state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System. See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q) (1994).
The Comptroller of the Currency is the principal regulatory body for national banks, and the
FDIC is the principal regulatory body for state nonmember banks. The Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) is the principal regulatory agency for federally chartered thrift institutions,
and the FDIC is the principal regulatory body for insured state thrifts. Prior to FIRREA, the
principal regulatory agency for federally chartered thrifts and for insured state thrifts had been
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB or Bank Board); this body was abolished by
FIRREA. See infra note 224 and accompanying discussion.
For each of thrifts and banks, there are four major statutory enactments - one governing
chartering, another governing a system of banks providing standby credit (the Federal Reserve
Banks for commercial banks and the Federal Home Loan Banks for thrifts), a third governing
deposit insurance, and a fourth governing holding companies. Chartering banks are governed
by the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-216d (1994), enacted originally in 1863; chartering
thrifts by the Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-70 (1994), originally
adopted in 1933. The standby credit banks laws are the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 221-522 (1994), which was originally enacted in 1913, and the Federal Home Loan Bank
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-49 (1994), originally adopted in 1932. The deposit insurance law
governing both industries since FIRREA is the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA), 12
U.S.C. §§ 1811-35a (1994). From 1934 to 1989, the thrift industry deposit insurance was
governed by § 407 of the National Housing Act of 1934, Ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246, § 406. The
Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1994), was originally enacted in 1956.
The Savings and Loan Holding Company Act, which is also § 10 of HOLA, 12 U.S.C. § 1467a
(1994), dates from the Spence Act of 1959. See generally STANLEY I. LANGBEIN, TAXATION
AND REGULATION OF BANK AND THRiFr AcQUISITIONS §§ 2.03-.04, 2.07-. 12, 2.14-. 16 (1993)
(discussing evolution of federal regulation of banks and thrifts).
59. 66 FED. Ros. BULL., June 1980, at A27.
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The high interest rates squeezed thrift profits principally because thrift
operations at the time consisted largely of borrowing through deposits,
which are short-term investments and at the time were subject to interest rate
ceilings,' and because lending on residential real estate mortgages, which
at the time were primarily fixed rate mortgages, was lent out at historic rates
that were far lower than those prevailing after the 1979-80 interest rate run-
up. Aggravating the situation was the rapid expansion during the period of
the "money market certificate," offered by securities firms, which permitted
retail investors who otherwise might deposit funds in community institutions
to earn a prevailing market rate of return, coupled with check-writing privi-
leges, free of deposit interest ceilings.6
By late 1979, officials of thrift industry groups, particularly those of
mutual savings banks concentrated in the Northeast, and particularly New
York, were decrying the situation: "[Thrift institutions, the major suppliers
of mortgage credit, simply cannot compete against the rates that are available
to the public in the money market. "62 The industry proposed two legislative
solutions. First, in late 1979, a proposal began to surface that would have
made interest on thrift deposits tax exempt.63 That proposal was justified on
the grounds that it directed funds to a troubled mortgage market. Second,
a proposal emerged to have the federal government buy the low-rate fixed
mortgages held on thrift books at face value, which in effect would have
compensated the thrifts for the interest rate-related losses on their portfo-
lios.'
60. Deposit rate limitations were imposed on financial institutions under 12 U.S.C.
§ 371a (1976), as in effect prior to the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.), and the Board's Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. § 217 (1980). Thrift
institutions were permitted to charge interest rates one-half percentage point higher than those
banks were permitted to charge under these ceilings prior to the adoption of the 1980 statute.
61. By late 1979, money market certificate investments had reached $179 billion,
roughly 23% of total thrift deposits, which at the time amounted to about $780 billion. See
Gordon Matthews, Outlook Glum for Thrifts in East, AM. BANKER, Oct. 12, 1979, at 11.
62. Nash, supra note 57, at 11.
63. See id.
64. See Paul S. Nader, Now Is the Time for Compassion by Regulators of Banks and
Thrifts, AM. BANKER, Feb. 9, 1981, at 4; James Rubenstein, Thrifts Faulted on Bailout Plea,
AM. BANKER, Mar. 13, 1981, at 28. There also were abundant proposals for modifying
accounting standards applicable to thrifts and for relaxing capital standards imposed on thrifts
during what was perceived to be a temporary critical period. See Paul Horvitz, 'Problem'
of Thrifts Can be Solved by Creative Accounting, AM. BANKER, Apr. 20, 1981, at 4; Robert
J. Lipshutz, Sophistication, Creativity, Boldness Needed to Rescue Thrifts; Liquidity, Net
Worth Seen As Areas of Prime Concern, AM. BANKER, Nov. 10, 1981, at 14; Nader, supra,
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In 1980, the Republican Party gained control of the Presidency through
the election of President Reagan and also gained control of the Senate for the
first time in twenty-six years. Elected on an express policy of promoting
"free market" economics, a promise of a general and substantial reduction
in personal tax rates, and a promise of an increase in allowances against
corporate taxes, the new Administration was not interested in subsidies of
the kind embodied in the thrift industry proposals, whether through the tax
system or through portfolio purchases. Nor was support for the proposals
forthcoming from either house of Congress.
In the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980 (DIDAMCA),65 however, Congress did enact a virtual repeal of the
Regulation Q ceilings that had restricted the rates which could be paid on
depository institution deposits.' That enactment relieved some of the pres-
sure from the outflow of funds to money market certificates. Meanwhile,
the sharp increase in interest rates in 1980 induced a sharp though brief
recession in early 1980 that was followed by a weak recovery. Interest rates
declined after the recession, but not to their pre-1980 levels.67 The Reagan
administration's first major initiative after taking office was to ensure the
enactment of its tax reduction program, which was achieved in the Economic
at 6; The Outlook for S&Ls: An Agenda for the Industry, AM. BANKER, Apr. 9, 1981, at 4;
Rubenstein, supra, at 28. The warehousing proposal, or a modification involving the swap
of mortgages for higher yielding government paper, did receive some study from then
freshman Senator D'Amato. See Lisa J. McCue, D'Amato Studies Paper Swap for Troubled
Thrifts, AM. BANKER, Apr. 10, 1981, at 2.
65. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
66. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-221, §§ 202-05, 94 Stat. 132, 142-43 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.). DIDAMCA transferred the power to control rates from the Federal Reserve
Board, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and the FDIC to a Deregulation Committee
comprised of the Treasury Secretary, the chairs of the Bank Board, the Board, the FDIC, and
the National Credit Union Administration Board, with the Comptroller serving as a nonvoting
member. Id. § 203(a). The Deregulation Committee was directed to phase out all interest
rate ceilings within six years, with increases of at least one-quarter point in the ceiling to be
effected within eighteen months, and an additional half-point at the ends of each of the third,
fourth, and fifth years following the date of enactment. Id. § 205(a).
67. Thefederal funds rate, which had been 11.19% on average during 1979 and 7.93%
in 1978, peaked at 19.08% in January 1981 then declined to 16.28% in May 1981, 67 FED.
Ras. BULL., May 1981, at A25, and 12.42% in late November 1981. 67 FED. Ras. BULL.,
Dec. 1981, at A27. In late 1982, nearing the end of a long recession, the rate was still
8.91%. 68 FED. RES. BULL., Dec. 1982, at A28. In 1983, with the economy resuming
growth, interest rates turned up again. The federal funds rate did not return to its average
1978 rate in any year until 1990.
THE THRIFT CRISIS AND THE CONSTITUTION
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA). 68  But that enactment created what
Keynesian economists call the "structural" budget deficit, 69 which has per-
sisted ever since. The presence of the deficit made the enactment of any-
thing like the industry's initial proposals - tax-exempt interest on thrift
deposits or purchase of the depreciated mortgage pools - still more politi-
cally unpalatable.
Compounding the difficulty was the fact that relative novices came to
the chairmanships of the congressional banking committees after the 1980
election. For a substantial time prior to 1980, the committee had been
chaired by two Wisconsin Democrats, both identified as progressives with
some ties to community banking interests, but who were generally regarded
as hostile to the Federal Reserve and to money-center institutions. In the
Senate, Senator Proxmire lost the chairmanship because of the Republican
takeover of the Senate. The chairmanship devolved upon Senator Jake Gain
of Utah, a conservative who was something of a mystery to the industry. In
the House, Congressman Reuss resigned the chairmanship to accept leader-
ship of another committee and was succeeded by Representative Ferdinand
St Germaine of Rhode Island, who had been and remained relatively hostile
to industry interests.
In its early mode, the Reagan administration showed little interest in the
emerging thrift crisis. The response to the crisis was aggravated by the
relative secrecy of the bank examination process,70 which meant that little
68. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
69. The "structural" deficit is contrasted to the Keynesian "full employment" deficit;
the latter is defined as the difference between government revenues actually collected and
those that would be collected were the economy operating at "full employment." The full
employment deficit was taken by Keynesian orthodoxy to measure the appropriate amount of
stimulus needed to move the economy from underemployment to full employment. The
deficits run by Democratic administrations and Congresses from the early 1960s through the
early 1980s tended to be limited to the full employment deficits. Those larger deficits that
ensued after ERTA have exceeded the measured full employment deficit in all fiscal years
since fiscal 1982, the first following the enactment of ERTA. See generally JOSEPH PECH-
MAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY (5th ed. 1987).
70. Bank examinations are protected from public disclosure by exemption (8) of the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (1994), and in the civil discovery process
by a vaguely defined "bank examination" privilege apparently mandated by agency regula-
tion. See 12 C.F.R. § 261.2(b) (1995); see also Schreiber v. Society for Say. Bancorp, Inc.,
11 F.3d 217, 220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (demonstrating application of bank examination
privilege); In re Subpoena Served Upon Comptroller of Currency, 967 F.2d 630, 633-36
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (discussing bank examination privilege). In recent litigation by Procter &
Gamble against Bankers Trust concerning the latter's management of the former's derivatives
holdings, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit refused to apply the bank examination
privilege. See In re Bankers Trust Co., 61 F.3d 465, 471-72 (6th Cir. 1995). The decision
53 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 159 (1996)
information was available to the public, or to Congress, concerning the
developing difficulties of the thrifts. Moreover, the overriding concern was
to prevent an earnings crisis from becoming a liquidity crisis,7 which could
have occurred if public confidence in the institutions were threatened; thus,
regulators and congressmen alike were reluctant to highlight the information
that was public. At a minimum, however, the regulators did understand that
a problem was emerging. By June 1981, the number of problem institutions
had risen to 265 from 120 a year earlier.7' Throughout the period, the
industry continued to advocate solutions in the form of a tax exemption for
savers or the warehousing of below-market mortgages with the federal gov-
ernment.73 Neither Congress nor the President set forth any concrete pro-
posals. 74
In the spring of 1981, however, the federal regulatory officials -
including primarily the Bank Board, which governed the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), the insurer of most thrifts, the FDIC,
which insured state mutual savings banks, and the Federal Reserve -
brought forth proposals that recognized the budgetary constraints and the
shyness about publicizing the issues, but at the same time acknowledged the
imminence and seriousness of the problem.75 These proposals came to be
known as the "regulators' bill" and ultimately were adopted into law as part
of the Garn-St Germain Act, or the Depository Institutions Act of 1982.76
The regulators' bill provided for the expansion of the regulatory agencies'
powers to assist institutions by keeping them open.' The most important of
represents a recent instance of emerging judicial hostility to the bank regulatory agencies and
the expansion of their powers in the last two decades. See supra notes 14-18 and accompany-
ing text (discussing other judicial responses to banking regulators).
71. See Phil Battey, Thrifts Seen Facing Troubles Even If Inflation Rate Drops: Former
FHLBB Chairman Says Key Issue Is Keeping Earnings Problem from Becoming Liquidity
Crunch, AM. BANKER, May 20, 1981, at 3 (reporting speech of Garth Marston); Joseph D.
Hutnyan, Thrifts Find that Government Rescue Is Traumatic Affair, AM. BANKER, Apr. 2,
1982, at 4; Pratt: No S&L Liquidity Crisis, AM. BANKER, May 29, 1981, at 1, 20 (reporting
speech of FHLBB Chairman Richard Pratt).
72. See Lisa J. McCue, New Insurance Basis Weighted for S&Ls, AM. BANKER, June
12, 1981, at 1.
73. See Rubenstein, supra note 64, at 28.
74. See James Rubenstein, Treasury Aid Says S&Ls Will Survive Crunch, AM. BANKER,
May 15, 1981, at 3 (reporting statements of Deputy Treasury Secretary McNamara).
75. See Jay Rosenstein, Regulators Revise Crisis Merger Legislation, AM. BANKER,
May 27, 1981, at 1 (discussing proposed legislation regarding emergency acquisitions).
76. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
77. See Rosenstein, supra note 75, at 36.
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these measures would have involved merging ailing institutions with healthy
institutions, including "interindustry" mergers (between thrifts and banks or
bank-holding companies) and "interstate" mergers.7" In addition, the mea-
sure expanded regulatory authority to assist institutions without closing them
through "open bank assistance," which involved a variety of transactions
with institutions whereby assistance could be provided through favorable
transaction terms and through assisted acquisitions by healthy institutions.79
Finally, the provision expanded the powers of federal savings banks (first
authorized in 1978) and liberalized provisions by which state mutual savings
banks could convert to federal charters and then, having so converted, could
convert to stock form (thus converting the premium value of the institution
into tangible capital).'
The most significant elements of the package were the proposals for
merging ailing institutions into healthy ones, and the most significant ele-
ment of these were proposals for interstate and interindustry acquisitions.81
These proposals were significant because they touched upon initiatives to
deregulate and strengthen the depository institution industry that had been
advanced even prior to, and were advanced apart from, the thrift industry
problem.' These proposals called for three principal sets of reforms. The
first was the elimination of legal barriers to the affiliation of commercial
banking entities with entities providing other forms of financial services,
principally investment banking, securities advisory, and brokerage serv-
ices. 3 The second called for the removal of barriers to interstate expansion
by depository institutions.' The third called for the elimination of differ-
ences between different types of depository institutions. Principally, this
meant that the thrifts had to confine their activity primarily to residential real
estate lending." The regulators' bill called for emergency acquisition au-
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Jay Rosenstein, Volcker Presses for Interstate, Interindustry Acquisitions; Warns
Congress that Authority Is Needed to Act on Troubled Thrifts, AM. BANKER, Oct. 2, 1981, at
3.
82. See Lisa J. McCue, Congress Moves on 2 Banking Bill Fronts, AM. BANKER, Dec.
11, 1981, at 3; Sam Scott Miller, Financial Markets and Deregulation, AM. BANKER, Jan. 4,
1982, at 4 (describing proposals for remodeling regulatory structure). See generally JAMEs L.
PIERCE, FINANCIAL INSTIUTIONS AND THE NATION'S ECONOMY (1975).
83. Congress traditionally had been hostile to bank-thrift combinations. See Gordon
Matthews, Bank-Thrift Mergers Seen Imminent, AM. BANKER, Jan. 23, 1981, at 1.
84. See Rosenstein, supra note 75, at 36.
85. See generally Cabinet Panel to Discuss Thrift Aid, AM. BANKER, May 21, 1981, at
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thority that allowed either interstate or interindustry acquisition; this pro-
vided a beginning for progress on the second and third of the three initia-
tives, which had been urged - at the time for more than a decade - as a
means of modernizing, rationalizing, and deregulating the financial services
industry generally.
When first advanced by the regulators in the spring of 1981, the regula-
tors' bill received an icy reception. The Reagan administration, preoccupied
with the tax program then advancing in Congress, showed no interest in the
proposal and refused to support it.86 The thrift industry, still pressing for
more straightforward relief efforts and suspicious, if not hostile to the emer-
gency acquisition provisions that would lead to commercial bank incursion
on the domain of the thrifts, opposed the measure.' The commercial bank-
ing industry was attracted by the emergency acquisition features of the pro-
posal, but did not actively seek to advance it largely because of the banking
industry's shyness about open conflicts with the thrift industry.8 8 By mid-
June 1981, the regulators' bill appeared to be going nowhere. 89
86. See Joseph D. Hutnyan, Desertions on Rescue Bill Question Validity of Thrift Crisis,
AM. BANKER, June 5, 1981, at 4.
87. See id. (stating that "the United States League of Savings Associations - the nation's
largest S&L trade group - denounced the bill as a devious move to encourage commercial
banks to pick off S&Ls").
88. The commercial banking industry spent the summer fighting efforts by the thrift
industry to restore the interest rate differential of one-quarter of one percent that thrifts were
permitted to pay on deposits before the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee. See
Karen Slater, US Savings League Threatens to Sue Over Deregulation Actions; Charges Deci-
sions Exceeded Congressional Mandate, AM. BANKER, June 29, 1981, at 1, 16. Senator Gan,
the Banking Committee Chairman, later would publicly upbraid banking industry representatives
for "'bitch[ing] about' the need for new competitive tools," saying that "'selfishness' and
'greed' among the special interest groups has kept Congress from acting" and that banking
industry representatives "gave the impression that banks were 'scared to death of a crippled
thrift institutions industry' but not about their non-depository competitors, such as securities
firms and large retailers," adding that "unless the bankers were willing to make compromises,
'we're not going to have a bill and the non-depository institutions will roll merrily along, taking
all of your money away.'" Jay Rosenstein, Garn Tells Commercial Banks to Quit Griping About
Thrifts, AM. BANKER, Oct. 21, 1981, at 1. The passage is the beginning of an effort that
Senator Gam made over five or six years to secure a united front among depository institutions
in advancing deregulation legislation; the effort bore little fruit. The commercial banking
industry seems to have been the wiser. Eventually, the decentralized nondepository rivals, other
than the insurance industry, failed to prevail in protecting itself, faltering largely as a result of
the 1987 Competitive Equality Banking Act legislation and the initiatives of the bank regulators,
which were upheld by the courts. The thrifts were more formidable legislative rivals and were
felled only by the 1989 legislation, which was enacted really only after the underlying econom-
ics of the thrift industry had all but ensured the industry's ultimate evisceration.
89. See Hutnyan, supra note 86, at 4.
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But the accelerating rate of failures in the industry continued to trouble
the regulators and began to concern the banking committees. By late sum-
mer 1981, the tax bill had been passed, the industry's troubles were continu-
ing to multiply, and the regulators, this time with Representative St Ger-
maine's support, revived the drive for the measure.' To mollify the thrift
industry, however, and perhaps as well to detract from the tendency of the
measure to benefit (or encourage) the commercial banking industry, a third
major feature was added to the initiative as it emerged in the late summer
and early fall of 1981. This proposal quite significantly expanded the invest-
ment and activity authority of thrifts to make them more like commercial
banks and, in some respects, conferred powers upon them beyond those
granted to commercial banks. 9' The thrift industry supported this feature of
the proposal, but the commercial banking industry opposed it.' In October
1981, the House adopted a measure incorporating the regulators' bill, pro-
viding for emergency acquisitions and open bank assistance, but without
adding thrift powers.93 Late in the year, Senator Garn publicly admonished
the representatives of the various factions of the depository institutions in-
dustry to agree among themselves on measures for congressional adoption.'
90. See Joseph D. Humyan, Congressional Support Seems to Grow for Crisis Mergers,
AM. BANKER, Oct. 1, 1981, at 1; Jay Rosenstein, Move Is On to Revive Bank and Thrift Aid,
AM. BANKER, Aug. 3, 1981, at 6.
91. See Joseph D. Hutnyan, Two "Thrift' Bills Likely to Dominate Washington, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 28, 1981, at 4. The proposal was sponsored by the FHLBB, apparently
without support from the other regulatory agencies, but it won early Treasury backing at a
time when the Treasury continued to refuse to support the emergency combination bill on the
ground that it was a disguised federal subsidy. Id.
92. See id. (stating that "[blank lobbies are sure to blast any move to strengthen their
competitors"). Throughout most of the period that the legislation was considered, it included
provisions to broaden bank powers to underwrite municipal revenue bonds, as well as other
expansions of bank powers. This secured the support of most of the banking industry,
although the Independent Bankers Association of America (IBAA) opposed the legislation
throughout because of its opposition to the expansion of thrift powers. See Jay Rosenstein,
Lobbies Bid Congress Give Wider Powers, AM. BANKER, June 10, 1982, at 1. In the end,
the Senate version of the bill took away most of what the commercial banking industry had
sought. See Joseph D. Hutnyan, Heinz Version of Banking Bill Seems Near to Gaining Favor,
AM. BANKER, Aug. 19, 1982, at 1. The industry made a last ditch effort to kill the entire bill
after the Senate eliminated any expansion of its powers. See Joseph D. Hutnyan, Irate,
Frustrated Bankers Lashing Out at Garn Bill, AM. BANKER, Sept. 10, 1982, at 4.
93. See Jay Rosenstein, Emergency Bank Aid Likely to Pass Congress This Year, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 9, 1981, at 1. By December, Rep. St Germain had begun hearings on
expanded thrift powers, with indications that he might support them. Meanwhile, Senator
Garn had promised a vote on them by February. See McCue, supra note 82, at 3.
94. See Joseph D. Hutnyan, Garn Puts Onus on Lobbies for Consensus Bill, AM.
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The Reagan administration remained neutral throughout late 1981, explicitly
refusing to oppose the regulators' bill.9'
Meanwhile, known mostly to the regulators, the crisis was worsening.'
While Congress was considering the regulators' bill, the Board and FHLBB
took unilateral steps to prod elements of Congress into adopting the emer-
gency acquisition features.' Much of the reluctance to adopt the provision
stemmed from the powers of the state governments and from congres-
sional protectiveness of the thrift industry, many of the members of which
were prominent in their local communities and had ties to members of the
BANKER, Nov. 20, 1981, at 4; Rosenstein, supra note 88, at 1.
95. See Hutnyan, supra note 91, at 4; Rosenstein, supra note 90, at 6; State Groups
Fight Crisis Merger Bill, AM. BANKER, Oct. 28, 1981, at 15 [hereinafter State Groups Fight].
96. See Jay Rosenstein, House Committee Delays Vote on Thrift Emergency Bill;
Skeptical Members Say Regulators Have Yet to Make Their Case for It, AM. BANKER, Oct.
3, 1981, at 3 (Rep. Stephen Neal asked Banking Committee Chairman St Germain "whether
there was a crisis that required the committee to act quickly"; "Mr. St Germain responded,
'If the chair didn't feel there were some imminent situations out there, the chair would not
have convened this'"; when asked for more details by Mr. Neal, Mr. St Germain said, "I
would suggest you check with some of the regulators"). The exchange reveals the limited
information that was available even then to members of Congress. Rep. Neal ordinarily was
sensitive to the concerns of the banking industry, particularly the "regional" banks, some of
which stood to benefit from, though they were not then supporting, the acquisition provisions
of the regulators' bill.
97. See Karen Slater, Mutuals Ask for Capital Aid; FDIC Resisting Action, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 14, 1981, at 1 (reporting FDIC resistance to requests from state savings banks
for capital assistance leading to "suggestions that the FDIC is attempting to use a hard-line
position on capital aid as leverage to win Congressional approval for interstate and interindus-
try takeovers of troubled institutions as well as for broader capital infusion powers"); Regula-
tors Sketch Thrift-Takeover Options; Rescues Could Take Form of New Limited Banks,
StraightAsset Sales, AM. BANKER, Oct. 28, 1982, at 1; Rosenstein, supra note 81, at 3. By
spring 1982, the Bank Board was frequently effecting forced mergers prior to the adoption
of the final Garn-St Germain legislation. See Joseph D. Hutnyan, Thrifts Find that Govern-
ment Rescue Is Traumatic Affair, AM. BANKER, Apr. 2, 1982, at 4. There were complaints
from the industry that the FHLBB and FSLIC might have "been acting in a 'high handed'
manner during supervisory merger transactions," and that regulators had been "'a little too
creative' in their attempts to find ways to deal with the record number of troubled associations
that demand[ed] their attention." Thrift Industry Exults at Humbling of Regulators: See
Courts Precluding Any More Fidelity Cases, AM. BANKER, June 11, 1982, at 3. At the time,
the Board frequently effected "phoenix" transactions, where a number of troubled institutions
were combined into a single institution that would rise like the mythical bird from the rubble
of its constituent parts. See Laura L. Mulcahy, NJ Commissioner to Propose Plan to Cover
Disposition ofAiling Thrifts: Application to Troubled Suburban S&L Said Coincidental, AM.
BANKER, July 13, 1982, at 3. This practice was largely discontinued after Garn-St Germain,
subject to a brief revival in 1988 in connection with widespread failures in Texas. See infra
note 204 and accompanying discussion.
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House.9" Under the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA), the Board could
approve the acquisition by a company controlling a bank of a company
engaged in an activity "so closely related to banking as to be a proper inci-
dent thereto."99 The Board historically had left open the question whether
the operation of a thrift could be held to constitute an activity "closely
related to banking." In 1982, during the pendency of the regulators' bill, the
Board and FHLBB approved Citicorp's acquisition of Fidelity Savings &
Loan Association of San Francisco, a solvent thrift. In doing so, the Board
held that the operation of the thrift was "closely related" to banking."°
Additionally, the Chairman of the Board testified that the Board would
consider generally permitting bank holding company acquisitions of thrifts
if Congress did not act on the emergency acquisitions bill. The Chairman
also noted that the Board's policy would permit acquisitions of healthy, as
much as ailing, thrifts."°'
In February 1982, as the House was considering the expansion of thrift
powers advocated by the Administration and the Senate, proposals for more
direct aid to the thrift industry resurfaced. Estimates began to surface
suggesting that between $30 billion and $120 billion eventually would be
needed to resolve the crisis." The liberal Brookings Institution published
a study saying that as many as 1000 thrifts (twenty-five percent of the total)
were in danger of failing. 03 The industry, this time joined by Representative
St Germain, advanced a proposal for government loans to thrifts that would
have permitted the institutions to borrow from the government to maintain
their capital at two percent of assets."° The subsidy plans, however, having
98. When the regulators' bill was reported by the House Committee and came up for
consideration by the full House, the principal opposition came from the National Association
of Savings and Loan Supervisors and the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, which
represented the bank and thrift regulatory officials of the states. See State Groups Fight,
supra note 95, at 1, 15.
99. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994).
100. Citicorp, 68 FED. REs. BULL. 656 (1982). The approval was invalidated by a
federal district court, but was reinstated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme
Court denied certiorari. See Fidelity Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd.,
540 F. Supp. 1374 (N.D. Cal.), rev'd, 689 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
914 (1983).
101. See Rosenstein, supra note 81, at 3.
102. Karen Slater, Two-Thirds of Thrifts Forecast to Need US Aid by 1990, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 30, 1981, at 3 (reporting estimates by Richard W. Kopcke, vice president and
economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston).
103. Linda W. McCormick, Pressure for Federal Aid to Thrifts Grows, AM. BANKER,
Feb. 23, 1982, at 1.
104. See Joseph D. Hutnyan, Thrift Rescue Plans Getting Serious, AM. BANKER, Feb.
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immediate budgetary impact, encountered difficulty. Ultimately, Represen-
tative St Germain had to content himself with proposals for "capital certifi-
cates," under which the government issued promissory notes to the thrifts to
maintain capital at two percent, and the notes had to be paid only upon the
failure of the institution. 105
In April, the Administration abandoned neutrality and endorsed the
regulators' bill, subject to a priority system that favored intrastate intra-
industry mergers over interindustry mergers, intrastate interindustry mergers
over interstate intraindustry mergers, and interstate intraindustry mergers
over interstate interindustry mergers.'I The Administration also endorsed
the modified bailout capital certificates program. " In October, the measure
was adopted as the Depository Institutions Act of 1982.108 It commonly has
been known as the Gan-St Germain Act.
2. Garn-St Gennain
Because of their role in the management of the thrift crisis not only
prior to FIRREA, but beyond, and because the provisions of the regulators'
bill in particular mark the beginning of a vast expansion of regulatory au-
thority, particularly on the part of the deposit insurers, the provisions of
Gain-St Germain that formed the tripartite approach to the "first" crisis are
worth describing in slight detail. As noted, each of the three major prescrip-
tions for the ills of the industry derived from a different source: the regula-
12, 1982, at 1; McCormick, supra note 103, at 1. The thrift assistance plans were "inspired
by the Democrats ... to use the crisis to embarrass the White House." Joseph D. Hutnyan,
Rescue the Thrifts and You Question Reaganomics, AM. BANKER, Feb. 26, 1982, at 4. The
plans were supported by the thrift industry and FHLBB, but the Board remained neutral,
though critical. See Linda W. McCormick, Volcker Says No to Thrift Bailout, AM. BANKER,
Feb. 24, 1982, at 1; Volcker Stand on Thrift Aid Clarified, AM. BANKER, Mar. 2, 1982, at
3. Consumer interests opposed the bailout plans unless the thrift powers expansion plans
were scaled back. See Lisa J. McCue, Consumer Groups Say Aid to Thrifts Should Be Tied
to Their Continued Role as Mortgage Lenders, AM. BANKER, Mar. 22, 1982, at 2.
105. See Joseph D. Hutnyan, Thrift Aid Plans Will Have to Go Back to the Drawing
Board, AM. BANKER, Mar. 12, 1982, at 5. In early May, the Administration and Senator
Gan endorsed the more limited capital certificate program. See Joseph D. Hutnyan, Thrifts'
Plea to White House: Stay Out of the Battle, AM. BANKER, Apr. 30, 1982, at 4; Lisa J.
McCue & Linda W. McCormick, Certificate Aid to Thrifts Gains at Capitol as Garn Reverses
Stand, AM. BANKER, May 5, 1982, at 1. The ABA supported the more limited guarantee
program. As passed by the House, the guarantee was limited to $8.5 billion.
106. See Lisa J. McCue, Reagan Council Endorses Aids to Thrifts but Bars Direct
Bailout, AM. BANKER, Apr. 27, 1982, at 1.
107. See id.
108. P.L. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
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tots qua regulators (not as officials of any political administration) advanced
the regulators' bill; the Democratic majority in the House supported the
capital certificate program; and the Republican administration promoted the
liberalization of thrift powers.
a. Legislation Prior to Garn-St Germain Adumbrating the Regulators'
Bill and the Expansion of Thrift Powers. In its original form, the deposit
insurance law gave the insurer primitive and cumbersome powers both in
paying of insurance and in protecting the insurance fund by supervising
weakening institutions. The original provisions were adopted as Section 8
of the Banking Act of 1933, '" which added Section 12B to the Federal
Reserve Act."1 Under that law, if a bank were closed because it became
unable to meet the demands of depositors, the Comptroller was to appoint
the FDIC as the receiver of any national bank, and any state authority was
permitted to appoint the FDIC as the receiver of any state bank."' The
FDIC was to form a "new bank.""' The new bank was to issue stock as
soon as the FDIC deemed desirable, and if stock could not be sold, then the
FDIC was to transfer the bank to another institution. If no such institution
could be found, the bank's affairs were to be wound up and liquidated." 3
The provisions were amplified a couple of years later by the Banking Act of
1935 (1935 Act),114 which authorized transactions between the FDIC and
closed banks, including sales and pledges of bank assets to the FDIC in
exchange for cash or loans, guarantees to an acquiring bank against losses
on assets of a closed or open bank acquired by the beneficiary bank, mergers
and consolidations of insured banks with other insured banks, or transactions
by which an insured bank would acquire the assets and assume the liabilities
of another insured bank."5 In addition, the 1935 Act provided that the FDIC
109. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162. The provisions of the deposit insurance law originally were
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 364 (Supp. VII 1934). They were transferred to the separate Federal
Deposit Insurance Act by Act of Aug. 17, 1950, ch. 729 §§ 5-7, 64 Stat. 457. See LANG-
BEIN, supra note 58, § 2.07 & n.71 (discussing Banking Act of 1933). The FDIA is current-
ly codified at 12 U.S.C. § 181 1-35a (1994). See also supra note 58 and accompanying text.
110. 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522 (1994).
111. See LANGBEIN, supra note 58, § 2.07 (discussing creation of Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation).
112. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(m) (1994) (current descendant of "new bank" provision).
113. See LANGBEiN, supra note 58, § 2.07 (discussing FDIC's obligations under Banking
Act of 1933).
114. Law of Aug. 23, 1935, ch. 614, 49 Stat. 684.
115. See Federal Reserve Act § 12B0)(9), (u)(4), as in effect after the enactment of the
Banking Act of 1935. These provisions survive today as 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)-(d) (1994), as
modified principally by the open bank assistance provisions of Garn-St Germain and the
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could terminate an institution's insurance if it found the institution was
engaged in unsafe or unsound practices." 6 The 1934 National Housing Act
legislation governing insurance of thrift institutions largely paralleled those
provisions,17 though the statutory language was sparser, leaving greater
room for administrative amplification - a circumstance that was characteris-
tic of the federal thrift legislation of the 1930s.18
The decades-long expansion of the power of the deposit insurers began
with the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 (FISA)," 9 a product
of the liberal activist 89th Congress. The motivation for that statute was the
cumbersomeness of the tools under the original laws: The deposit insurers
could terminate insurance or could seek to have the chartering body (which
in the case of federal thrifts was the same body as the insurer) throw the
institution into receivership or conservatorship."2 FISA for the first time
gave the deposit insurers authority to issue "cease and desist" orders for
violations of law, agency rules, or unsafe or unsound practices.' 2 1 It con-
ferred authority for removal or suspension of officers, directors, or others
"participating in the affairs" of an institution l" and spelled out expansive
grounds for the appointment of receivers for federal institutions." FISA
amended the provisions of the National Housing Act and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act in parallel fashion. FISA thus marks the beginning of the long
process of combining the laws governing bank and thrift insurance, which
amendments to those provisions enacted by subsequent legislation, principally FIRREA. See
LANGBEIN, supra note 58, § 2.08 (discussing Banking Act of 1935 and its effect on FDIC).
See generally STEPHEN K. HUBER, BANK OFFIcER's HANDBOOK OF GOVERNMENT REGULA-
TION 1-15 (2d ed. 1989) (giving historical overview of banking in United States).
116. See Federal Reserve Act § 12(i)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 264(i)(1) (1994), as enacted by Act
of Aug. 23, 1935, ch. 614, 49 Stat. 684, 690.
117. Law of June 27, 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 § 406(a)-(c).
118. See LANGBEIN, supra note 58, § 2.12 (discussing National Housing Act of 1934).
119. Pub. L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat. 1028.
120. National Housing Act of 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246, §§ 406(a), 407(a).
121. Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 [hereinafter FISA], Pub. L. No. 89-
695, sec. 101(a), § 5(d)(2)-(3), 80 Stat. 1028, 1028-29 (codified as extensively amended at
12 U.S.C. § 1818()-(d) (1994)). See LANOBEIN, supra note 58, § 2.18 (discussing pre-FISA
period and changes made by FISA).
122. FISA, Pub. L. No. 89-695, sec. 101(a), § 5(d)(4)-(5), 80 Stat. 1028, 1030-32
(codified as extensively amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)-(g) (1994)). See LANGBEIN, supra
note 58, § 2.18 (discussing new powers conferred by FISA).
123. FISA, Pub. L. No. 89-695, sec. 101(a), § 5(d)(6), 80 Stat. 1028, 1032-33 (codified
as extensively amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2) (1994)). See LANGBEIN, supra note 58,
§ 2.18 (discussing FISA power to appoint receiver).
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culminated as a legal matter in FIRREA and which is now in the process of
being culminated as a financial matter. 24
The germ of the 1982 approach actually was born in 1978 legislation -
the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978
(FIRIRCA).'" FIRIRCA effected the first expansion of thrift powers.
Under the Home Owner's Loan Act (IOLA), as enacted in 1933, federally
chartered thrifts could hold first lien mortgages on residences, or combined
residences and businesses within a defined radius of the thrift's location,
subject to maximum amount limitations, and also could hold stock in federal
home loan banks. The 1978 legislation expanded thrift powers to make
"residential" investments include property up to $60,000 in value within a
100-mile radius of the thrift office, government-insured and quasi-govern-
mental securities (such as obligations of the Federal National Mortgage
Association or those guaranteed by the Government National Mortgage
Association), and bank obligations."2 The 1978 legislation also permitted
up to thirty percent of the thrifts assets to be invested in nonhousing related
items - up to twenty percent in commercial real estate loans, five percent
in construction loans and certain other items, and five percent in revenue
bonds of states and municipalities." z The statute extended the 1935 Banking
Act provisions allowing loans, sales, and pledges of assets between the
deposit insurer, the insured institution, and the thrift industry and, for the
first time, extended purchase and assumption authority, though limited to
cases where an institution was in default or danger of default."
Finally, the statute provided, for the first time, for federally chartered
savings banks. 29 At the time, seventeen states provided for chartering
124. FIR.EA made both industries subject to the FDIA and made the FDIC the insurer of
both industries. But the premiums paid by the industries are determined separately and paid into
separate funds - the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) for commercial banks and the Savings Associa-
tion Insurance Fund (SAIF) for thrifts. A provision combining the funds was included in H.R.
2491, the omnibus budget reconciliation measure passed by Congress but vetoed by President
Clinton in 1995.
125. Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641.
126. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 [hereinafter
FIRIRCA], Pub. L. No. 95-630, see. 1701, § 5(c)(1), 92 Stat. 3641, 3714-16 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1) (1994)).
127. Id. See LANGBEIN, supra note 58, § 2.24 (discussing expansion of thrift investment
powers under FIRRCA).
128. FIRIRCA, Pub. L. No. 95-630, see. 105(b)(2), § 406(t), 92 Stat. 3641, 3647 (codi-
fied at 12 U.S.C. § 1729(f) (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989)).
See LANGBIN, supra note 58, § 2.22 (noting that FDIC had purchase and assumption authority
from beginning, but that FSLIC did not until FIRIRCA).
129. FIRIRCA, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. XII, 92 Stat. 3641, 3710-12 (codified as
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savings banks; the 1978 legislation did not allow the chartering of new
federal savings banks, but allowed only the conversion of state mutual
savings banks to federal mutual savings banks. 30 The motivation for this
provision was to permit savings banks, which were then insured by the
FDIC and are still insured as banks, to secure FSLIC insurance, which at the
time bore a lower premium. Upon conversion to federal charters, these
banks switched insurers and became insured by the FSLIC. This statute also
authorized the imposition of cease and desist orders against officers, direc-
tors, and other persons "participating in the affairs" of an institution and
authorized the imposition of civil money penalties by the deposit insurers for
the first time.'
In 1980, DIDAMCA expanded the range of loans that thrifts were
permitted to make to include consumer loans, up to twenty percent of
assets. 32 Together with the twenty percent permitted by the 1978 legisla-
tion,'33 this meant that the aggregate of construction loans, commercial
loans, consumer loans, and revenue bond investments that thrifts could
make, even prior to Garn-St Germain, equaled forty percent of the thrift's
assets.
b. The Regulators' Bill. The regulators' bill comprised three principal
initiatives: provisions for open bank assistance,'I 4 provisions for emergency
acquisitions," and provisions for mutual-to-stock and "supervisory" conver-
sions of thrifts. 36
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1462(d), 1464(a), 1464(i), 1726(a), 1831(c) (1988), repealed by
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989)). For current corresponding provisions, see 12
U.S.C. §§ 1462(4), 1464(a),(i) (1994).
130. FIRIRCA, Pub. L. No. 95-630, see. 1202, § 5(a), 92 Stat. 3641, 3710-11 (codified
as re-enacted and amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(i) (1994)).
131. FIRIRCA, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. I, 92 Stat. 3641, 3641-72 (codified'as amended
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(u), 1818(b),(e),(i) (1994)).
132. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-221, § 401, 94 Stat. 132, 145 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(B)).
133. FIRIRCA, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1701, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1464(c)(2)(A)).
134. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 [hereinafter Garn-St Ger-
main], Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 111, 96 Stat. 1469, 1469-71 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(c) (1994)).
135. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(k) (1994); Garn-St Germain, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 116, 96
Stat. 1469, 1476-79 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(f) (1994)); see also Garn-St
Germain, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 122(a), 96 Stat. 1469, 1480-81 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1729(f) (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989)).
136. Gain-St Germain, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 121, 96 Stat. 1469, 1479-80 (codified at
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i. Open Bank Assistance. The open bank assistance provisions
extended the provisions of the 1935 law (for banks) and the 1978 law (for
thrifts) to allow the deposit insurers to engage in transactions with institu-
tions that were not subject to closure but were in need of assistance. The
insurers were permitted to assist open banks in order "to prevent the closing"
of an institution, "to restore [a] closed bank to normal operations," or to
lessen the risk posed by "severe financial conditions ... which threaten[ed]
the stability of a significant number of insured [institutions] possessing
significant financial resources."'" The insurers were permitted to make
loans to, deposits in, or contributions to any such institution, to purchase
assets or securities of the institution, or to assume its liabilities.' In con-
nection with a purchase and assumption (P&A) transaction, the insurers were
permitted to engage in these transactions with either the troubled or the
acquiring institution.'38 In such transactions, the insurers could guarantee
either institution against loss by reason of the transactions or against the loss
with respect to any asset."'4 The amount of the assistance was limited to the
amount that the insurer "determine[d] to be reasonably necessary to save the
cost of liquidating, including paying the insured accounts" of the troubled
institution. 14 This restriction was lifted - and it is this provision that is
most controversial in relation to the "too big to fail" policies - where the
insurer determines that "continued operation" of the institution is "essential
to provide adequate banking services in its community. "142
ii. Emergency Acquisitions. The most significant of the provisions
of the regulators' bill were the provisions for emergency or extraordinary
acquisitions. At the time, as noted above, the Board ordinarily did not
permit banks or bank holding companies to acquire thrifts, so the thrift and
12 U.S.C. § 1464(p) (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989)); see also
12 U.S.C. § 1464(p) (1994) (current statutory provision).
137. Garn-St Germain, Pub. L. No. 97-320, sec. 111, § 13(c)(1), 96 Stat. 1469, 1469
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(1) (1994)).
138. Id. at sec. 111, § 13(c)(1), (c)(2)(A), 96 Stat. 1469, 1469-70 (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(1), (c)(2)(A) (1994)).
139. Id. at see. 111, § 13(c)(2)(A), 96 Stat. 1469, 1469-70 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1823(c)(2)(A) (1994)).
140. Id. at sec. 111, § 13(c)(2)(A)(iii), 96 Stat. 1469, 1470 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1823(c)(2)(A)(iii) (1994)).
141. Id. at sec. 111, § 13(c)(4)(A), 96 Stat. 1469, 1470 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (1994)).
142. Garn-StGemain, Pub. L. No. 97-320, sec. 111, § 13(c)(4)(A), 96 Stat. 1469, 1470
(codified as substantially amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (1994)).
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bank industries were kept separate. 43 Also at the time, most states prohib-
ited entry by out-of-state institutions, and federal law incorporated state law
as to either bank or bank holding company expansion.'44 The emergency
acquisition provisions gave large thrifts and banks an opportunity to circum-
vent both provisions. Because such restrictions lent institutions not subject
to them enhanced premium value 45 and because premium value operated to
diminish the amount of cash assistance that had to be extended in rescue
transactions, the emergency acquisition provision promised significant
savings on the deposit insurance payout bill.
For FDIC-insured institutions, banks, and mutual savings banks, emer-
gency acquisitions were limited to target institutions with $500 million in
assets or more." Banks had to be closed; mutual savings banks could be
subject to acquisition if "in danger of closing."'47 Banks could be subject
only to P&A transactions; mutual savings banks could be subject to P&A
transactions, mergers, or stock acquisitions.'
Savings and loan associations could be subject to an emergency acquisi-
tion if "severe financial conditions exist[ed] which threaten[ed] the stability
of a significant number of insured institutions possessing significant financial
resources," if the institution were in default or could be restored to normal
143. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (discussing controversy surrounding
interindustry acquisitions).
144. See 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1994) (prohibiting branching by national banks except where
permitted by state law); id. § 1842(d) (prohibiting bank holding company expansion across state
lines where not expressly permitted by state law). Barriers to interstate banking began to erode
by virtue of state laws and interstate arrangements, where the states permitted entry based on
"region" or based on reciprocity by the states whose institutions sought entry. These arrange-
ments were upheld against statutory and constitutional challenge in Northeast Bancorp v. Board
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159 (1985). In the intervening time, barriers
have eroded greatly, though most state laws still require "regionality" or "reciprocity." In the
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328,
108 Stat. 2338, Congress eliminated most remaining barriers to bank holding company expan-
sion, effective September 29, 1995, and eliminated barriers to interstate branching, unless a
state "opts out" of interstate branching laws, effective June 1, 1997, or unless a state elected to
"opt in" to those laws at an earlier date. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(e)-(g) (1994).
145. See supra note 19-28 and accompanying text (discussing concept of premium value).
146. Gain-St Germain, Pub. L. No. 97-320, sec. 116, § 13(f)(2)(A), (f)(3)(A)(i), 96 Stat.
1469, 1476-77 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(f)(2)(A), (f)(3)(A) (1994)).
147. Id. See LANGBEIN, supra note 58, § 2.31 (discussing regulation of acquisitions).
148. Gam-St Germain, Pub. L. No. 97-320, sec. 116, § 13(f)(2)(A), (f)(3)(A)(i), 96 Stat.
1469, 1476-77 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(t)(2)(A), (f)(3)(A) (1994)). See
LANGBEIN, supra note 58, § 2.31 (discussing different treatment of acquisitions of banks from
those of mutual savings banks).
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operations, or if a default could be prevented. 149 Thrifts could be subject to
either a P&A transaction or a merger.1 50
In any case, the FDIC or FSLIC was required to notify the state author-
ity of the target institution. The state authority had forty-eight hours to
object. If it did object, the deposit insurers nevertheless could proceed with
the transaction upon a unanimous vote of the federal insurer's board. 1
The regulators' bill permitted interstate and interindustry acquisitions
subject to a hierarchy, with a first priority (and a second opportunity to bid
if the original bid were within the lesser of fifteen percent or $15 million of
the otherwise low bid) given to in-state, same industry acquirers; a second
priority given to interstate, same industry acquirers; a third priority given to
same state, interindustry acquirers; and a last priority given to out-of-state
other industry acquirers." In soliciting bids, the deposit insurers were to
find prospective purchasers "it determine[d], in its sole discretion" were
qualified, and the insurers then were able to acquire the subject institution's
assets and liabilities - the deposit insurer's "calculations and estimations"
were to be "determinative."'5 The statute thus was unfriendly to judicial
review in the context of these acquisitions.
iii. Supervisory Conversions. The third element of the regulators'
bill provided for conversions of mutual institutions into stock institutions,
including supervisory conversions. As indicated above, FIRIRCA for the
first time provided for federally chartered savings banks.'I4 De novo char-
149. Garn-St Germain, Pub. L. No. 97-320, sec. 123(a), § 408(m)(1)(A)(i), 96 Stat.
1469, 1483 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(m)(1)(A)(i) (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 101-
73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989)).
150. Id.
151. Id. at see. 123(a), § 408(m)(1)(B), 96 Stat. 1469, 1483 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1730a(m)(1)(B) (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989)); id. at see.
116, § 13()(3)(C), 96 Stat. 1469, 1477 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1823()(2)(B),
(f)(3)(E) (1994)).
152. Id. at sec. 116, § 13(f)(6)(A)-(C), 96 Stat. 1469, 1478 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1823()(6)(A)-(B) (1994)); id. at sec. 123(a), § 408(m)(3)(A)-(B), 96 Stat. 1469,
1483-84 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(m)(3)(A)-(B) (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 101-
73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989)). See LANGBEIN, supra note 58, § 2.31 (noting hierarchy of bids
by category of offeror for both FDIC and FSLIC).
153. Garn-St Germain, Pub. L. No. 97-320, see. 116, § 13(f)(5), (t)(6)(D), 96 Stat.
1469, 1477-78 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(f)(5), (f)(6)(D) (1994)) (emphasis
added); id. at see. 123(a), § 408(m)(2), (m)(3)(E), 96 Stat. 1469, 1483-84 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1730a(m)(2), (m)(3)(E) (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183
(1989)).
154. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text (discussing creation of federal
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tering was not allowed - only conversions from state institutions, and then
only into federal institutions organized in mutual form. Gain-St Germain
provided that converting state institutions could, at the time of conversion,
change directly into a stock form organization.' 5 De novo federal institu-
tions still were not recognized, but federal stock savings banks were recog-
nized for the first time. In addition, the FDIC, which chartered state savings
banks, was permitted to mandate a supervisory conversion of a state institu-
tion if "necessary to prevent the closing" of the bank, or if "severe financial
conditions exist[ed] that threaten[ed] the stability" of the bank, and the
conversion was "likely to improve the financial condition" of the institu-
tion. '56 This action required Bank Board concurrence and forty-eight-hour
notice to state officials, whose objections could be overridden by a unani-
mous vote of the FDIC Board. 157
iv. Net Worth Certificates. The provision for net worth certificates
was largely the child of the Democratic majority in the House of Representa-
tives, which to a considerable extent took the side of the thrift industry. Net
worth certificates were available to any institution with a net worth of less
than three percent of assets and were to be in an amount equal to 50% of
operating losses for institutions with a net worth in the 2-3% range; 60% in
the 1-2% range; or 70% in the less than 1% range. 58 Institutions were to
have capital at least equal to 0.5% of assets after counting the certificates.' 59
The net worth certificates did not involve the transfer of any tangible assets
to the issuer; the certificates were to be purchased with promissory notes and
were to pay dividends equal to the interest due on the notes." They were
thus noncash transactions. If the issuer had positive net worth for six
mutual savings banks).
155. Garn-St Germain, Pub. L. No. 97-320, sec. 121, § 5(p), 96 Stat 1469, 1479-80
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(p) (1994)). See LANGBEIN, supra note 58, § 2.30
(noting new direct conversion to stock form).
156. Garn-St Germain, Pub. L. No. 97-320, sec. 112, § 5(o)(2)(F), 96 Stat. 1469, 1471-
72 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(o)(2)(F0 (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat.
183 (1989), replaced by 12 U.S.C. § 1464(o) (1994)). The current § 1464(o) is substantially
the same as the original, but does not contain § 1464(o)(2)(F).
157. Id.
158. Id. at sec. 203, § 13(i)(5), 96 Stat. 1469, 1492, repealed by id. § 206, 96 Stat.
1469, 1496 (1985 Sunset Provision).
159. Id. at sec. 203, § 13(i)(2)(E), 96 Stat. 1469, 1493, repealed by id. § 206, 96 Stat.
1469, 1496 (1985 Sunset Provision).
160. Id. at sec. 203, § 13(i)(1)(B), 96 Stat. 1469, 1493, repealed by id. § 206, 96 Stat.
1469, 1496 (1985 Sunset Provision).
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months, the deposit insurers were not permitted to force an acquisition on
the institution; if the issuer had a positive net worth for more than nine
months, the insurers were proscribed from imposing certain management
changes on the institutions.
61
v. Thrift Powers. The thrift powers provisions were the "deregula-
tory" provisions advocated by the Reagan administration as its condition of
support for the bill." Under the bill, thrifts were permitted to invest in
commercial real estate up to forty percent of assets; in revenue bonds of
states and municipalities up to ten percent of its equity and reserves, without
regard to whether the proceeds were used for residential real estate purposes;
in commercial loans up to ten percent of assets after 1983; and in leasing of
personalty up to ten percent of assets.' 63 Together with prior enactments, the
provisions in theory permitted an institution to invest its reserves and equity,
plus eighty percent of its assets in nonresidential lending (40% in commer-
cial real estate lending; 20% consumer lending; 10% leasing; 10% commer-
cial loans; plus reserves invested in industrial development bonds). The
provisions were imitated at the state level, some states conferring powers far
broader than those allowed by HOLA. '" In essence, these provisions gave
the green light to the "go-go thrifts" of the 1980s.
B. The Second Thrift Crisis and the Road to FIRREA
The Garn-St Germain Act (the Act), signed in October 1982, brought
to a close the "first" thrift crisis. For about two years after the Act, the
problems in the industry appeared to be under control. The Bank Board
resolved a number of the problem institutions through P&A transactions,
65
and the deposit insurers - the FSLIC with respect to most thrifts, the FDIC
with respect to state mutual savings banks - encouraged the conversion of
161. Id. at sec. 203, § 13(i)(3), 96 Stat. 1469, 1493-94, repealed by id. § 206, 96 Stat.
1469, 1496 (1985 Sunset Provision).
162. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (discussing political compromise
leading to Garn-St Germain).
163. Garn-St Germain, Pub. L. No. 97-320, sec. 322, 324, 325, 330, §§ 5(c)(1)(B),
(c)(1)(H), (c)(1)(R), (c)(2)(A), 96 Stat. 1469, 1499 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1464(c)(1)(B), (c)(1)(H), (c)(1)(R), (c)(2)(A)).
164. See generally H.R. REP. No. 54(1), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 297 (1989).
165. During the 1981-1982 period, 730 thrifts, or approximately one-sixth of a total of
about 4600 FSLIC-insured institutions, were merged or liquidated. See Robert Trigaux,
Congressional Study Calls Thrift Insurance Fund Fragile: Future Health Remains Closely Tied
to Continued Low Level of Interest Rates, GAO Says, AM. BANKER, Dec. 7, 1983, at 3.
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mutual institutions into stock form."6 The conversion technique, like the
P&A technique, allowed the agency to harness the premium value of institu-
tions in the service of the rescue effort. And the FSLIC - not the FDIC -
promoted combinations through the adoption of regulatory accounting princi-
ples, which permitted institutions to record both the premium value of the
institutions, measured by the excess of the liabilities assumed over the sum
of the value of the assets plus the amount of assistance provided by the
insurer, and the amount of assistance as assets on the books of the thrifts,
boosting the capital of combined, or converting, institutions. 1
67
Even during this period, however, reports surfaced concerning the
management difficulties that thrifts were encountering in exploiting the
powers newly granted them by the 1982 legislation. 16  But the economy
improved and interest rates declined during the 1982-84 period, and for the
most part the difficulties of the institutions were off the front pages.161
166. The Bank Board liberalized its rules governing conversions in March 1983, for the
first time permitting a converting mutual institution to sell a controlling block of stock to a
single purchaser. See Harry M. Zimmerman, Jr., et al., Recent Bank Board Rules Promise
Accelerated Pace of S&L Conversions, AM. BANKER, July 11, 1983, at 4; see also Lisa J.
McCue, Isaac Urges Mutuals to Adopt Stock Ownership Form, AM. BANKER, May 18, 1983,
at 3; Thomas P. Vartanian & John D. Hawke Jr., Conversions May Spur Thrift Industry
Rebirth, AM. BANKER, Apr. 14, 1983, at 4. Conversions had been a subject of controversy
since regulations authorizing them had first been proposed in 1955. See LANGBEIN, supra
note 58, § 3.32 (discussing controversy behind and reasons for conversions from mutual to
stock form); JULIE L. WILLIAMS, SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS: MERGERS, ACQuISITIONS AND
CONVERSIONS 7.01 (Supp. 1995). The difficulty with conversions concerns identifying who
is "entitled" to the premium value of the institutions and also concerns the opportunity that
conversions present for what is perceived as "insider abuse" - the concerns clearly stemming
from ambiguity or uncertainty in prevailing legal, accounting, and economic conceptions
regarding the "premium value" of entities generally. See supra notes 19-28 and accompany-
ing text (discussing premium value). The difficulties have arisen anew in the last few years
in relation to state programs authorizing mutual conversions. See Stanley I. Langbein, Public
Resentment Over State-Supervised Mutual Savings Bank Conversions Spurs OTS, FDIC
Action, Congressional Inquiry, and Administrative Concern, 1 BANK AND TIdFT ACQUISI-
TION UPDATE 2 (June 1994); WILLIAMS, supra, 7.01(6).
167. See infra notes 248-52 and accompanying text (detailing advantages and disadvan-
tages of various accounting approaches to acquisitions).
168. See John Drukker, One Year After Garn-St Germain: An Assessment; Savings
Institutions Got New Powers with that Act, but the Bulk Have Done Little with Them, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 14, 1983, at 21; Leonard Shane, Sorry, but Savings Institutions are Not
Banks, Despite Garn-St Germain, AM. BANKER, Nov. 14, 1983, at 33.
169. In December 1983, the General Accounting Office reported that the industry would
face new dangers if short-term interest rates rose above 11.5%. See Trigaux, supra note 165,
at 3. In November 1983, the federal funds rate was between 9% and 9.5%. 69 FED. RES.
BULL., Dec. 1983, at A26. The GAO had been directed by § 205 of the Garn-St Germain
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In 1984, however, Continental Illinois Corporation, then the ninth
largest banking institution in the nation, experienced difficulties that required
intervention by the FDIC, which was extended in the form of open bank
assistance.17 The action led to criticism that the FDIC had adopted a "too
big to fail" policy, a circumstance that led the FDIC, as well as the Bank
Board and the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), to eschew open bank
assistance in the future.' The charge was that the "too big to fail" policy
involved the deposit insurers in actions that benefited shareholders, unin-
sured depositors, and nondepositor creditors when the first may have borne
some responsibility for the circumstances leading to the institution's failure,
and the latter two lacked any expectation of protection under the deposit
insurance laws."m The criticism appears to have been the germ of the treai-
ment that these parties would receive under FIRREA, which as elaborated
below, bears provisions aimed at penalizing shareholders and takes extraor-
dinary precaution against benefiting uninsured depositors and nondepositor
creditors, even at the risk of punishing members of each category for doing
nothing wrong.
7 1
In 1985, the problems of the thrift industry began their dramatic return
to the limelight. The General Accounting Office (GAO), charged by Garn-
St Germain with monitoring the net worth certificate program, audited the
FSLIC's annual report, and the audits revealed that the collection of devices
for deferring the payments of insurance - the net worth certificate program,
FSLIC guarantees of Home Loan Bank advances, yield maintenance obliga-
tions, and the like - rendered determinations of the solvency or net position
of the fund quite difficult.'74 A series of GAO reports from 1985 to 1988
repeatedly criticized the Bank Board initiatives in resolving institutions, from
the net worth maintenance program to forbearance agreements, to the "man-
Act to report to Congress semiannually concerning the net worth certificate program. The
GAO took this authority and went much further with it, issuing during the 1980s a series of
reports warning Congress of the magnitude of the developing crisis. See infra notes 174-75
and accompanying text.
170. See Andrew Albert, Regan Hints US Will Limit Thrift Backing: Says Financial
Corporation Different from Continental, AM. BANKER, Sept. 11, 1984, at 1.
171. See Lisa J. McCue, FDIC Bailout Data Disputed by St Germain, AM. BANKER, Oct.
5, 1984, at 1; Robert Trigaux, Isaac Faces New Bailout Debate: Likely to Hear Ideas Urging
Tougher Market Discipline, AM. BANKER, Oct. 4, 1984, at 1.
172. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEPOSIT INSURANCE: SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
OF REFORM PROPOSALS 24-33 (1986).
173. See infra notes 237-43 and accompanying text.
174. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EXAMINATION OF THE FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN INSURANCE CORPORATION'S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE YEARS ENDED DECEM-
BER 31, 1984 AND 1983 (1985).
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agement consignment" program adopted by the Board. 75 It was clear,
however, that in this second phase of the crisis, it was not interest-spread
difficulties that were at the heart of the crisis, but asset quality problems.
The problems were particularly acute in Texas, where the collapse of oil
prices in 1985 and 1986 led to a collapse in real estate prices, which led, in
turn, to the souring of real estate loans held by the thrifts; similar problems
occurred in other "oil patch" states, in Florida, and also in California. All
of these states had amended their thrift chartering laws to extend to thrifts
chartered under those laws a new range of powers even broader than those
extended to federal thrifts by Garn-St Germain. In Texas, in particular, the
real estate difficulties weakened the commercial banking industry as well as
the thrift industry and led to a number of FDIC and FSLIC rescues.
By late 1985, the Chairman of the Bank Board was sounding warnings
that the FSLIC was insolvent and in need of additional funding to resolve
problem thrifts.'76 The Chair's fellow Board members publicly expressed
reservations about the warnings, and the thrift industry officially, publicly,
and persistently minimized the problems. " The industry's objective appears
to have been to block congressional funding of the FSLIC and thereby deny
the regulators the ability to cause the absorption of smaller institutions by
larger ones or to cause the absorption of thrifts, whether large or small, by
large banks. 78 Again, the role of the premium value of institutions is evi-
dent: The thrifts hoped to force the kind of outright taxpayer bailout they had
sought in 1981 and 1982, rather than an extension of the practices under the
regulators' bill, which transferred the enterprise value of the institutions (that
even insolvent institutions had) into the hands of more consolidated entities.
By 1986, there was pressure for congressional action. For one thing,
the provisions of the regulators' bill adopted in 1982 and the provisions
175. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FAILED THRIFrS: No COMPELLING
EVIDENCE OF A NEED FOR THE FEDERAL ASSET DISPOSITION ASSOCIATION (1988); GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THRIFT INDUSTRY: THE MANAGEMENT CONSIGNMENT PROGRAM
(1987); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THRIFT INDUSTRY: FORBEARANCE FOR TROUBLED
INSTITUTIONS 1982-1986 (1987); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THRIFT INDUSTRY: COST
TO FSLIC OF DELAYING ACTION ON INSOLVENT SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS (1986); GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THRIFT INDUSTRY: NET WORTH AND INCOME CAPITAL CERTIFICATES
(1986).
176. See Nina Easton & Bartlett Naylor, At Last, Relief is in Sight for the Nation's S&L
Fund, AM. BANKER, May 27, 1986, at 17.
177. See Nina Easton & Bartlett Naylor, Thrift Group Attacks FSLIC Bailout: But US
League Opposition to Treasury Plan Faces Uphill Battle, AM. BANKER, Dec. 15, 1986, at 2;
Robert M. Garsson, Shaky S&Ls May Stay Open to Keep Fund Afloat, AM. BANKER, Sept.
15, 1986, at 10.
178. See Easton & Naylor, supra note 177, at 2.
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authorizing the net worth certificate program were expiring; there would be
a series of congressional extensions of the provisions before legislation
finally was passed in mid-1987.179 The Reagan administration remained
largely aloof from the crisis, as it did from most banking issues throughout
its term, but in early 1986 a new Undersecretary of the Treasury developed
a proposal for infusing $15 billion into the FSLIC by a combination of
increased premiums imposed upon the thrifts, purchases of FSLIC obliga-
tions by the Federal Home Loan Banks, and principally, by the formation of
a financing corporation that would issue obligations that it then would use
to purchase zero coupon obligations of the FSLIC."8 The advantage of these
devices was that they did not reflect any expenditure in the federal budget on
behalf of the thrifts and thus did not aggravate the ongoing political conflict
about the budget deficit. Although an official of the Congressional Budget
Office initially objected that the plan should not be accounted for off-budget,
the Administration prevailed on the point, and it was agreed that the debt
represented by the bonds would not be a budget item.181
By this time (mid-1986), however, other legislative matters were trou-
bling the banking industry and the members of Congress concerned with it.
The industry had been pressing for several years for expanded powers,
particularly the power to enter the securities business, which the industry
was restricted from doing by the Glass-Steagall Act, a portion of the Banking
Act of 1933.82 Securities powers were of special concern to the large
money center banking institutions. Since the early 1980s, nonbanking
enterprises had been developing institutions known as "nonbank banks,"
which exploited the definition of the term "bank" in the Bank Holding
Company Act (BHCA). Under the BHCA, in order to be considered a bank,
a company had to be engaged in both taking deposits and making commercial
loans."8 The nonbank banks refrained from one or the other of these activi-
ties, and thus their affiliated holding companies escaped the limitations on
nonbanking activities imposed by the BHCA on bank holding companies.184
179. See Garsson, supra note 177, at 10.
180. See Easton & Naylor, supra note 176, at 17.
181. See Nina Easton & Bartlett Naylor, Plan to Recapitalize FSLIC Hits Snags: Effect
on Federal Budget Disputed; Industry Opinion Shifting, AM. BANKER, July 14, 1986, at 9;
Bartlett Naylor & Nina Easton, Congressional Budget Expert Rejects Treasury FSLIC Plea,
AM. BANKER, July 9, 1986, at 1.
182. The Glass-Steagall Act encompasses §§ 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the 1933 Act. These
provisions are now codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 377, 378a, 78 (1994).
183. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982).
184. See generally JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND
REGULATION 300-01 (1993).
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The Board resisted the practice and sought to exercise jurisdiction over the
nonbank banks, while the Comptroller of the Currency approved the prac-
tice. Eventually, the Board's regulatory effort was defeated by decision of
the Supreme Court.'" The larger banks were ambivalent about the nonbank
bank device; they did not welcome competition from larger industrial con-
cerns, but at the same time, the device represented a way of expanding bank
affiliations with nonbanking concerns."M One bank even stated that it was
considering severing its lending and deposit-taking businesses into nonbank
banks and then diversifying through its holding company."
Notwithstanding the commercial banks' position, however, Congress
did not respond, and the Administration remained aloof.' 8 By early 1986,
however, the regulatory agencies, led by the Board, undertook a number of
initiatives to reinterpret the Glass-Steagall Act and afford expanded opportu-
nities for banks to enter the securities business. In addition, the Board
sought legislation curtailing the nonbank bank practice.'89 When the Admin-
istration's 1986 proposal for helping the thrift industry was put forth, it
quickly became embroiled in the debate over expanded banking powers and
nonbank banks.'" The Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, the
Administration's principal congressional ally on banking matters, sought to
tie the thrift assistance to legislation expanding commercial bank powers and
legislation conditioning the continuation of nonbank banks on the nonbank
185. See Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S.
361 (1986).
186. See Robert M. Garsson, 100th Congress Preps for Financial Service Struggle:
FSLIC Aid Still Dominates Hill Agenda, While Industry's Divisions Remain Keen, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 5, 1987, at 8. The smaller, community or independent banks, however, were
emphatically and unequivocally opposed to the nonbank bank practice. Id. The banking
industry also was divided over expanded powers, including particularly the repeal of the
restrictions on bank investment banking activity imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act, which the
independent bankers persistently opposed. See Philip T. Sudo, Small Banks Add to Chorus
Against Glass-Steagall, AM. BANKER, Mar. 2, 1987, at 9. The divisions consistently placed
the American Bankers Association, the principal trade association of commercial bankers, in
an awkward position because its membership includes both money center and independent
banks. See Robert M. Garsson & Jed Horowitz, Lobbyists Seek United Front on Bank
Powers, AM. BANKER, Mar. 13, 1987, at 1.
187. See Robert Trigaux, Butcher Says Chase May Not Remain a Bank at All, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 23, 1987, at 2.
188. See Bartlett Naylor, House Banking Panel Members Express Chagrin Over Inaction,
AM. BANKER, Jan. 3, 1986, at 1; Regulatory Confusion Is Fault of Reagan, Says Head of
SunTrust Banks, AM. BANKER, Mar. 25, 1987, at 6.
189. See Robert M. Garsson, Volcker Backs Efforts to Close Nonbank-Bank Loophole,
AM. BANKER, Feb. 23, 1987, at 19.
190. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
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banks' acquiring troubled thrifts, thereby contributing to the resolution of the
crisis (again, a proposal for enlisting the premium value of existing institu-
tions in the rescue process).'91 But in the 1986 session of Congress, the
thrift industry, aided principally by House Democrats, notably the Speaker
of the House himself, succeeded in derailing the financing plan it opposed. 192
As finally presented to the Congress in October, the proposal involved only
the financing plan and the extension of the regulators' bills. " Even as pared
down, the legislation died with the expiration of the 99th Congress.
When the 100th Congress returned in early 1987, both Houses were
under Democratic control, and the Administration was preoccupied with the
Iran-contra arms scandal. The Senate Banking Committee quickly took up
the FSLIC recapitalization plan along with a comprehensive bill that, in its
original form, included an effort to secure expanded banking powers. 19 4 The
expansion was endorsed by the new Chairman of the Senate Banking Com-
mittee. 95 The Chairman, however, was a noted ally of the independent
bankers, who were ambivalent about expanded powers because of their
tendency to strengthen the larger institutions at the expense of the smaller
ones. The result, by March, was a bill that not only did not expand banking
powers, but one that included a one-year moratorium on the grant by regula-
tors of any additional securities, insurance, or real estate powers. 19 The bill
also abolished nonbank banks and reduced the amount of the recapitalization
proposed to $7.5 billion from the $15 billion originally proposed.'17 The
commercial banking industry responded angrily and opposed the bill. 9 The
191. See Robert Trigaux & Bartlett Naylor, Garn Bill Promises Soul-Searching Debate,
AM. BANKER, June 26, 1986, at 3.
192. See Bartlett Naylor, In 1987, Congress Faces Renewed Legislative Push: Despite
Capitol Hill Inertia, Pressure for Financial Services Laws May Spur Passage, AM. BANKER,
Oct. 27, 1986, at 17.
193. See Bartlett Naylor, Treasury Sets Backup Plan to Fund FSLIC: Recapitalization
Option Ready in Case Bill Fails, AM. BANKER, Oct. 16, 1986, at 1:
194. See Jay Rosenstein, ABA Leaders Endorse Limited Expansion of Bank Powers, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 13, 1987, at 11. The bill involved a limited expansion of bank powers,
supported by the larger commercial banking institutions but generally opposed by the smaller
banks, and a ban on nonbank banks, which the smaller banks sought, but as to which the
money center commercial banks were ambivalent. See supra note 186 and accompanying
discussion.
195. See Rosenstein, supra note 194, at 11.
196. See Robert M. Garsson, House Panel Begins Action on FSLIC Recap; Banks
Sharply Divided on Senate-Passed Bill, AM. BANKER, Mar. 31, 1987, at 1.
197. See id.
198. See Robert M. Garsson, ABA Support of Proxmire Bill in Doubt as Panel Vote
Nears, AM. BANKER, Mar. 2, 1987, at 1; Jay Rosenstein, Briefing: Proxmire's Promises are
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Reagan administration, provoked by the "reregulatory" features of the bill,
threatened to veto the legislation. 99 The measure nonetheless moved through
the House, which reduced the recapitalization amount to $5 billion (reflecting
the influence of a thrift industry still bent on forcing a bailout of existing
institutions)."t It passed with a recapitalization figure of $8.5 billion,"1 as
well as the nonbank bank ban and the moratorium on new powers. Almost
everyone at the time knew the amount authorized would be inadequate.'
Fading, AM. BANKER, Mar. 2, 1987, at 10; Philip T. Sudo, Bankers See Freeze as Delaying the
Inevitable, AM. BANKER, Mar. 12, 1987, at 15. The result in the Senate Banking Committee -
a moratorium of new powers, a failure to enact new powers, and a ban on nonbank banks -
involved action uniformly in keeping with the objectives of the independent banks. See supra
note 186 and accompanying discussion.
199. See Reagan Threatens to Veto Bill with 'Unacceptable' Provisions, AM. BANKER,
Mar. 26, 1987, at 1. Although the Administration was never crystal clear on what its objections
to the bill were, it appears that both the moratorium and the nonbank bank prohibition offended
its conception of "deregulation" - which to it meant the elimination of legal proscriptions on
the activities of institutions. The Administration repeated the veto threat throughout the
summer, even after differences between the House and Senate versions had been ironed out in
conference. See Robert M. Garsson, Can the Banking Bill Survive Threatened Presidential
Veto?, AM. BANKER, July 20, 1987, at 5 (stating that "[tihe thought of the President of the
United States going on television to talk to the American people about nonbank banks seemed
too comical to take seriously"); Jim McTague, Briefing: Hands-On Reagan Readies a Veto,
AM. BANKER, July 27, 1987, at 10 (reporting that "[p]eople at the White House and the Trea-
sury say President Reagan is fully aware that he is going to veto the banking bill. The
commander-in-chief, they claim, also knows why.... This is a new, hands-on, tuned-in Ronald
Reagan emerging in chats with staffers at the Treasury and the White House").
200. See Robert M. Garsson, Veto Avoided, Banking Bill Nears Passage; US League
Acquiesces on Compromise Measure, AM. BANKER, Jan. 31, 1987, at 1.
201. The 1987 legislation had created the Financing Corporation (FICO), a mixed govern-
meni corporation whose stock was owned by the Federal Home Loan Banks, and which was
managed by a directorate comprised of the Director of the Office of Finance of the Bank Board
and two presidents of home loan banks appointed by the Bank Board. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b)(1) (1988) (amended 1989). Stock subscriptions of up to $3 billion were to be made,
with the first $1 billion allocated according to a table set forth in the statute, and the remainder
allocated in accordance with the aggregate assets of the institution members of the banks in
question. This allocation method meant a disproportionate contribution was made by the banks
in areas with large thrifts, which meant primarily California: The San Francisco bank was
required to acquire almost 20% of the stock; the Atlanta bank over 14%; while the Boston
bank's share was under 2% and the Pittsburgh bank's just over 4%. Id. § 1441(d)(4) (amended
1989, 1991). The Financing Corporation was authorized to borrow up to $10.825 billion, but
was limited to borrowing $3.75 billion per year, and additional borrowing after the second year
required congressional approval. Id. § 1441(e)(1), (e)(2) (amended 1989, 1991, 1992). A
supplemental assessment was imposed on thrifts to fund expenses and interest on the FICO
obligations. Id. § 1441(f)(1)-(2) (amended 1989).
202. One motivation for a veto was to procure a "clean" recapitalization bill with the
original $15 billion authorized and without the powers-limiting features of the bill. The $15
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Nevertheless, the President signed the bill. 23
The period between the enactment of the Competitive Equality Banking
Act of 1987 and the beginning of 1989 was the time when public attention to
the thrift crisis became intense. The failures reported through 1988, mostly
in Texas, were of ever increasing size; assistance amounts began to exceed $1
billion each and did so with some regularity.' A new Bank Board Chairman,
who had been a key Republican Senate staffer during the 1980-1986 period
of Republican control of the Senate, assumed office and, unlike his predeces-
sor, persistently downplayed the magnitude of the problem (though like his
predecessor he watched fellow Board members publicly disagree with him,
but this time in the opposite direction). 5 Graphic reports of insider abuse,
use of institution funds to purchase yachts, paintings, furnishings, Oriental
rugs, or to finance wildcat oil schemes became commonplace.'m Public
billion was known to be inadequate. The thrift industry had fought the recapitalization plan
consistently, securing reductions in the amount authorized in the House version of the bill
below the $10 billion authorized by the Senate.
203. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
204. By August 1988, estimates were that the Texas thrift industry had plunged into a
collective insolvency that to that date had cost the FSLIC $12 billion. On August 18, 1988,
the Bank Board announced a $1.3 billion bailout of twelve Texas thrifts that were acquired
by LSST Financial Services Corp. The following day, the Bank Board announced a combina-
tion of eight Texas thrifts with $2.4 billion in assistance, which were combined in a single
thrift in a "revisal" of the deposit insurers' "Phoenix" program of the early 1980s. See Steve
Klinkerman, Bailouts Mark End of High-Flying S&Ls: Regulator to Pump $2.4 Billion into
Latest Texas Rescue, AM. BANKER, Aug. 22, 1988, at 1; supra note 97 and accompanying
discussion. The closing of Lincoln Savings and Loan - the institution whose insolvency led
to the resignation of Speaker Wright, the investigation of five senators who came to be known
as the "Keating five" after Lincoln's CEO, the ultimate resignation of M. Danny Wall as
Chairman of the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the imposition of fines against and suspen-
sion of partners of the thereto distinguished New York law firm Kaye Scholer Fierman Hays
& Handler - involved an estimated amount of $2.5 billion. See Jim McTague & Barbara A.
Rehm, Closing Lincoln Could Cost US $2.5 Billion: Transfer of S&L's Assets By Owner
Under Scrutiny, AM. BANKER, Apr. 24, 1989, at 1.
205. See Jim McTague, Wall's Estimate of S&L Bailout Will Rise Again: Bank Board
Colleagues Disagree on Price Tag, AM. BANKER, Sept. 13, 1988, at 1; Jim McTague, Wall
Says Thrift Rescue to Cost $8 Billion More, AM. BANKER, July 11, 1988, at 7; Jim McTague,
Wall Ups Estimate by $20 Billion for Rescue of Insolvent Thrifts, AM. BANKER, July 8, 1988,
at 1; Jim McTague & Barbara A. Rehm, Wall Disputing Estimates on FSLIC Bailout, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 15, 1988, at 1; Robert Trigaux & Jim McTague, Bank Board Chief Is Up
Against the Credibility Wall, AM. BANKER, July 11, 1988, at 3.
206. See H. Erich Heinemann, Pious Phrases Aside, Cause of S&L Crisis Was Fraud,
Greed, and Mismanagement, AM. BANKER, Sept. 26, 1988, at 4; Lynn Homa, Maxwell Slams
Thrifts, AM. BANKER, Oct. 26, 1988, at 3.
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estimates of the eventual cost of a rescue climbed steadily each month.' An
insolvent FSLIC resolved institutions with a variety of devices that would
demand capital in the future - net worth maintenance agreements, yield
maintenance agreements, and capital asset guarantees - which made esti-
mates of the amount of the FSLIC's insolvency or of the magnitude of the
demands that the crisis would make critically difficult. A series of transac-
tions spectacularly favorable to acquirers who were exploiting the tax incen-
tives that had been adopted in 1981, but were expiring in 1988, excited
public charges of regulatory favoritism or regulatory "giveaways.""8
With a pending Presidential election, however, there was virtually no
action in Congress. Both parties shied away from the issue, principally out
of fear of "blame" for the crisis.' The Republican President had proposed
and supported the expansion of thrift powers that had so visibly backfired.21
The budget deficit was a political problem for the President; it had led to
deferring action on the thrift crisis, and the deferral had undoubtedly exacer-
bated the problem. The Democrats had controlled Congress; their finger-
prints were visible on the largely successful effort by the thrift industry to
delay a bailout and understate the problem - an effort that in the end also
would backfire badly. Moreover, the charges of impropriety included
charges that certain members of Congress had intervened improperly con-
207. See Brookings Fellow Places S&L Bailout at $58 Billion, AM. BANKER, Sept. 29,
1988, at 12; Robert M. Garsson, Proxmire Now Backs S&L Bailout: Urges $20 Billion from
US, $30 Billion from Thrifts, AM. BANKER, Sept. 22, 1988, at 1; Jim McTague, FSLIC and
Fiscal Gymnastics: Or, How to Account for a $100 Billion Bailout, AM. BANKER, Dec. 30,
1988, at 1; Jim McTague, GAO: $50 Billion May Be Needed to Bail Out Thrifts, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 19, 1988, at 5; Jim McTague, Martin Puts S&L Bailout at $45 Billion -
Minimum, AM. BANKER, Sept. 20, 1988, at 3; Jim McTague, Wall's Estimate of S&L Bailout
Will Rise Again: Bank Board Colleagues Disagree on Price Tag, AM. BANKER, Sept. 13,
1988, at 1; Jim McTague, Wall Says Thrift Rescue to Cost $8 Billion More, AM. BANKER,
July 11, 1988, at 7; Jim McTague, Wall Ups Estimate by $20 Billion for Rescue of Insolvent
Thrifts, AM. BANKER, July 8, 1988, at 1; Barbara A. Rehm, ABA Proposes Federal Bailout
for Sick Thrifts: Calls Crisis Top Priority; $74 Billion Price Tag Seen, AM. BANKER, Sept.
21, 1988, at 1.
208. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FAILED THRIFTS: BANK BOARD'S
1988 TEXAS RESOLUTIONS (1989).
209. The Democratic Presidential candidate spoke of the issue only once, in early
October 1988, implying that the incumbent President was partly to blame for the crisis
because of the role played by the expansion of thrift powers in bringing about the difficulty
and the role of the Vice President as head of an interagency task force that in 1984 made
recommendations concerning the future of the industry. See Dukakis Says Bush Is Partly to
Blame for Thrift Crisis, AM. BANKER, Oct. 3, 1988, at 5.
210. See Deregulation Started Thrifts Snowballing Downhill, AM. BANKER, Dec. 30,
1988, at 6.
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cerning regulatory actions against individual thrifts; most (though by no
means all) of those charges were against Democratic members.1
But with the election of a new President, the repeated delay of action
came to an abrupt halt. With the election behind, the new Administration
and the new Congress became suddenly anxious to resolve the crisis as
quickly as possible, so that the issue would be shuttled from public view as
soon before the next election as possible. Within three weeks of taking
office, the Bush administration announced its proposal for handling the thrift
crisis. 212 That complex and massive proposal would become FIRREA. The
proposal was implemented in part almost as soon as it was announced.
Before enactment, the regulatory restructuring proposal and the transfer of
the function of administering thrift deposit insurance to the FDIC (while
abolishing the FSLIC) were accomplished. 213  New receiverships and
conservatorships of thrifts were frozen during legislative consideration of the
measure. 21 4 The measure, however, moved quickly and efficiently through
Congress with little change. The two houses of Congress passed bills in
June, and the Conference Committee resolved problems in early August.21 5
The President signed the bill on August 9, 1989, just before the moratorium
on thrift exits from the thrift to the bank insurance fund was about to
expire. 21
6
In fact, during the course of its consideration, the legislation engendered
little controversy. The two most difficult issues in the legislation concerned
whether to place the entire bailout on budget and whether to impose new,
toughened, bank-like capital standards on thrifts that had been allowed to use
regulatory accounting practices in connection with acquisitions or conver-
sions effected under Bank Board supervision. The principal funding mecha-
nism of the bill involved the issuance of obligations by the newly formed
211. On the role, for example, of Jim Wright, the Speaker of the House, who had been
instrumental in blocking congressional approval of the legislation to fund the Financing
Corporation in 1986, see Ethics Report: How Wright Tried to Get Regulator Fired, AM.
BANKER, Apr. 29, 1989, at 16; Maria Dickerson, Lawmakers Accept a Measure of Blame for
S&L Crisis, AM. BANKER, Apr. 26, 1989, at 13.
212. See President's Plan to Restructure Regulation of Thrifts, AM. BANKER, Feb. 8,
1989, at 4.
213. See Jim McTague, FDIC Takes Control of 222 S&Ls: Agency Begins Merger with
FSLIC; Southwest Plan Halted, AM. BANKER, Feb. 8, 1989, at 1.
214. See id.
215. See Robert M. Garsson, Bush Threatens Veto on S&L Bill in Budget Fight, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 4, 1989, at 1.
216. See Robert M. Garsson, President's Pen Ends Era of Deregulation for Thrift
Industry, AM. BANKER, Aug. 10, 1989, at 1.
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Resolution Funding Corporation (Refcorp), which in turn, was to lend the
proceeds to the Resolution Trust Corporation - the agency formed to handle
thrifts going into insolvency in the years following FIRREA's adoption." 7
The House bill would have placed the amounts of the obligations on budget,
which obviously would have compounded the Administration's political
difficulties with the "structural" budget deficit.2" 8 The Conference Commit-
tee, however, followed the Senate version by leaving the bonds off budget.2"9
In the final stages of the House's consideration of the bill, the thrift industry
made a major push to amend provisions that would have abrogated undertak-
ings by the Bank Board that permitted the use of regulatory capital stan-
dards.' Amendments protecting the thrifts were defeated on the House
floor by substantial votes."
Although it is very long and textually intricate, FIRREA, as one of the
seven major banking enactments of the last seventeen years, has the simplest
evolutionary history and, in terms of the political and interest group competi-
tion that produced it, is relatively simple. The most important objective of
the enactment was to fund the bailout. It did this by creating a new financ-
ing entity, Refcorp, which operated in a manner similar to that of the Fi-
nancing Corporation established by the 1987 legislation.'m Refcorp's fund-
ing, however, was much greater than the Financing Corporation's ($50
billion initially, which was enhanced by the 1991 FDICIA legislation),2m and
provision was made for ultimate use of taxpayer funds in connection with the
rescue.
224
217. See Garsson, supra note 215, at 1.
218. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing structural budget deficit).
219. See Garsson, supra note 215, at 1.
220. See Robert M. Garsson, House Affirms Tough S&L Capital Rules: Industry Fails
to Sway Vote on Protection of Goodwill, AM. BANKER, June 16, 1989, at 1 [hereinafter
Garsson, House Affirms]; Robert M. Garsson, Tough S&L Rule on Core Capital Likely to
Stick: House Panel's Measure Expected to Be Enacted, AM. BANKER, May 4, 1989, at 1.
These efforts are discussed in a number of the courts of appeals decisions considering the
capital standards issue. See infra notes 285-311 and accompanying text.
221. See Garsson, House Affirms, supra note 220, at 1.
222. 12 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (Supp. 11989) (amended 1991, 1992); see supra note 201 and
accompanying text (discussing Financing Corporation).
223. See Resolution Trust Corporation Refinancing, Restructuring, and Improvement Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-233, § 101, 105 Stat. 1761; see also infra note 224 and accompa-
nying discussion (describing RTC and Refcorp).
224. The original amount of $50 billion was comprised of $18.8 billion raised in a
Treasury bond offering and transferred to the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and $31.2
billion transferred to the RTC by the Resolution Funding Corporation (Refcorp). See 12
U.S.C. §§ 1441a(b)(14)(A), 1441b(e)(8), b(0(1) (Supp. 1 1989) (amended 1991, 1992).
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Refcorp, like the 1987 Act's Financing Corporation, is a mixed ownership government
corporation with a directorate comprised of the director of the Bank Board's Office of
Finance and two FHLB presidents. Id. § 1441b(c)(1). It, however, is subject to direction
by the Oversight Board, which originally consisted of the Secretaries of the Treasury and
Housing and Urban Development, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve, and two other members appointed by the President. Id. § 1441a(a)(1)-(2) (amended
1991, 1992). The Oversight Board's composition was crafted carefully so that there were two
Executive Branch officials, balanced by two nominees especially named for the purpose (and
who thus were not Executive Branch officials), plus the independent Fed Chairman. This left
ambiguous the extent to which control over the bailout was vested in the "executive" or was
an "independent agency" type arrangement under greater congressional control.
Refcorp was to raise the $31.2 billion through stock subscriptions by the FHLBs of $1.2
billion and a debt offering of $30 billion. Id. § 1441b(e)(8), b(f)(1). The $30 billion was to
be used to purchase "capital certificates" of the RTC. Id. § 1441b(f)(1). Refcorp then was
required to establish a Funding Corporation Principal Fund (FCPF) in the amount of the
discounted present value of the face amount of Refcorp's obligation, to be invested in zero
coupon Treasury obligations to finance repayment of principal on the Refcorp obligations.
Id. § 144lb(g)(2). Interest on the Refcorp obligations was to be funded first by any assets
of Refcorp outside the FCPF, second by distributions from the RTC of excess funds collected
in the process of the receiverships, third from contributions from the FHLBs of not more than
$300 million annually, and finally, by contributions from the Treasury. Id. § 1441b(t)(2)
(amended 1992).
The RTC itself in its original form was a mixed ownership government corporation and
agency that was subject to supervision by the Oversight Board. Id. § 1441a(a), (b)(1)(B)
(amended 1991, 1992). Under FIRREA as originally enacted, the FDIC served as the
"manager" of the RTC, which meant that as a practical matter it acted for the RTC. The
Oversight Board was empowered to "replace" the FDIC as the RTC manager for specified
causes. Id. § 1441a(b)(1)(C) (amended 1991). The RTC was vested with jurisdiction over
thrifts entering receivership or conservatorship in the three years following the date of
enactment of FIRREA (August 9, 1989 to August 8, 1992). Id. § 1441a(1)(3)(A) (amended
1991, 1992, 1993).
The Resolution Trust Corporation Refinancing, Restructuring, and Improvement Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-233, § 101, 105 Stat. 1761, provided an additional $25 billion in
Treasury funding for the RTC, through April 1, 1992. See 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(i)(1)(3) (Supp.
11991). The amount was increased to the limit of the RTC's needs by the Resolution Trust
Corporation Completion Act of December 17, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-204, § 2, 107 Stat.
2369, 2370-71. The 1991 statute also extended the jurisdiction of the RTC to receiverships
or conservatorships commenced through October 1, 1993. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(A)(ii)
(Supp. 111 1991) (amended 1993). The 1993 law extended the period to a date between
January 1 and July 1, 1995, as determined by the Oversight Board. The Board in fact
determined the date to be April 1, 1995, which was the date on which RTC receiverships and
conservatorships ended. Id. § 1441a(b)(3)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 1993). The statute also created a
chief executive officer of the RTC, appointed by the President and subject to Senate confirma-
tion. Id. § 1441a(b)(8)(C) (Supp. V 1993). Additionally, the statute eliminated the FDIC's
role as the "manager" of the RTC, thus constituting the RTC as an agency separate from the
FDIC, though its powers and duties as receiver or conservator continued to be governed by
the same provisions of the DIA as govern the FDIC. See Resolution Trust Corporation
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In connection with funding the rescue with borrowings and taxpayer
funds, the legislation contemplated two other sources of funds: deposit
insurance premiums from healthy thrifts and the insolvency estates of the
insured thrifts. The statute increased the premiums paid by thrifts so that
there was a substantial difference between bank and thrift premiums.' It
imposed exit fees on institutions leaving the thrift fund and entrance fees on
institutions entering the bank fund. It also placed a moratorium on transac-
tions by which an institution converted from thrift form to bank form.'
Refinancing, Restructuring, and Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-233, § 310, 105
Stat. 1761, 1769 (repealing 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(8)). Management of the RTC was vested
in the chief executive officer and the Oversight Board, which was renamed the Thrift Deposi-
tor Protection Oversight Board, and reconstituted by expanding its membership from five to
seven persons, taking the HUD Secretary off the Board and placing on the Board the Director
of OTS, the Chair of the FDIC, and the RTC chief executive officer. This left the Oversight
Board with mixed executive and independent agency status, with a board comprised of two
executive officers (the Treasury Secretary and OTS Director), two independent agency heads
(the FDIC Chair and Board of Governors Chair), and three specially appointed officers. 12
U.S.C. § 1441a(a)(1)-(3), (b)(8)(C)-(D) (Supp. V 1993).
In addition, FIRREA expanded the membership of the FDIC. Prior to FIRREA, the
FDIC had a three-member board, comprised of the Comptroller and two Presidential appoint-
ees confirmed by the Senate, one of whom was Chair. When it placed thrifts in the SAIF
under FDIC control, Congress made the OTS Director a member of the FDIC Board, which
it expanded to five members to ensure that the special Presidential appointees remained a
majority. With the expansion to five members, however, it became possible for the Senate
to put the corporation in a position where the two Executive Branch officers could constitute
a majority for a period of time by acting with glacial slowness in confirming the appointments
to the full-time directorship positions. The Senate wasted little time in availing itself of this
opportunity.
225. The premiums for BIF members were set at 0.0833% of the deposit base for 1989,
rising to 0.12% for 1990, and 0.15% for 1991. For SAIF members, the fees were set at
0.208% until December 31, 1989, rising to 0.23% for 1991 through 1993, falling to 0.18%
from 1994 through 1997, and through 0.15% thereafter. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(C)-(D)
(Supp. 11989) (amended 1990, 1991). FDICIA created authority on the part of the FDIC to
reduce assessment rates for BIF members if BIF reserves exceeded the designated reserve
ratio. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(C) (1994).
226. The statute imposed a five-year moratorium on "conversion transactions," generally
defined as transactions by which a BIF member became an organized insured by the SAIF or
a SAIF member became an organization that would be insured by the BIF (e.g., a conversion
of a federal savings bank into a state savings bank or the conversion of an S&L into a bank).
12 U.S.C. § 1815(d)(2) (Supp. 11989) (amended 1993). The moratorium was subject to an
exception for mergers of institutions that were commonly controlled; these were permitted,
even when involving a SAIF member and a BIF member, provided that a portion of the
resulting institution's deposit, the "adjusted attributable deposit amount" (AADA) remained
subject to SAIF premiums. These were so-called "Oakar banks," named for the provisions
of the "Oakar amendment" that authorized them, named in turn for Rep. Mary Oakar of
Ohio, the sponsor of the amendment. The amendment was adopted during the conference
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The statute also effected a regulatory reorganization of the banking
agencies by abolishing the Bank Board and FSLIC, 7 which had come under
intense criticism for their handling of the crisis. It transferred the deposit
insurance functions of the Bank Board to the FDIC and transferred the
chartering and holding company regulatory functions to a newly created
agency in the Treasury - the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). 22 To
manage the resolution of the thrifts then in difficulties, the legislation created
the RTC, which was to be administered by an Oversight Board that included
officials of both independent agencies and the executive branch, and whose
day-to-day administration would be executed by the FDIC (with its legal
authority coming from the FDIA). 9
The statute overhauled the federal thrift chartering law and amended the
deposit insurance laws in ways that imposed restrictions on state thrift char-
tering laws. The principal thrust of this effort was the enactment of provi-
sions restricting thrift powers. FIRREA amended the provisions of the
Home Owners Loan Act of 1932 to cut back on the 1982 extensions.' It
included provisions restricting the power of state chartered thrifts to hold
committee consideration of the legislation during July 1989 and was supported heavily by the
commercial banking industry (and opposed by the thrift industry). FDICIA lifted the conver-
sion moratorium generally, subject to a requirement based on the Oakar amendment, that the
AADA portion of deposits remain subject to premiums to the fund by which the acquired
institution was insured before the transaction. 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d)(3) (Supp. M 1991)
(amended 1992, 1994).
227. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-73, § 401, 101 Stat. 183, 354-57. As noted above, the existence of the Bank
Board and FSLIC effectively were ended as of the date the Administration proposed the
legislation. On that date, the FDIC assumed responsibility for the receiverships and conserva-
torships under FSLIC control at that time. Functions of the Bank Board were transferred to
the Treasury at the time, in what would become the OTS. The transfer of functions was
hailed as a victory by elements of the commercial banking industry, particularly the independ-
ent bankers, who, at the time of the proposal of FIREA, predicted that the transfer would
meet with severe opposition from the thrift industry. This opposition was not forthcoming.
228. Id. § 402, 101 Stat. 183, 357-60.
229. See supra note 224 and accompanying discussion.
230. FIRREA restricted federal thrift nonresidential real estate loans to 400% of capital,
subject to discretionary variation by the OTS; consumer loans and investments in corporate
debt and commercial paper to 30% of assets; and investments in personalty (leases) and
commercial loans to 10% of assets. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(C)(2)(B)-(D) (Supp. 11989) (amended
1991, 1992). These were down from 40% of assets under the 1982 Act (down, unless an
institution's capital exceeded 10% of assets, which would rarely be the case) from unlimited
investment in corporate debt and commercial paper plus 20% of assets in consumer loans and
from 10% of assets each in personal property leases and commercial loans. See supra notes
165-66 and accompanying text.
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junk bonds, equity investment in real estate, or to collect brokered
deposits. 3 Most significantly, it imposed a "qualified thrift lender" test
(QTL) on thrifts, which required that, to continue as thrifts, they hold sev-
enty percent of their assets as residential real estate loans or securities
backed by such loans.3 2 Failure to do so relegated the thrift to the powers
of a national bank. 3 One-thrift holding companies, which always have been
permitted to engage in any industrial activity, were to be subject to BHCA
restrictions if their thrifts were not QTLs, unless the thrifts had been ac-
quired in an assisted transaction effected under the provisions of the regula-
tors' bill. 4 Indeed, a thrift holding company, all of whose thrifts had been
acquired in such transactions, was freed of else-imposed restrictions on
nonbanking (nonthrifting) activities. 5 Finally, and perhaps most signifi-
cantly for the litigation that the statute generated, the statute imposed capital
standards upon thrifts identical to those imposed on banks, together with a
new tangible capital standard specially applicable to thrifts.' The new
capital standard abrogated the forbearance agreements that had been agreed
to throughout the 1980s by the Bank Board in structuring combinations of
smaller thrifts with larger ones, and the new standard also set in motion the
saga detailed below.
Additionally, the statute overhauled the deposit insurance law, Which
became a single law applicable to both banks and thrifts. The deposit insur-
ance law constitutes, in part, a comprehensive special bankruptcy law appli-
cable to financial institutions. The overhaul of the deposit insurance laws
included most of the provisions, noted at the outset, that burden parties who
are relative strangers to the crisis (nondepositor creditors, uninsured deposi-
tors, holding companies or other shareholders, lessors, lessees, and other
parties engaged in transactions with the institutions), and which have gener-
ated litigation following the pattern suggested at the outset3 7 FIRREA
expanded the circumstances in which the federal chartering agency could
place an institution in receivership or conservatorship; 8 established a claims
231. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831e, 1831f(Supp. 11989) (amended 1991, 1994).
232. Id. § 1467a(m)(1) (Supp I. 1989) (amended 1991, 1992).
233. Id. § 1467a(m)(3)(A) (Supp. 11989) (amended 1991, 1992). The restrictions on
thrift investments, and particularly the restrictive QTL test, were heavily supported by the
commercial banking industry and opposed by the thrift industry.
234. Id. § 1467a(c)(3) (Supp. 11989).
235. Id. § 1467a(m)(3)(B) (Supp. 11989).
236. Id. § 1464(t) (amended 1991, 1992). See infra notes 263-67 and accompanying
text.
237. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
238. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(4)-(5) (amended 1991, 1992, 1994). See LANGBEIN, supra
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procedure for processing claims, the provisions governing which are highly
ambiguous;" 9 expanded the rights of the deposit insurer as receiver against
lessors of the institution or the institution's lessees, as well as other parties
dealing with the institution;2' provided a minimum gross negligence stan-
dard in suits against the officers and directors of an insured depository
institution; and revised and strengthened the statutory "side agreement"
rule.24 With respect to uninsured creditors of the institution, in connection
with P&A transactions, the statute provided that no such creditor was enti-
tled to more than it would receive if the institution were liquidated.243
Finally, the statute provided for the acquisition of healthy thrifts by
bank holding companies. Under the BHCA, there had been a long-standing
question concerning whether the acquisition of a thrift by a bank holding
company (BHC) was permissible.2" At the time of and as an inducement to
congressional enactment of the 1982 legislation, the Board had approved
some acquisitions by BHCs of healthy thrifts, but it had not instituted a
policy of regularly doing so, in part from fear of court challenges. 5
FIRREA expressly permitted BHCs to acquire any thrift,2 and a special
provision added in the final stages of consideration of the bill - the Oakar
Amendment - permitted BHCs to convert acquired thrifts to banks,
notwithstanding the moratorium imposed on such transactions, if the
institution continued to pay thrift rather than bank premiums with respect to
a portion of its deposits; such amount to be determined by the level of
deposits the institution had on hand at the time of the conversion.247
Complex though the provisions may have been, with respect to the
political environment in which the statute was enacted and in relation to the
fault lines that subsist among and divide the industry, the policy thrust of the
statute is relatively clear and well defined. The statute was a crushing defeat
for the thrift industry, one that threatened its very existence. The premium
increases imposed much of the cost of the bailout on the healthy thrifts,
which were trapped as thrifts by the moratorium and exit fees. The QTL
note 58, § 2.45.
239. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)-(14) (amended 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994).
240. Id. § 1821(e) (amended 1991, 1994).
241. Id. § 1821(k).
242. Id. § 1823(e) (amended 1994).
243. Id. § 1821(i)(2).
244. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
245. Id.
246. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(i) (Supp. 11989).
247. See supra note 226 and accompanying discussion.
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tests and the powers restrictions stripped the industry of what it had thought
it had won in 1982, however Pyrrhic that victory may have turned out to be.
To whatever extent competition for retaining premium value of institutions
was at issue, the banking industry won and the thrift industry lost under the
legislation, and the larger banking interests won more than the smaller. This
was reflected in the provision for BHC acquisitions of thrifts, intensified by
the Oakar Amendment, the QTL restrictions on one-thrift holding compa-
nies, and the enhanced power of the regulators to force receiverships or
conservatorships. As between large banks and large thrifts, the imposition
of bank capital standards, particularly the retroactive abrogation of the
forbearance agreements, favored the banking industry. As between small
thrifts and small banks, the transfer of functions from the Bank Board to the
OTS under Treasury control was a victory for the small banks.
II. The Supervisory Goodwill Litigation Under FIRREA
The discussion below proceeds by briefly describing capital standards
and the regulatory forbearance program pursued by the Bank Board in the
early 1980s, including a brief description of why that program affected the
pricing of transactions in which healthy thrifts were enlisted to take over
ailing thrifts during the "first phase" of the thrift crisis. Next, the provisions
that abrogated those forbearance agreements are presented in some detail.
The trend of the case law in the lower courts leading to the Winstar decision
then will be discussed. Finally, a discussion of how the Supreme Court's
recent approach to the Takings Clause might be applied to the question of
supervisory goodwill is set forth.
A. A Description of the Problem
1. Capital Standards and Intangible Capital Generally
The most serious litigation problem posed by FIRREA to date has
arisen from the imposition of bank-type capital standards on thrifts. As
indicated above,' next to the question whether to place the bailout on or off
budget, the question of imposing bank-type capital standards on thrifts was
the most contentious issue raised in consideration of the legislation, one that
was not resolved until the final days of the legislation. When the legislation
was in the final stage's of consideration, the thrifts made plain their intention
to bring suit to block enforcement of the capital standards provision on
constitutional grounds. The provisions were adopted notwithstanding the
248. See supra notes 217-21 and accompanying text.
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opposition, and within weeks of the legislation's passage the thrifts made
good on their pledge.
"Capital standards" are requirements imposed by regulators that require
institutions to maintain on their balance sheets a certain amount of capital,
which is expressed as a percentage of assets. Capital standards have been
elevated over the last decade and now play a central role in bank regulation.
The statutory basis for the capital standards imposed upon banks is the
International Lending Standards Act of 1983 (ILSA), which directed the
bank regulatory agencies to adopt capital adequacy standards.249 At the time,
the capital standards applied by the agencies were "leverage" standards,
which measure capital as a percentage of assets. The current leverage
requirement is six percent, of which three percent must consist of Tier 1, or
"core," capital; the remainder is Tier 2.'o
In 1987, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and the Bank
of England agreed for the first time on the development of risk-weighted
capital standards. These standards also count Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital as a
percentage of assets, but measure assets by weighting them for risk. The
risk weighting not only accounts for risk, but also seeks to account for off
balance sheet items (OBSIs), which are items that create risk though they are
not reflected on the balance sheet. These items include many swap or deriv-
atives transactions, standby letters of credit, loan commitments, and the like.
The risk weighting divides assets into four categories, weighted at zero,
249. 12 U.S.C. § 3907 (1994). The statute authorizes each of the banking agencies
(including the Bank Board prior to FIRREA and the OTS subsequently) to "cause" institutions
"to achieve and maintain adequate capital by establishing minimum levels of capital" and "to
establish such minimum level of capital . . . as the agency . . . deems to be necessary or
appropriate." Id. § 3907(a)(1)-(2). It provides further that the failure of an institution to
maintain its minimum level of capital can be treated as an unsafe or unsound practice subject
to enforcement proceedings under § 8 of the FDIA and provides for the issuance of capital
directives by the agencies. Prior to the enactment of ILSA, strict review of agency enforce-
ment orders predicated upon challenges to the adequacy of an institution's capital had cast
doubt upon the agencies' authority to impose capital adequacy standards. See First Nat'l
Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller, 697 F.2d 674, 685-86 (5th Cir. 1983). With respect to the
application of the ILSA provision to the OTS, that provision also is subject to the provisions
of § 5(t) of the HOLA, as amended by FIRREA.
250. Tier 1 capital under contemporary standards typically consists of common stockhold-
ers' equity, including retained surplus; noncumulative perpetual preferred stock; and minority
interests in equity capital accounts of consolidated controlled subsidiaries. Tier 2 capital
includes allowances for loan and lease losses, up to a maximum of 1.25 % of risk-weighted
assets; cumulative perpetual preferred stock and long-term preferred stock (maturities of 20
years or more); hybrid (mandatory convertible) debt securities; and term subordinated debt
or intermediate term preferred stock (maturities of over 5 years or more), the latter categories
limited to a maximum of 50% of Tier 2 capital. See 12 C.F.R. § 325, Appendix A (1995).
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twenty, fifty, and one hundred percent. The zero percent category includes
principally government paper; the twenty percent category includes mostly
bank deposits or other claims on banks of member countries in the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development; the fifty percent category
includes principally mortgages secured by one- to four-family dwellings; and
the one hundred percent category includes all other assets. Weighting OBSIs
requires placing the items into one of the four categories and applying the
corresponding weight to derive a credit equivalent amount (CEA) for the
item. The CEA is then weighted according to its risk category and included
in assets.
In their current form, both sets of regulations provide for subtracting
intangible assets from capital. The rules have been tightened over the years
to exclude intangible assets from inclusion in capital; at present only mort-
gage servicing rights and the rights to service certain credit-card receivables
are included in capital." The subtraction method proceeds as follows:
Suppose that the capital adequacy rule is the risk-weighted figure under
current regulations (8%), of which at least half (4%) must be Tier 1, or
core, capital. 2 Suppose that assets are 2000, which includes 200 of good-
will (from an acquisition accounted for under a purchase method of account-
ing). Suppose total capital is 350, including 275 of core capital. The 200
in goodwill will be subtracted from the 2000 assets figure, from the 350 total
capital figure, and from the 275 core capital figure. The capital adequacy
measures will thus be 150/1800 (or 8.33 %) for total capital; 75/1800 (or
4.17%) for core capital; and the institution will meet its capital standards.
If instead, the core capital figure was 250, the institution's core capital ratio
would be 2.78% ((250-200)/1800), and the institution would not meet its
capital standard, notwithstanding that its core capital is 12.5% (250/2000)
of assets computed without the deduction for goodwill.
2. Regulatory Accounting Practices (RAPs), Supervisory
Goodwill, and Forbearances in the Implementation of the Regulators'
Bill Under Garn-St Germain in the Early 1980s
In the early 1980s, the Bank Board, as part of its policy of "giving
time" to troubled thrifts to work out their difficulties, began a program of
allowing "forbearance" to thrifts under regulatory accounting principles.
The most important device adopted was the allowance of regulatory account-
ing procedure (RAP) goodwill and supervisory goodwill. These practices
came under heavy criticism during the enactment of FIRREA; however, the
251. Id. item B(1).
252. Id.
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practice should be evaluated in light of the regulatory space development of
the thrift crisis - which created an early period of accounting to minimize
the seriousness of the crisis (to justify limited action in the belief that time
would cure the difficulties of the industry), followed by a period of empha-
sizing difficulties (to create a crisis atmosphere leading to expedited legisla-
tion so that the matter was moved away from public attention). The prac-
tices also should be evaluated in light of institution's premium value. Institu-
tions generate enterprise value, a value that is not subject to determinate
accounting practice. The omission of a goodwill item is in some ways as
problematic as allowing it from the standpoint of the substantive economics
of an institution.
Supervisory goodwill worked as follows: A healthy institution acquired
a troubled institution. At the time of the acquisition, the target had liabilities
in excess of its assets. The Bank Board provided assistance, which might
have been a cash payment or a promise to make payment in the future - for
instance, a yield maintenance agreement with respect to certain assets that
guaranteed a minimum annual yield to the assets or a note given to the
institution in purchasing a net worth or income capital certificate. Suppose
the healthy institution had, prior to the acquisition, assets of 5000 and capital
of 400, and faced a capital requirement of six percent, which it plainly met.
(We need not distinguish among types of capital requirement for these
purposes because the objective is simply to identify the idea behind supervi-
sory goodwill.) Suppose the acquired institution had assets of 1000 and
liabilities of 1500 and that the acquiring institution is willing to enter the
transaction upon the payment of 200 in assistance by the Bank Board.
RAP goodwill would allow for the treatment of the 300 excess of the
liabilities over the sum of the assets and the assistance (1000-1500+200) in
goodwill; supervisory goodwill would allow for the inclusion of 200 in
assets. Many observers, including some of the courts considering the ques-
tion, have looked at this situation and characterized it as "upside down"
because it allows an excess of liabilities over book assets to be treated as an
asset. This mistakes the idea behind this accounting. The justification for
including the 200 assistance in capital is that it is an asset, at worst an obli-
gation of a government corporation (but one that a strong public interest
suggests the government ultimately will back up). The justification for
including the 300 excess is that this represents the "enterprise value" of the
institution, and this value is real.
Moreover, a crude algebraic example reveals that the capital rules
agreed upon are a material element in determining the amount of assistance
the agency has to offer, which is the "price" agreed to by the parties; and,
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at the same time, this algebraic example suggests the measure of the "cost"
of the capital rules to the government.
3. Capital Standards, Forbearance, and the Pricing of
Assistance in Assisted Transactions
The problem of capital ratios for institution managers can be briefly, if
crudely, summarized as follows: Assume an institution faces a cost of capital
as to which it is a "taker," that is, its bargaining does not affect the price.
There is a fixed rate cost of debt (rd) and of equity (r). In addition, the
institution seeks a rate of return on assets (ra) and faces a required capital
ratio (k). Denominating its total assets A and total liabilities L, its earnings
(which includes growth in equity) will be determined by the spread between
its return on its assets (raA) and its cost on its liabilities (rdL), which will
equal the demanded return to equity (rkkA) (the corporate equity will be kA).
The equation thus generated can be resolved to express the capital ratio in
terms of the relationship between the "sought" spread between the rate of
return on assets and the "taken" spread between the rate of return on equity
and rate of return on debt:
ra-r l
rk -rl
An increase in the capital ratio, accordingly, increases the rate of return on
assets that the manager must seek to obtain the requisite return on equity,
assuming fixed cost of capital (both debt and equity). Equally clearly,
capital that demands a lower rate of return also reduces the rate of return to
assets the manager must find to achieve the requisite rate of return. Best of
all is phantom capital - intangible capital - which requires no rate of
return; this means the capital ratio can be satisfied with a still lesser rate of
return to assets.
It appears that phantom capital of this sort is thus an evil because it
enables the manager to escape responsibility for achieving a high rate of
return and thus masks poor performance and ultimately, perhaps, under-
capitalization. That is not so clear, however, if one bears in mind the reality
of the premium value of institutions: The return is intangible but real. If one
does not account for the premium value by taking into account intangible
capital to some extent, one may be requiring excessive capitalization, which
ultimately will depress earnings and eventually lead to capital problems. The
point here is not to resolve this question, but merely to note its existence and
the novelty and indefiniteness of capital adequacy theory on this point (which
corresponds to like indefiniteness on others). It bears noting only because,
during the FIRREA legislative history, much was made of the "evils" of
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forbearance accounting and the allowance of supervisory goodwill and other
intangible capital.
The above discussion may be clarified by simple numbers. Suppose the
capital ratio is 10 percent, the rate of return on liabilities is 8 percent, and
the demanded return on equity 20 percent. Suppose the assets of the institu-
tion are 500. If the institution meets its capital ratio, its liabilities will be
450 (500-(500x10%)); its debt cost 36 (450x8%); and the demanded equity
return 10 ((500x10%)-(500x8%)). Thus, it will need to achieve a rate of
return on assets of 9.2% ((10+36)/500).
Now, suppose this solvent institution is faced with the prospect of pur-
chasing an insolvent institution that, because of economies of scale, entry
into new markets, or some other synergistic effect, will enable it to enhance
its rate of return on assets. Suppose the target institution has assets of 70
and liabilities of 90, but for whatever reason, the acquiring institution is
willing to acquire the institution upon payment of assistance by the deposit
insurer of 10. Thus, liabilities (90) exceed the assets and assistance pay-
ments (70+ 10) by 10. There are three ways of counting the capital of the
new (combined) institution, using a purchase method, which, for these
purposes, means that the capital position of the target preacquisition is
irrelevant. One way is to treat the acquired capital as 0 ((70-90)+10+10)
- which gives credit both for the assistance payment of 10 (which in many
cases was contingent or otherwise "phantom" because it was given by an
insolvent FSLIC in the form of exotic devices like yield maintenance agree-
ments or acquisition notes on capital certificates), and for the supervisory
goodwill of 10 (the excess of the liabilities assumed over the sum of the
assets and assistance payments). A second method is to treat the acquired
capital as -10 - which gives credit only for the assets and assistance pay-
ments ((70-90)+10). The third method is to give credit only for the assets;
the acquired capital is thus -20 (70-90). In any case, the institution will have
to raise some additional capital to meet its capital requirement. Allowing the
phantom capital will reduce the blended, demanded return on equity (to
19.33% if 20 is allowed as capital, or to 19.67% if 10 is allowed). The
amount by which the rate of return on assets will have to be increased will
be lower depending on how liberal the capital rule is. If one assumes, as is
likely, that the change in the rate of return on assets to be affected by the
transaction is fixed, then the variable will be the amount of assistance that
the institution demands as a condition of entry into the transaction - so that
the capital rule agreed to by the parties is intimately linked to the price
charged.
Let us plug in a set of numbers to see how the capital rule can affect the
parties' decisions concerning entry into the transactions. Suppose the combi-
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nation will increase the rate of return on assets to 9.4%. Assume that the 10
of assistance from FSLIC is in the form of a capital maintenance certificate
that is invested in an FSLIC note, with matching returns on the note and
certificate so that there is no net cash flow associated with the note. After
combination, the institutions will have "hard" assets of 580 (exclusive of the
FSLIC note or other asset embodying the assistance) - the 500 it had origi-
nally, the 70 it acquires, and the 10 acquired with a requisite hard capital
contribution of 10. Its aggregate return will be 54.52 (9.4% of 580). The
amount it will need to earn is 55.2 (9.2% of 600, because it still has the
same percentage mix of liabilities and hard equity - 540 liabilities, 60
equity). Assume that a shortfall to this will be made up by a yield mainte-
nance payment from FSLIC, which is the "real" cost to it of the transaction.
If the full 20 is counted as equity, the acquirer must make an infusion of
only 10, and the FSLIC yield maintenance payment is 0.68, which represents
6.8% of the amount of the cost of liquidating the institution. If only the 10
represented by the certificate is counted, the required infusion will be 20; the
hard capital structure now will comprise 540 of liabilities and 70 of equity,
with a demanded return of 57.2 (43.2, or 8 % of the liabilities, plus 12, or
20% of equity); the earnings will be 55.46 (9.4% of assets of 540); and the
shortfall will be 1.74 (57.2-55.46), which represents 17.4% of the liquida-
tion cost. If neither the certificate nor the supervisory goodwill is reflected
as capital, the demanded return will rise to 59.2, the earnings to 56.4, and
the shortfall to 2.8, which represents 28% of the liquidation cost of the
institution. At that rate, the transaction is likely to be too costly to the
FSLIC in relation to the cost of liquidating the institution.
This example assumes that the FSLIC would make up in yield mainte-
nance payments the full cost of a change in the capital rule. In practice, a
change would be factored into a negotiation between the acquirer and in-
surer, resulting in a payment that made up part, but not all, of the cost.
Thus, the example demonstrates two points: First, the amount of the regula-
tory capital allowed is a material determinant of the price; and second, on
the final rule (requiring an annual maintenance payment equal to 28 % of
liquidation cost), the amount probably would prohibit the deal because the
liquidation of the institution likely would be the more economical course for
the deposit insurer to pursue.
B. The FIRREA Provisions at Issue
FIRREA abrogated the forbearances that the Bank Board had allowed
in connection with thrift acquisitions and conversions during the 1980s. One
objective of FIRREA was to impose bank-like capital standards on the thrift
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industry. 53 FIRREA added a new Section 5(t) to the Home Owners' Loan
Act, 4 which requires the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision by
regulation to "prescribe and maintain uniformly applicable capital standards
for savings associations. '" These standards were to include a leverage
limit, a tangible capital requirement, and a risk-based capital requirement.6
The capital requirements were to be promulgated as final regulations within
90 days of the date of FIRREA's enactment, to be effective within 120 days
of the enactment date,' and the standards involved were to be "no less
stringent than the capital standards applicable to national banks. "Is The
statute specified further that the leverage limit was to require that savings
associations maintain core capital in an amount not less than 3 percent of the
association's total assets259 and a tangible capital requirement not less than
1.5 percent of total assets.26 The statute also required a risk-based capital
requirement, which was permitted to "deviate from the risk-based capital
standards applicable to national banks to reflect interest-rate risk or other
risks." However, "such deviations" were not permitted "in the aggregate"
to "result in materially lower levels of capital being required of savings
associations under the risk-based capital requirement than would be required
under the risk-based capital standards applicable to national banks. "26'
The statute contained express provisions governing intangible capital.
The statute expressly permitted savings associations to include, in calculating
capital for purposes of the leverage and risk-based limits, ninety percent of
the fair market value of "readily marketable purchased mortgage servicing
rights," on terms "no less stringent" than those applicable to both state
nonmember banks and national banks.'6 A similar rule applied to the
tangible capital requirement, subject to the power of the FDIC to prescribe
a maximum percentage of such value that could be included by a thrift.263
Core capital was defined as "core capital as defined by the Comptroller of
the Currency for national banks, less any unidentifiable intangible assets,
253. See supra notes 217-21, 236 and accompanying text.
254. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t) (1994).
255. Id. § 1464(t)(1)(A).
256. Id. § 1464(t)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
257. Id. § 1464(t)(1)(D).
258. Id. § 1464(t)(1)(C).
259. Id. § 1464(t)(2)(A).
260. Id. § 1464(t)(2)(B).
261. Id. § 1464(t)(2)(C).
262. Id. § 1464(t)(4)(A).
263. See id. § 1464(t)(4)(B)-(C)(i).
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plus any purchased mortgage servicing rights excluded from the Comptrol-
ler's definition of capital but included in calculating the core capital of
savings associations" under Section 5(t)(4).1' Tangible capital was defined
as "core capital minus any intangible assets (as intangible assets are defined
by the Comptroller of the Currency for national banks). "26
As a result of a compromise reached in the late stages of the legisla-
tion's consideration, the statute set forth a transition rule applicable to "qual-
ifying supervisory goodwill." Savings associations were permitted to include
qualifying supervisory goodwill in calculating core capital in an amount of
up to 1.5 percent of total assets until 1992, 1 percent during 1992, 0.75
percent during 1993, 0.375 percent during 1994, and zero thereafter.' The
statute also provided for the amortization of supervisory goodwill over the
shorter of twenty years from April 12, 1989, or the period otherwise remain-
ing under the amortization schedule in effect on April 12, 1989.67
The statute provided that prior to January 1, 1991, the OTS Director
could restrict the asset growth of any savings association not in compliance
with capital standards and could require a capital plan of any association,
beginning sixty days after the promulgation of regulations under Section
5(t).268
C. The Litigation
1. The Injunction Litigation in the District Courts
a. The Early District Court Injunctions. FIRREA was signed on
August 9, 1989, and, on November 7, 1989, the OTS proposed capital regu-
lations governing thrifts.269 Shortly thereafter, the OTS began to determine
that thrifts whose supervisory goodwill was eliminated under the FIRREA
provisions were not in compliance with the capital standards and also began
to require "consent letters" authorizing OTS to arrange a sale or merger of
the institutions. A number of the institutions responded with lawsuits seek-
ing injunctive relief against the OTS actions.
The cases fall into three categories: those involving single institutions,
which ordinarily involved supervisory conversions from mutual to stock
264. Id. § 1464(t)(9)(A).
265. Id. § 1464(t)(9)(C).
266. Id. § 1464(t)(3)(A).
267. Id. § 1464(t)(9)(B).
268. Id. § 1464(t)(6).
269. 54 Fed. Reg. 46,845 (1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 561, 563, 567)
(proposed Nov. 7, 1989).
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form;' those involving acquisitive transactions, in which assistance was not
provided;27 and those involving acquisitive transactions in which assistance
was provided. 2 In all of the cases, the question arose whether there was a
contractual promise to allow the thrifts to use supervisory goodwill. All of
the transactions, whether assisted or not, required Bank Board approval.
Ordinarily, the permission to use supervisory goodwill was embodied in a
Bank Board resolution granting approval after a transaction had been negoti-
ated and submitted, instead of in any agreement signed by the party granted
permission.' Sometimes, too, the authorization was embodied in a letter
from the Bank Board. In the cases involving assistance, there was ordinarily
an Assistance Agreement executed between the acquiring or resulting party
and the FSLIC, which often merged Bank Board resolutions or letters into
the agreement.274 In cases in which no assistance was provided, there was
ordinarily no agreement signed by any government party.
In the earliest suits, brought before consent letters were requested and
decided in January and February 1990, the OTS prevailed. 5 In the second
of these cases, Flagship Federal Savings Bank v. Wall,' 6 the court went to
the merits of the question and held that the "forbearance letter was not a
contract but a statement by the FHLBB that it would not prosecute Flagship
for failing to meet the statutory capital requirements in force in November
of 1988 .... If this was a contract, it was an illusory one, for one party had
270. See Flagship Fed. Say. Bank v. Wall, 748 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Cal. 1990); Far West
Fed. Bank v. Director, 746 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Or. 1990), rev'd, 951 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.
1991); Century Fed. Sav. Bank v. United States, 745 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Il. 1990).
271. See Charter Fed. Say. Bank v. Director, 773 F. Supp. 809 (W.D. Va. 1991), rev'd,
976 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1992); Carteret Say. Bank v. Director, 762 F. Supp. 1159 (D.N.J.
1991), rev'd, 963 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1992) (involving First Federal Savings & Loans Associa-
tion of Delray Beach transaction); Sterling Say. Ass'n v. Ryan, 751 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.
Wash. 1990) (involving Central Evergreen Federal Association transactions); Guaranty Fin.
Servs., Inc. v. Director, 742 F. Supp. 1159 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (involving merger conversion),
rev'd, 928 F.2d 994 (1lth Cir. 1991).
272. See Carteret Say. Bank v. Director, 762 F. Supp. 1159 (D.N.J. 1991) (regarding
Barton Savings & Loan Association, First Federal Savings & Loan of Montgomery County
(Blacksburg, Virginia), and Mountain Security Savings Bank (Wytheville, Virginia) transac-
tions), rev'd, 963 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1992); Security Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Director, 761 F.
Supp. 1277 (S.D. Miss. 1991), rev'd, 960 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1992); Sterling Say. Ass'n v.
Ryan, 751 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Wash. 1990) (involving Lewis Federal and Tri-Cities Savings
transactions).
273. See cases cited supra notes 270, 272.
274. See cases cited supra note 272.
275. El Paso Say. Ass'n v. Director, No. EP-89-CA-426-H (W.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 1990);
Flagship Fed. Say. Bank v. Wall, 748 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Cal. 1990).
276. 748 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Cal. 1990).
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the right at any time to cancel its side of the bargain. "' The court further
held that "when Congress reserves the power to amend legislation, contracts
made pursuant to that legislation are subject to future legislative action,"
citing Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment
(POSSE).278 Thus, "[e]ven if there was a contract between FHLBB and
Flagship, this contract [was] subject to FIRREA under the POSSE
doctrine. "I It rejected the plaintiff's argument that Sections 401(f), (g), and
(h) of FIRREA grandfathered the forbearance agreements and responded to
the plaintiffs' request for an injunction against an "alleged unconstitutional
taking of property" by noting that the plaintiffs' remedy was "limited to an
action in the Claims Court subsequent to any unconstitutional taking. "'
In the subsequent litigation, the Government did not fare well at the trial
level. From July to September 1990, six federal district courts decided
litigation concerning the abrogation of the forbearance agreements, and five
of them issued injunctions. 28' Three other district courts issued injunctions
in 1991.282 In all of these' cases, involving a variety of transactions docu-
mented in a variety of ways, the courts tended to find that a contract existed
between the Bank Board and the acquiring institutions concerning the exten-
sion of the regulatory forbearance. Most of the decisions rested on Sectiois
401(g) and 401(h) of FIRREA. Section 401(g) provided:
(g) Savings Provisions Relating to FHLBB. -
(1) EXISTING RIGHTS, DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS NOT AFFECTED. - Subsec-
tion (a) [eliminating the FSLIC and the FHLBB] shall not affect the
validity of any right, duty, or obligation of the United States, the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, or any other person, which -
277. Flagship Fed. Say. Bank v. Wall, 748 F. Supp. 742, 748 (S.D. Cal. 1990).
278. 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
279. Flagship Fed. Say. Bank, 748 F. Supp. at 748.
280. Id. at 748-49.
281. Injunctions were granted in the following cases: Franklin Fed. Say. Bank v.
Director, No. CIV 2-90-166, 1990 WL 123145 (E.D. Tenn. July 16, 1990), rev'd, 927 F.2d
1332 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 937 (1991); Sterling Say. Ass'n v. Ryan, 751 F.
Supp. 871 (E.D. Wash. 1990); Security Fed. Say. Bank of Florida v. Director, 747 F. Supp.
656 (N.D. Fla. 1990); Guaranty Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Director, 742 F. Supp. 1159 (M.D. Ga.
1990), rev'd, 928 F.2d 994 (11th Cir. 1991); Far West Fed. Bank v. Director, 746 F. Supp.
1042 (D. Or. 1990), rev'd, 951 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1991). An injunction was denied in
Century Fed. Say. Bank v. United States, 745 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ili. 1990).
282. All three decisions were reversed by the courts of appeals: Security Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Director, 761 F. Supp. 1277 (S.D. Miss. 1991), rev'd, 960 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir.
1992); Carteret Sav. Bank v. Director, 762 F. Supp. 1159 (D.N.J. 1991), rev'd, 963 F.2d
567 (3d Cir. 1992); Charter Fed. Say. Bank v. Director, 773 F. Supp. 809 (W.D. Va. 1991),
rev'd, 976 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1992).
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(A) arises under or pursuant to the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, the
Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, or any other provision of law applica-
ble with respect to such Board (other than title IV of the National Housing
Act); and
(B) existed on the day before the date of enactment of this Act. 3
Only one of the district court decisions, Far West Federal Bank v. Direc-
tory 4 appeared to rest on a finding of likely success on the constitutional
grounds.
b. The Courts of Appeals Reversals and Sections 401(g) and 401(h).
In early 1991, some of the cases granting injunctions reached the courts of
appeals. The first decision came from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in Franklin Federal Savings Bank v. Director.' After holding
the case ripe for review, the court, relying on the legislative history, found
that sections 401(g) and 401(h) did not preserve the forbearance agree-
ments. 6 Although it noted that the committee reports were silent on the
question of abrogation, the court looked to language in those reports con-
cerning the desirability of doing so:
Both sides find comfort in the extensive legislative history of FIRREA.
The OTS points to some portions of the legislative history in which some
legislators express the view that abrogating the provisions of forbearance
agreements allowing the amortization of supervisory goodwill would be
a good idea, while Franklin points to other portions of the legislative
history in which some legislators suggest that retaining such provisions
would be a good idea. Both sides miss the point of looking to the legisla-
tive history.'
The court then cited statements of separate views included with the commit-
tee reports and a floor debate on the Hyde Amendment (after its sponsor,
Representative Henry Hyde of Illinois) that would have given institutions
suffering abrogation a hearing on their contract claims. 8 It concluded that
an assumption underlying the debate was that the forbearance agreements
were to be abrogated:
283. 12 U.S.C. § 1437(g)(1) (1994).
284. 746 F. Supp. 1042, 1049-51 (D. Or. 1990), rev'd, 951 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1991).
285. 927 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 937 (1991).
286. Franklin Fed. Say. Bank v. Director, 927 F.2d 1332, 1339-41 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 937 (1991).
287. Id. at 1339-40.
288. Id. at 1340.
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In the course of the floor debate, representatives expressed their under-
standing of what the statutory language meant. The debate is useful to
us because it reveals a shared understanding of a particular text. Nobody
expressed the view that FIRREA did not abrogate forbearance agree-
ments regarding supervisory goodwill. The only discussion of the proce-
dures themselves came from the defenders of the amendment who em-
phasized that the amendment would not automatically recognize all
forbearances.29
The court then held that the OTS position was a "reasonable" one and, rely-
ing on Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,' ruled
for the OTS.
There was a dissent filed in Franklin Federal Savings Bank. Judge
Contie argued that "[w]hen Congress intends to upset previously settled
expectations, it is obligated to do so in unambiguous terms" and that "the
government failed to identify any provision in FIRREA that expressly abro-
gates all conversion agreements; the government relies instead on strained
inferences and select legislative history. "29 He rejected the Government's
arguments "that section 401(g) protects only those rights, duties, and obliga-
tions endangered by the abolition of the FSLIC and FHLBB" as "merely
manipulat[ing] the express language of section 401(g). "2I He rejected the
majority's reading of the consideration of the Hyde Amendment:
Contrary to the government's contention, however, the issue before
Congress when it considered the Hyde Amendment was not the validity
of existing forbearances; instead, the Hyde Amendment contemplated the
establishment of an administrative process to review possible contract
claims. Though the appellants are correct that some representatives
voted against the Hyde Amendment because they wanted all forbearance
agreements abrogated, it is equally clear that many Congressmen op-
posed the Hyde Amendment because of the contemplated administrative
process. Because the Hyde Amendment never presented Congress with
the sole issue of whether conversion agreements should be abrogated, the
amendment's defeat is irrelevant to this action because the appellants, the
appellees, and this court can not determine, with any certainty, why
Congress defeated the Hyde Amendment.2'
289. Id. at 1340-41.
290. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
291. Franklin Fed. Sav. Bank, 927 F.2d at 1341-42 (6th Cir. 1991) (Contie, J., dissent-
ing).
292. Id. at 1342 (Contie, J., dissenting).
293. Id. at 1342-43 (Contie, J., dissenting).
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The second case, Guaranty Financial Services, Inc. v. Ryan,2' decided
only two weeks after Franklin Federal Savings Bank, similarly relied on
legislative history. It quoted the separate supporting and opposing views of
committee members expressed in the House Banking Committee report as
indicating an understanding that the bill in fact effected abrogation. Thus,
opponents complained that "[flor those institutions with substantial supervi-
sory goodwill, the bill radically change[d] the terms of previously negotiated
transactions,"295 while supporters objected that "an overriding public policy
would be jeopardized by the continued adherence to arrangements which
were blithely entered into by FSLIC. "296 The court also noted that the
debate on the Hyde Amendment and another amendment offered by Repre-
sentative Quillen (which would have grandfathered existing forbearances as
the Sixth Circuit had) reflected an understanding that the forbearances were
abrogated:
Although we draw no inferences from the fate of the two amendments,
the comments made on the floor during the debate on Rep. Hyde's
amendment, as well as at other points during the congressional debate,
only serve to strengthen our conviction that Congress intended that
FIRREA would abrogate any capital forbearances after the phase-out
period. . . . Again, both advocates and opponents of Rep. Hyde's
amendment evinced an understanding that the bill would abrogate super-
visory goodwill agreements.'l
Franklin Federal Savings Bank briefly addressed the takings issue by
stating that "[i]f Franklin did have a contractual property interest, we believe
that the evidence of congressional intent is strong enough to infer that Con-
gress wanted to effect a taking,""298 whatever relevance that had, and that
"[i]n the event that this action were determined to be a taking, Franklin
would be entitled to compensation, not to equitable relief. "'299 Guaranty
294. 928 F.2d 994 (1lth Cir. 1991).
295. Guaranty Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Ryan, 928 F.2d 994, 1005 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 534, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
86, 327 (additional views of Representatives Hiler, Ridge, Bartlett, Dreier, McCandless,
Saiki, Baker, and Paxon)).
296. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 545, reprinted in
1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 336 (supplemental views concerning forbearances from industry-
wide capital standards of Representatives Schumer, Morrison, Roukema, Gonzalez, Vento,
McMillen, and Hoagland)).
297. Id. at 1005.
298. Franklin Fed. Say. Bank v. Director, 927 F.2d 1332, 1341. (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 937 (1991).
299. Id.
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Financial Services did not address a takings issue apparently because no such
issue was raised by the litigants in the case.'
In Far West Federal Bank v. Director,'" decided in December 1991, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit became the third court of ap-
peals to vacate an injunction against the amendment of the capital standards.
On both the statutory issue and the takings issue, the court relied upon the
earlier decisions: "For the reasons detailed in the exhaustive opinions of the
Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, we also agree with the OTS's interpretation. "'
The court further stated that "[s]ince a taking, if one occurred, was autho-
rized by Congress, and a suit for compensation is within the jurisdiction of
the Claims Court, we do not reach the question of whether a taking oc-
curred."303 In Security Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Director,' the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit relied on the earlier decisions on the
Section 401(g) issue and followed them in holding that the takings claim
should be decided in the Claims Court.0 5 In Carteret Savings Bank v.
Director,' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in an extended
opinion, accepted the views of the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits concerning
the legislative history and the interpretation of Section 401(g).' It added
a statutory language argument, however, and focused upon the definition of
supervisory goodwill in Section 5(t)(9)(C) of the statute, which shortened the
amortization period for supervisory goodwill to at most twenty years:1°8
"There would have been no reason to refer to the 'remaining period for
amortization in effect' if the new provisions were inapplicable to previously
acceptable supervisory goodwill."" Nonetheless, the court said that the
OTS position that the statutory language supported the conclusion that the
agreements were intended to be abrogated "is reached through inference, and
we cannot agree with OTS that statutory language alone is dispositive. "31
However, the court proceeded to reach the abrogation result by interpreting
the legislative history and by relying on substantially the same elements of
300. The takings issue was not discussed in the district court.
301. 951 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1991).
302. Far West Fed. Bank v. Director, 951 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1991).
303. Id. at 1100.
304. 960 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1992).
305. Security Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Director, 960 F.2d 1318, 1322-23 (5th Cir. 1992).
306. 963 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1992).
307. Carteret Say. Bank v. Director, 963 F.2d 567, 577-78 (3d Cir. 1992).
308. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
309. Carteret, 963 F.2d at 576.
310. Id.
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the history as had the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits.3 1'
c. The Later Courts of Appeals Cases and the Takings Problem: Trans-
ohio and Charter. Two later cases raised or addressed the issues in slightly
different ways that foreshadowed the manner in which the question would
be presented before the Federal Circuit. The first four circuits to address the
question did not reach the merits of the takings claims and held instead that
the claims properly were brought before the Claims Court. In Transohio
Savings Bank v. Director,312 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit broke rank and decided the takings claim against the
plaintiff. 3 The court faced an argument under one of its precedents,
Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger,314 which as the Transohio court noted,
held that "when the monetary compensation available through the Tucker
Act remedy is so inadequate that the plaintiff would not be justly compen-
sated for the seizure of his property by the United States, an injunctive
remedy is not barred. ""'
The Transohio court relied on what it termed the "unmistakability"
doctrine - that "one who wishes to obtain a contractual right against the
sovereign that is immune from the effect of future changes in law must make
sure that the contract confers such a right in unmistakable terms."316 The
court said that the Supreme Court applies this requirement "most forcefully
in cases involving the government's regulatory power, as opposed to the
government's power to ease its financial burdens. "317 It then found, quite
facilely, that "this case involves the government's regulatory power - the
power to supervise thousands of thrifts,"318 a conclusion that did not thought-
fully consider the true context or genesis of FIRREA 9 It concluded that
"in light of the long history of pervasive thrift regulation, and in light of the
events in Congress before and during the negotiation of the agreement in this
case, we share the Eleventh Circuit's view ... [that] the thrift 'in effect
311. Id.
312. 967 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
313. Transohio Sav. Bank v. Director, 967 F.2d 598, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
314. 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S.
1113 (1985).
315. Transohio, 967 F.2d at 613 (quoting Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d
1500, 1527 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985)).
316. Id. at 618 (quoting Western Fuels-Utah, Inc. v. Lujan, 895 F.2d 780, 789 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990)).
317. Id. at 619 (emphasis added).
318. Id.
319. See generally supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
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wager[ed] the chance that the rules would be changed against the potential
return if they were not.'"320 The court then ruled against Transohio on the
basis of a second reason: Even if the contract "unmistakably" preserved the
thrift's right to use supervisory goodwill, the agreement was ultra vires
because a regulatory body could not contract away Congress's power to
change the regulations absent an "unmistakable" delegation by Congress of
the power to enter into such a contract.32'
In Charter Federal Savings Bank v. Director,32 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed a declaratory judgment against
both the OTS and FDIC which held that the Bank was entitled to rescission
of its contract to acquire certain Virginia thrifts executed in 1981 and 1982.
The' district court's opinion was not entirely clear on the point, but it ap-
peared to accept the conclusion that FIRREA had abrogated the contracts;
the court of appeals explicitly assumed that it did, stating that the OTS
argued and Charter appeared to concede the point before the court of ap-
peals.' The court of appeals reversed the district court, treating the ques-
tion to be whether the implied-in-fact contracts created a right to continued
use of supervisory goodwill notwithstanding changes in regulation.324 The
Fourth Circuit held that they did not:
In the context of supervisory goodwill cases, the D.C. and Eleventh
Circuits, relying on Bowen, have 'interpret[ed] the contract provisions
at issue to mean that the agencies would allow [the thrift] to treat super-
visory goodwill as regulatory capital only as long as the regulatory
regime permitted the agencies to do so....' We follow these cases and
hold that the FHLBB did not promise Charter continued use of supervi-
sory goodwill as regulatory capital in the face of a contrary regulatory
scheme.
In our cases, like Transohio and Guaranty, the FHLBB never
expressly waived its right to enforce future regulations governing super-
visory goodwill. The FHLBB approved Charter's use of supervisory
goodwill under its then statutory discretion to permit such accounting
practices, but made no explicit promise to Charter of continued approval
throughout the life of the amortization period....
Furthermore, the highly regulated nature of the savings and loan
industry convinces us that, absent an explicit statement to the contrary,
320. Transohio, 967 F.2d at 620 (quoting Guaranty Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Ryan, 928 F.2d
994, 999 (11th Cir. 1991)).
321. Id. at 620-21.
322. 976 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1992).
323. Charter Fed. Say. Bank v. Director, 976 F.2d 203, 210 (4th Cir. 1992).
324. Id. at 212-13.
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the FHLBB would not have intended to promise Charter continued
treatment of supervisory goodwill as capital for the life of the amortiza-
tion period."
Thus, in the district court actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief
(or contract rescission), the thrifts by the end of 1992 had lost the fight. But
the courts of appeals - except for the District of Columbia Circuit in Trans-
ohio Savings Bank and possibly the Fourth Circuit in Charter Federal Sav-
ings Bank - had left open the possibility that the thrifts could bring a claim
for damages in the Claims Court. In fact, the thrifts already had done so,
and the litigation was decided by that court in the thrifts' favor by mid-1990.
Once again, however, a decision in favor of the industry by a trial tribunal
would be overturned by an appeals court; but that court vacated its opinion
rather quickly, thereby setting the stage for an ultimate victory by the thrifts
at the appellate level.
2. The Claims Court Litigation
a. The Claims Court's Decisions. In July 1990, well before the deci-
sions in Charter Federal Savings Bank and Transohio Savings Bank, the
Claims Court decided as a matter of contractual interpretation that the gov-
ernment, in negotiating forbearances through the Bank Board, had agreed
that supervisory goodwill could continue to be used notwithstanding changes
in the statute or regulatory policy. In Winstar Corp. v. United States,326 the
Claims Court stated:
[Tihe government expressly intended to contract for the particular treat-
ment of goodwill at issue in this case, notwithstanding changes in GAAP
or in the statutory scheme. There is no support for the defendant's
argument that these statements merely were representations of the then-
existing regulatory policy. Rather, they illustrate the reality that the
promise of continued treatment of goodwill as a capital asset that could
be amortized over 35 years was a negotiated and critical term of this
particular transaction. It was critical because it was clear that without it
no purchaser would have engaged in the transaction. z-
The court rejected the Government's attempt "to mischaracterize plaintiffs'
claim as one which improperly seeks to bind the government's power to
325. Id. at 212 (citations omitted).
326. 21 Ct. C. 112 (1990), aff'd, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S.
Ct. 806 (1996).
327. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 21 Ct. C1. 112, 115 (1990), aff'd, 64 F.3d 1531
(Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996).
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regulate" by reference to the fact that the case was a takings claim, not an
injunction suit:
It is critical to this case, and apparently misconstrued by defendant,
that plaintiffs are not claiming that the government contractually bound
Congress not to change its regulations. Rather, plaintiffs claim that in
their particular transaction with the government, it was agreed that they
would be permitted to treat supervisory goodwill in a particular way for
a fixed number of years. Thus, while Congress' power to regulate is not
impaired, the government may be compelled to pay for the results of its
actions, especially when in so doing the government actually is paying
because it received a benefit.3"
The Winstar court expressly indicated that it was simply interpreting the
implied-in-fact contract and noted that "it is preferable to resolve disputes in
such a way as to avoid constitutional considerations."329 The court denied
the Government's motion to dismiss and cross motions for summary judg-
ment and ordered supplemental briefing on the questions of whether a breach
occurred, of whether injury occurred, and of the appropriate measure of
relief.33
0
The Government filed a motion for clarification, and the court
responded with an opinion that calls into question the coherency of the
court's own insistence that it was not deciding a constitutional question. In
the second opinion (Winstar 1),331 the Claims Court addressed principally
the government's argument that the court's earlier decision was inconsistent
with Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment
(POSSE)3I and an argument that the POSSE decision was inconsistent with
the "sovereign acts" doctrine.333 In POSSE, the Supreme Court unanimously
upheld amendments to the Social Security Act that eliminated the rights of
the state governments to withdraw their employees from the Social Security
system.334 The Claims Court distinguished POSSE on the grounds that, in
328. Id. at 116.
329. Id. at 117.
330. Id.
331. Winstar Corp. v. United States (Winstar11), 25 Cl. Ct. 541 (1992), aft'd, 64 F.3d
1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996).
332. 477 U.S. 41 (1977). This is the case on which the Government relied throughout
the litigation in the district courts and courts of appeals in response to "takings" arguments.
See supra notes 275-80 and accompanying text.
333. See Winstar II, 25 Cl. Ct. at 544-53.
334. See Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment (POSSE),
477 U.S. 41, 51-56 (1977).
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the prior cases, the parties contracting with the government - the state and
local governments - had no rights under the regulatory scheme:
In POSSE, however, unlike the case here, no such vested rights were
created as the basic elements of contract formation were absent. In con-
tracts involving the government, as with all contractual relationships,
rights vest and contract terms become binding when, after arm's length
negotiation, all parties to the contract agree to exchange real obligations
for real benefits. In POSSE, the Court determined that such vested con-
tract rights did not exist. Although the Court did not explicitly so state,
the facts of POSSE make it clear that the provisions of the original Social
Security Act were not promulgated after negotiation, arm's length or
otherwise, between Congress and the plaintiffs who filed suit. As is the
case with all legislation, the only 'negotiations' or bargaining involved in
the enactment of the original Social Security Act and its amendments took
place in the halls of Congress. The 'rights' at issue in POSSE, then, were
solely government-created. They were really policy decisions made by the
democratic process.33
In response to the "sovereign acts" argument - which holds that "the
government is not contractually liable, absent an express agreement to the
contrary, for the consequences of acts performed in its sovereign capac-
ity"33 - the court held that the "doctrine grants the government immunity
only where the government action alleged to constitute a breach is 'public
and general' in nature," as opposed to circumstances in which "the govern-
ment abrogates through a limited and focused action specific government
obligations to a particular class of individuals or entities it has contracted
with."3 7 The Claims Court held that, in the case of the supervisory goodwill
agreements, "taking away plaintiffs' right.. . was not the necessary means
to a broad public end, rather it was the government's end goal," and that
"[a]lthough the court accepts as a given that the government sought to pro-
mote the public welfare in enacting FIRREA as a whole, those specific
provisions of the Act altering the capital treatment of supervisory goodwill
were intended to, and did, impact only upon plaintiffs and those similarly
situated. ,338
In Statesman Savings Holding Corp. v. United States, 339 the Claims
Court decided two claims by larger thrifts, Statesman and Glendale Federal
335. Winstar /, 25 CI. Ct. at 545-46 (citations omitted).
336. Id. at 550.
337. Id. at 551.
338. Id. at 552.
339. 26 C1. Ct. 904 (1992)
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Bank. The Statesman decision was handed down after Transohio, and the
court answered the two arguments of Transohio.' In answering the "unmis-
takeability" argument, premised on POSSE, the court held that the doctrine
applied to interpretations of contracts under which it is claimed that the
government waived a sovereign power, rather than to the question whether
actions under a contract, required by a subsequent sovereign act, constitute
contract breaches triggering a right to compensation." In answering the
question whether the thrifts' interpretation required that the agency be con-
strued to have had the power to bind the exercise of Congress's power, the
Claims Court's language bordered on vitriolic:
Whether an agency has the power to bind Congress is a false issue in all of
the Winstar cases.... All agencies of the executive branch, other than the
President, are established by the Congress, with certain powers and certain
duties. By exercising these powers and fulfilling these duties an agency
immediately and continuously creates legal effects on private rights. This
exercise of power in no way 'binds' Congress as a legislative body. It can,
however, and continuously does, create rights on the part of private individ-
uals that are held against and restrict government action. Once a salary
check is paid, a surplus auto sold, a grant finally delivered, a license is-
sued, a promotion secured, a contract let, or a title transferred, a legal right
is created that under the Constitution binds the government. That property
right cannot be taken away or diminished by the government without pro-
cess of law, and in many cases even with process of law, it is immune to
recapture. To suggest, then, that an agency action cannot confer rights
which the government must honor is to suggest a notion that is as novel as
it is anathema to our constitutional system.
In recognizing that binding contractual rights were created and that
those rights must be honored, the court stresses what the contrary conclu-
sion entails. The Transohio court interpreted the contract between the
340. See Statesman Say. Holding Corp. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 904, 916-23 (1992),
aff'd sub nom. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
341. See id. at 919-21. The point follows from the court's interpretation of POSSE in
Winstar I1. In POSSE, the government's prior practice of permitting state withdrawal from the
Social Security system was regarded as an act of sovereign dispensation, not a restraint on
government action procured by bargaining on the part of its contract partner. See Bowen v.
Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment (POSSE), 477 U.S. 1, 55 (1977) ("The
termination clause was not.., a term over which the States had any bargaining power or for
which the State provided independent consideration."). The Supreme Court, according to the
Court of Claims, simply was saying that if that sovereign dispensation had been meant to be
surrendered, the contracts in question had to say so unmistakably. See id. at 55-56. The Claims
Court's interpretation of POSSE is probably correct, although the matter may not be quite so
clear as the Claims Court assumed. See infra notes 374-89 and accompanying text.
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government and the acquiring thrifts as embodying nothing more than a
gamble .... The Claims Court and its predecessor, the Court of Claims,
was formed with the purpose of instilling confidence in dealing with the
federal government that the government would honor its obligations to its
citizens.... To conclude that all dealings with the government constitute
nothing more than 'a very elaborate and expensive form of gambling' is
thus at variance with the very ideal upon which this court, the Tucker Act,
and ultimately the rule of law is based 4 2
The Court consolidated the Statesman, Glendale, and Winstar cases and
certified them on interlocutory appeal to the Federal Circuit' 3
b. The Federal Circuit. A divided panel of the Federal Circuit re-
versed the Claims Court in the three cases in Winstar Corp. v. United
States.3" The panel held that the agreements between the thrifts and the
Bank Board were subject to the sovereign acts doctrine. It disagreed with
the Claims Court's view that the purpose of FIRREA's abrogation of the
contracts "was to take away plaintiffs' rights to use supervisory goodwill, " 5
holding that "FIRREA's capital reforms are 'general and public' acts to
which the Sovereign Acts Doctrine applies," citing references in the legisla-
tive history to the accounting practices as "gimmicks," and holding that those
"methods which had been approved were disapproved for all the industry
because of the perceived harm to the public. "'4 The court then construed
the contracts at issue to allocate the risk of a change in the regulations on
which the use of supervisory goodwill was predicated entirely on the thrifts,
relying heavily on POSSE and the "unmistakability" doctrine and reflecting
the interpretation of POSSE in Transohio rather than the Claims Court's
interpretation. The panel brushed aside the Claims Court's view that the
"unmistakability" doctrine did not apply to claims for damages:
This distinction in remedies, though significant to the law of takings,
is not relevant to the plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract. A breach
requires a binding promise. . . . Specific performance and damages are
merely alternative remedies for breach, for which damages is the primary
342. Statesman, 26 C1. Ct. at 917, 918, 919 (citation omitted).
343. Id. at 923-24.
344. 994 F.2d 797, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
345. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 797, 808 (Fed. Cir. 1993), vacated and
rev'd, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996) (quoting Winstar
Corp. v. United States, 25 C1. Ct. 541, 552 (1992), aff'd, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995))
(emphasis omitted).
346. Id. at 808, 809.
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remedy. Where no contractual duty exists, no breach of contract is possi-
ble and no judgment for damages can be obtained. Because these contracts
did not obligate the Bank Board (or OTS) to regulate in a manner inconsis-
tent with FIRREA, the change in treatment of goodwill does not violate a
contractual duty and cannot support a claim for damages for breach. 47
The court declined to consider the constitutional takings claim, holding that
"[t]o the extent a plaintiffs other claims are not premised upon the taking of
a contract right to continue to use goodwill as regulatory capital, such claims
remain for decision. "m
Judge Newman dissented, relying largely on grounds that had been
advanced by the Claims Court. She argued that "acts of government that
directly abrogate existing contractual obligations, even if undertaken for
reasons of general welfare, are not immune from liability" 9 and cited pas-
sages in the legislative history discussing the forbearance transactions as
evidence that "these contracts were targeted, and not an incidental side-effect
of a general and public law. ,,3  She disputed the majority's conclusion that,
even assuming the application of the sovereign acts doctrine, the loss should
fall entirely upon the thrifts: "The government thus expressly agreed that in
the event of regulatory change, the negotiated forbearances and accounting
procedures would govern. "051
On August 18, 1993, the court entered an order vacating its earlier
judgment, withdrawing the opinion, and granting rehearing en banc. 3s
More than two years later, the en banc court affirmed the Federal Claims
Court.353 The court found that contracts unquestionably existed in the three
cases before it, resting upon integration clauses in the two cases involving
assistance that referred specifically to Bank Board regulations. It then held
that "It]here can be little question that the application of FIRREA and the
regulations thereunder to deny or restrict plaintiffs' contractual rights to use
supervisory goodwill with the associated amortization periods.., in partial
satisfaction of their capital requirements was a breach of the FSLIC's and the
Bank Board's agreements with [the thrifts]. ,,34
347. Id. at 812.
348. Id. at 813.
349. Id. at 815.
350. Id. at 816.
351. Id. at 818.
352. Id. at 819.
353. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531, 1551 (Fed. Cir.1995), cert. granted,
116 S. Ct. 806 (1996).
354. Id. at 1544.
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It then addressed two further questions: the argument as to the "unmis-
takability" doctrine under POSSE and the question of the "sovereign acts"
doctrine. As to the former, the Federal Circuit relied heavily upon the lower
court's opinion in finding that "the Court in POSSE recognized that the
government has the power to enter into contracts which confer vested
rights," 5 citing Perry v. United States-56 and Lynch v. United States.3 57 The
court stressed the difference between an injunctive claim and a claim for
damages and held, following the Claims Court, that the unmistakability
doctrine "controls how contractual rights with the government are created"
rather than "the effect of the government's breach of contract. "'
As to the sovereign acts doctrine, the court held that "government
action whose principal effect is to abrogate specific contractual rights does
not immunize the government from contractual liability,"'359 citing Everett
Plywood Corp. v. United States" and Sun Oil Co. v. United States. 6'
Referring to Sections 5(t)(3)(A) and 5(t)(9)(B), the court stated that "[t]he
statute plainly singles out supervisory goodwill for special treatment, albeit
treatment less harsh than other forms of intangible assets."362 It stated that
"the FIRREA provisions at issue here targeted thrifts that had undergone
supervisory mergers," which was not a "public and general act. "363
IV. The Constitutional Overlay of the Capital Standards Issue
A. The Courts of Appeals Decisions on the Injunctions
Throughout this series of litigation, the courts rarely mentioned consti-
tutional issues. It might be possible to resolve the matter without reference
to the constitutional problems, as nearly all of the courts did, despite diamet-
rically opposite results in some cases compared with others. Yet, there were
constitutional claims raised before the courts in all but the very earliest
cases. The constitutional claims have some validity; however, even if they
355. Id. at 1546 (quoting Winstar Corp. v. United States (Winstar H), 25 Cl. Ct. 541,
545 (1992), aff'd, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
356. 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
357. 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
358. Wstar, 64 F.3d at 1547 (quoting Statesman Say. Holding Corp. v. United States,
26 CI. Ct. 904, 920 (1992), aff'd sub nom. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531
(Fed. Cir. 1995)), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996).
359. Id. at 1549.
360. 651 F.2d 723 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
361. 572 F.2d 786 (Ct. C1. 1978).
362. Winstar, 64 F.3d at 1549.
363. Id. at 1550-51.
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are rejected, their presence and relative strength typically influence the
disposition of nonconstitutional issues. Furthermore, related constitutional
issues have been raised explicitly with respect to kindred difficulties growing
out of FIRREA and, in one case, initially accepted by the trial court. 64
Thus, it is worth considering, with considerably greater care than is reflected
in any of the opinions, the application of the "takings" doctrine to the ques-
tion of the abrogation of the supervisory goodwill agreements.
As a prefatory matter, it should be noted that the courts of appeals'
resolutions of the injunction suits may have been unfortunate, if not mis-
taken, and that a more careful consideration of the constitutional objections
of the thrifts might have led to different results. Sections 401(g) and 401(h)
certainly appear to preserve the rights of the thrifts under the forbearance
agreements, and the government's interpretation of those provisions - that
they apply only to agreements affected by the transfer of functions - is on
its face a strained one, for which one might demand some level of justifica-
tion in legislative history or otherwise. The courts of appeals, however, did
not demand explanation or support for this argument, but rather looked to
textual sources, especially legislative history, for the more precise question
whether Congress intended to abrogate the forbearance agreements. As the
discussion above indicates, the basis for the courts' conclusion that Congress
intended to abrogate was principally statements made by individual congress-
men or groups of identified congressmen either in floor debates or in sepa-
rate views appended to committee reports. Neither the statute itself nor the
committee reports explicitly addressed the question. But whatever the merits
of relying on legislative history generally365 or upon statements by individu-
als particularly,3" there is more than usual reason to be suspicious of such
sources in this case. The question of abrogation was, as noted above, a
significantly contested issue through the final days of crafting the legislation;
it was one on which the most important interest and lobbying groups - the
commercial banking industry and the thrift industry - focused.367 The
thrifts publicly made known their intention to litigate the question before
364. Branch exrel. Maine Nat'l Bank v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 626, 632-37 (Cl. Ct.
1994), rev'd, 69 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
365. The leading adherent of disregarding legislative history generally is of course
Justice Scalia - a view he has expressed in such decisions as Sable Communications v. FCC,
492 U.S. 115, 131-33 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,
490 U.S. 504, 527-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); and Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578, 610-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
366. See Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power Struggle, 67
S. CAL. L. REv. 585 (1994).
367. See supra notes 217-21 and accompanying text.
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final enactment. As Congress addressed the question in neither text nor
committee reports, it probably was evading the question altogether. The
consideration of the Hyde Amendment - which provided for a hearing
procedure without specifying statutory standards as to what was being heard
(that is, without saying one way or another whether agreements were being
abrogated and what Congress intended to provide in the way of compensa-
tion if they were) - only reinforces that conclusion.
Given such a visible form of congressional evasiveness, taken together
with the fact that Congress was "upset[ting] previously settled expecta-
tions '" 368 and that constitutional concerns were present, might not the courts
have been more judicious in deciding not to read Section 40 1(g) in its most
apparently normal way? The fact that the courts uniformly (eight panels of
eight different circuits) reached this result - that Sections 401(g) and 401(h)
did not preserve the thrifts' rights under the forbearance agreements - with
only a single dissenting judge (Judge Contie in Franklin Federal Savings)
displays tendencies that characterized the performance of the federal courts
generally in the immediate aftermath of FIRREA. Courts did not take
constitutional questions seriously - in part because of a judicial reluctance
to become involved in or "constitutionalize" an area of intense federal regu-
lation and in part because of an attitude that only property rights were at
issue, the importance of which has been downplayed since the late 1930s." 9
Courts were deferential to the regulatory agencies, whether explicitly invok-
ing the Chevron doctrine or not. Courts were tolerant of FIRREA itself and
prone to accept the account of the thrift crisis that attributed it to insider
dealing, lax if not corrupt regulation, and other avoidable conduct - rather
than an outcome of a larger political and economic process that had a con-
structive end but unavoidable casualties and almost certainly unavoidable
costs as well.
Moreover, injunctive relief might well have had salutary practical con-
sequences. When it enacted FIRREA, Congress did not provide the RTC
with sufficient funding to resolve all failing thrifts - it had to revisit the
funding question twice, in the Resolution Trust Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991370 and in the Resolution Trust Corporation Completion Act of
1993.37 Had the abrogation question been resolved against the government
368. Franklin Fed. Say. Bank v. Director, 927 F.2d 1332, 1341 (6th Cir.) (Contie, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 937 (1991).
369. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. CT. REv.
1, 19-20 (noting lax standard of judicial review for land use regulation).
370. Pub. L. No. 102-233, 105 Stat. 1761 (1991).
371. Pub. L. No. 103-204, 107 Stat. 2369 (1993).
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at an early date, the damages question would have been averted and a com-
promise could have been reached in connection with legislation that was
going to be enacted in any event. In 1987, FSLIC appropriated its second-
ary reserve to fund the thrift crisis. 3' This action too would have been
subject to court challenge, but the challenge was avoided by a compromise
reached under the Competitive Equality Baiking Act.373 Should the matter
be resolved in the thrifts' favor by the Supreme Court, the amount
involved - $15 billion - will have to be appropriated somehow. In the
end, the matter will probably require a legislative solution that will almost
surely be more expensive to both the fisc and the thrifts (and to their various
constituencies, including nondepositor creditors and other uninsured claim-
ants) than solutions that might have been achieved had the courts of appeals
sustained the early injunctions issued by the district courts.
Considerations of this sort have led to a change in approach by the
federal courts to FIRREA litigation generally. That change warrants an
examination of the "takings" problem in the capital standards cases, to which
we now turn.
B. The "Takings" Question
1. The Reasons for Examining Takings Analysis
The discussion above suggests that, although both the Claims Court and
the Federal Circuit purported to rest their divergent conclusions on contract
grounds, neither convincingly avoided constitutional concerns, if indeed they
really avoided the constitutional question at all. In Winstar II, the Claims
Court contended with the constitutionally based POSSE decision by reference
to the "vested rights" of the plaintiffs.374 However, "vested rights" is sug-
gestive of the "distinct" or "reasonable investment-backed expectations"
notion that figures prominently in the modem takings jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court.375 In Statesman Savings Holding Corp., the Court drifted
further into constitutional rhetoric in responding to the position of the Trans-
ohio decision that a regulatory agency could not bind Congress: The answer
372. See Linda Ellis, FSLIC Writeoff Pinches Thrifts in East: Secondary Reserve Losses
Were a Factor in Results, AM. BANKER, July 17, 1987, at 12.
373. Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 307, 101 Stat. 552 (1987).
374. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 541, 545-46 (1992), aft'd, 64 F.3d 1531
(Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996); see supra note 335 and accompanying
text.
375. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see infra notes 398-448 and accompany-
ing text.
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was that agencies "can... and continuously d[o]" create private rights that
"cannot be taken away or diminished by the government without process of
law, and in many cases even with process of law, it is immune to recap-
ture." 6 Whether the Statesman Savings court based its decision on contract
or Fifth Amendment principles is unclear.
The en banc decision is still less convincing in avoiding takings analy-
sis. 3" Regarding the unmistakeability doctrine, the Federal Circuit, too,
resorts to a discussion of "vested rights" that the parties were held to have
contemplated, and the opinion relies upon two takings cases, Perry v. United
States and Lynch v. United States.378 The opinion is quite conclusory, too,
in finding that the supervisory goodwill provisions were not public and
general acts, but targeted the very numerous thrifts that had supervisory
goodwill forbearances. 79  The provisions applied to all institutions. The
capital rules were general. The difficulty is that this "sovereign act" may
have destroyed contractual rights, or values under those rights, for which the
government might be required to compensate even if the contractual rights
had arisen under contracts with private parties. The sovereign acts doctrine
is a largely ineffective idea in this context, in which the question really is
whether the government has "taken" something for which it would be re-
quired to compensate even were its part in the transaction played by a private
party. The analysis above, demonstrating that the amount of forbearance is
directly determinative of the amount of assistance a private party would
demand,3" is germane to the point - it demonstrates that the benefit of the
bargain is quantifiable and demonstrates why the rights of a party to the
contract should "vest" upon its creation.
376. Statesman Say. Holding Corp. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 904, 918 (1992), aff'd
-sub nom. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116
S. Ct. 806 (1996); see text accompanying note 342, supra.
377. See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that
change in regulatory capital treatment of supervisory goodwill did not violate contractual duty
of FHLBB), aff'd sub nom. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996).
378. See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidating legislation authorizing
redemption of United States Liberty Bonds in currency other than gold); Lynch v. United
States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) (invalidating legislation repudiating government's obligation to
pay war risk insurance benefits to veterans).
379. See Winstar Corp., 64 F.3d at 1548 (agreeing with Court of Federal Claims that
FIRREA provisions were not public and general sovereign acts and that sovereign acts
doctrine did not apply).
380. See supra part fI.A.3 (discussing capital standards, forbearance, and pricing of
assistance in assisted transactions).
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The question, in fact, is a takings question, not a contract question, and
ought to be addressed as such. In the first place, the decisions of the various
courts, including finally the Federal Circuit, that there was a "contract"
obligating the regulators to allow the use of RAP is quite suspect. The Bank
Board resolutions and letters permitting, indeed directing, the use of good-
will, were regulatory approvals of transactions executed by private parties,
whether with or without assistance. Although the Bank Board has wide
discretion in granting or denying such approvals and although judicial review
of its action is virtually always unavailing,"' in principle, and to an extent
in practice that would be demonstrated if the regulators ever acted truly
arbitrarily, the regulators are bound to give approval if the private parties
meet appropriate conditions. In other words, in allowingthe forbearances,
the regulators acted in the government's regulatory, not its proprietary,
capacity. Just as clearly, when statutory standards changed (on the assump-
tion, mandated by the holdings in the injunction cases, that Congress had
changed them retroactively), the regulators were without discretion to con-
tinue applying the old standards - again because they were acting in a
regulatory, not a proprietary, capacity.3 2
Thus, it confuses matters greatly to treat the matter like an ordinary
breach of contract by the government in its proprietary capacity. The
change at issue was a regulatory change mandated by statute that directed
administrative action (although there was an administrative interpretation of
the statute involved). The fact that the change touched upon rights derived
from "agreements" with government corporations is largely coincidental;
effects such as those of the retroactive application of Section 5(t) would raise
questions whatever the source of the rights or interests touched.
In addition, both the doctrine and the precedent relied upon by the
Federal Circuit and the Claims Court demonstrate that the question is really
381. During the 1960s and early 1970s, at the height of an era encouraging judicial
review of agency action, with emphasis on expanding review of "informal" action, there were
numerous efforts brought, particularly in states like North Carolina and California that were
then in the process of liberalizing state branching laws, against federal approvals of new
charters or new branches. The nature of this effort is detailed in Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual
Banking System: A Model of Competitive Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (1977).
Virtually all challenges to approvals failed. The closest instance of success is First Nat'l
Bank of Fayetteville v. Smith, 508 F.2d 1371 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1974).
382. Even when the deposit insurers act in their "corporate" capacity, for instance, in
determining whether an instrument constitutes an insured "deposit" or in administering open
bank assistance, see supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text (discussing open bank
assistance), the insurers act as a regulator under the deposit insurance scheme because they
are always furthering the public purposes of depositor protection and risk spreading that
govern the deposit insurance scheme.
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a takings question, not a contract question. The sovereign acts doctrine is
obviously an inadequate tool to protect rights of the kind that the thrifts in
the capital standards cases sought to invoke. Quite clearly, Section 5(t) was
a sovereign act with a public purpose - it mandated greater capitalization
by thrift institutions in exchange for the protection of federally mandated
insurance. It applied impartially to all thrifts and conferred advantages on
the parties it burdened. It is not a suspect scheme.
The issue is somewhat closer on the question of retroactive application,
but even the construction of Congress's purpose in FIRREA that takes
forceful account of the realpolitik of the capital standards issue - that it was
intended to force a swift end to the thrift crisis to shuttle it as quickly as
possible away from public attention and that one of its objections was the
long-term consolidation of the deposit insurance industry under the aegis of
the commercial banking sector - still characterizes even the retroactive
application of the provisions as a public purpose. The Federal Circuit
precedents applying the sovereign acts doctrine - Everett Plywood and Sun
Oil Co. - are suspect, too, in the same way. 38 3 In both cases, administrative
officers invoked general environmental concerns to abrogate a government
contract executed clearly in the government's proprietary capacity (in Everett
Plywood, for the sale of timber; in Sun Oil Co., for the leasing of offshore
tracts for oil and gas exploration). In both cases, the courts found that the
official action was unauthorized in any event, but also rejected the govern-
ment's argument to deny recovery because the acts in question were "sover-
eign" acts.3"4 In both cases the environmental concerns that motivated the
officials were public policy concerns, however much those concerns may not
have properly been within the sphere of the officials in question to consider;
in effect, the courts simply were refusing to allow those concerns to override
legitimate proprietary interests of the parties involved.
In short, where conflicts of the kind embodied in the capital standards
cases are concerned - between the government's interest in regulatory flexi-
bility and private parties' interest in the protection of investment and predict-
ability in dealing with the government - the sovereign acts doctrine is not
likely to supply final answers unless it is taken as a doctrine of limited
content that for the most part sweeps away private rights.
The Supreme Court decisions relied upon by the Federal Circuit -
Peny and Lyncy - recognize considerations of this kind.3" Both cases were
383. See Everett Plywood Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 723 (Cl. Ct. 1981); Sun Oil
Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 786 (Cl. Ct. 1978).
384. See Everett Plywood Corp., 651 F.2d at 731-32; Sun Oil Co., 572 F.2d at 816-17.
385. See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S.
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Depression era cases in which the government abrogated significant private
rights - pension rights in Lynch and the right to have obligations paid in
gold coin in Peny. In both cases, the Court found that there were contracts
with the government, the abrogation of which exceeded congressional
power.' In both cases, too, the Court denied recovery - in Lynch because
it held that, though the plaintiffs had a substantive right to compensation, the
government had not waived sovereign immunity;3" and in Peny because the
Court found that the right to recover in gold coin could be satisfied by
payment of the dollar face amount of the bond because gold coin had been
withdrawn from circulation.388 The Court did not in either case trouble itself
to consider whether the government action was "public" or "sovereign,"
which in both cases it almost surely was. The question was whether the
public action so disrupted private action as to require compensation.
Furthermore, the takings doctrine is relevant where there is clearly no
contract with the government." 9 For these reasons, it is worthwhile to re-
examine the question of the abrogation of the supervisory goodwill
agreements in light of takings analysis.
2. The Application of Takings Doctrine to the
Capital Standards Problem
The takings clause decisional authority of the Supreme Court is copious,
complex, and confusing - a fact that no doubt represents an additional
reason why the courts of appeals in the capital standards cases, and
particularly the Federal Circuit, shied away from the issue. The Court often
begins takings cases by quoting Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City," ° to the effect that the Court "has been unable to develop any 'set
formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic
injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather
571 (1934).
386. Perry, 294 U.S. at 349-51; Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579-81. In both decisions, the Court
refused to apply the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the government action
in question; the Contracts Clause of the Constitution, which provides that no state may impair
the obligations of contract, does not apply to the federal government.
387. Lynch, 292 U.S. at 582-85. Lynch is limited in this regard by the Court's
subsequent holding in Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (concluding that taking
of liens by government constituted Fifth Amendment taking despite immunity of government
and its property from suit).
388. Perry, 294 U.S. at 354-58.
389. See infra notes 390-448.
390. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons."3 91 Instead,
the Court has "examined the 'taking' question by engaging in essentially ad
hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several factors - such as [1] the
economic impact of the regulation, [2] its interference with reasonable
investment backed expectations, and [3] the character of the governmental
action - that have particular significance." 3  These factors are important
for analyzing the capital standards problem.
The takings cases of the Supreme Court in the seventeen years since
Penn Central and especially those of the last ten years, have excited consid-
erable academic attention and controversy.393 Notwithstanding the lack of
a "set formula," these cases appear to fall into two lines, which were identi-
fied by Justice Souter in his opinion in Concrete Pipe & Products of Califor-
nia, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust.3" The first line includes
cases dealing with "permanent physical occupation or destruction of econom-
ically beneficial use of real property. "3 The other line of cases, which
might be (and sometimes are) called "regulatory takings" cases, employ a
separate analytical framework, one descended from Penn Central.396 The
former line is more restrictive of government action, more protective of
private property rights, and has excited the greatest degree of academic
attention. 3" Cases in the latter line, if interpreted in certain respects, are
potentially more far-reaching because they can create questions concerning
391. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, reh'g denied, 439
U.S. 883 (1978).
392. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
393. See generally The Jurisprudence of Takings Law, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1581 (1988)
(issue of several separate articles concerning takings doctrine); Jeremy Paul, The Hidden
Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1393 (1991); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings
Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part II - Takings as Intentional Deprivations of
Property Without Moral Justification, 78 CAL. L. REv. 55 (1990); Andrea L. Peterson, The
Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I - Critique of Current Takings
Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299 (1989).
394. 113 S. Ct. 2264 (1993).
395. Concrete Pipe & Prods. of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust,
113 S. Ct. 2264, 2290 (1993).
396. Id.
397. The attention focuses upon the sense that the cases are the "elephant's nose under
the tent" in an effort by the conservative wing of the Court to resurrect the pre-New Deal
"Constitution of liberty" in contexts far broader than the land use cases in which the doctrine
has been articulated. Justice Souter's sharp and, as the text suggests, overdrawn distinction
between the two lines seemed an effort to limit the land use cases in this regard, an inclination
Justice Souter has shown in other contexts. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
112 S. Ct. 2886, 2925-26 (1992) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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a broad range of, if not virtually all, government regulatory initiatives and
their consequences for private property rights. But the line between the two
lines of decision has not been formally or sharply drawn by the Court, and
the course of decision and its consequences for regulation generally is under-
going lively development.
a. Physical Invasions or Occupations. In cases concerning physical
invasions or complete occupation of real property, the Court has begun to
move away from a doctrinal pattern tolerant of government incursions on
private property rights, especially where the government interests asserted
involved what may be characterized as aesthetic concerns. The doctrinal
pattern restrictive of property rights reached its zenith in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City,39 where an ideologically divided
Court upheld New York City's refusal, under landmarks preservation legis-
lation, to allow Penn Central to construct an office building at the site of
Grand Central Station.3 Justice Brennan wrote for the Court, articulating
the three-factor approach noted above,' and was joined by his two col-
leagues who were most faithful to the received tradition (Justices Blackmun
and Marshall), three moderate Justices (Justices White, Powell, and Stew-
art); the three Justices then sitting who were most suspicious of the received
doctrine (Justices Rehnquist and Stevens and Chief Justice Burger) dissented.
Two terms later, the Court began to shift. In Andrus v. Allard, Justice
Brennan wrote for a unanimous Court, with the Chief Justice concurring
only in the judgment, and upheld a congressional prohibition on the sale of
parts of protected birds under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act."' However,
one week later, in a remarkable decision, Kaiser Aetna v. United States,'
the Court refused to allow the United States to convert a pond that a devel-
oper had developed as a marina into an aquatic park without proceeding
under the eminent domain power and paying compensation. The roles of the
Justices in Penn Central were reversed: Justice Blackmun dissented, joined
by Justices Marshall and Brennan; Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for
the 6-3 Court, the center Justices having switched sides. The most remark-
able feature of the decision is that the government acted under its Commerce
Clause power to regulate navigation, and that power had been held to be
398. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
399. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 115-22 (1978), reh'g
denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
400. See supra note 392 and accompanying text.
401. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
402. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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strictly insulated from challenges under the Takings Clause, even in the era
prior to the New Deal under a Supreme Court highly protective of property
rights.' Justice Rehnquist stressed two factors: the magnitude of the private
party's investment (with the implication that it had no basis for expecting the
government would have substantial interest in taking over the marina) and
the extraordinary character of the government's claim (recreational, rather
than strictly navigational). The Court stressed that "the factual situation in
this case is so different from typical ones involved in riparian condemnation
cases"I that "the Government's attempt to create a public right of access to
the improved pond goes so far beyond ordinary regulation or improvement
for navigation as to amount to a taking." 5 It stressed the role of local law:
The pond "has always been considered to be private property under Hawai-
ian law," and "what petitioners now have is a body of water that was private
property under Hawaiian law, linked to a navigable water by a channel
dredged by them with the consent of the Government."4 6  It noted that
"[w]hile the consent of individual officials representing the United States can-
not 'estop' the United States ... it can lead to the fruition of a number of
expectancies embodied in the concept of 'property' - expectancies that, if
sufficiently important, the Government must condemn and pay for before it
takes over the management of the landowner's property. "' Justice Blackmun
disagreed with the majority about the scope of the navigational servitude,"°
403. See United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913). In
Chandler-Dunbar, the Supreme Court held that a riparian owner did not have a right to
compensation when the government's construction of a pier cut off his access to navigable
water, stating that the "running water in a great navigable stream is [incapable] of private
ownership." Id. at 69. The Court applied this principle, in a series of equivocal cases
reviewed by Justice Rehnquist in Kaiser Aetna, to deny any element of compensation for
riparian rights to owners of "fast lands" whose property was confiscated for navigational
purposes. See United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 122-24 (1967); United States v.
Virginia Electric & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 627-29 (1961); United States v. Twin City
Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224-28 (1956). Justice Rehnquist's opinion dismissed this line of
cases, observing that "perhaps for the very reason that it is hindsight which we now exercise,
the shifting back and forth of the Court in this area until the most recent decisions bears the
sound of 'Old, unhappy, far-off things, and battles long ago.'" Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 177 (1979).
404. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
405. Id. at 178.
406. Id. at 179.
407. Id. (citations omitted).
408. Id. at 189-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("However that access or use may have
been turned to account for personal gain, and no matter how much the riparian owner had
invested to enhance the value, the Court held that these rights were shared with the public at
large.").
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the importance of the private party's expectations,' and the role of state
law. 41
0
Kaiser Aetna set in motion a series of unclear developments regarding
the application of the Takings Clause in real property cases. The Court
divided, sometimes stridently, along ideological lines. In Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp. ,41 the Court articulated the idea of a "per
se" taking for permanent physical invasions of property. In an opinion by
Justice Marshall, joined by four of the members of the Kaiser Aetna majority
and Justice O'Connor (who had replaced Justice Stewart), the Court held that
"when the 'character of the governmental action'... is a permanent physi-
cal occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to the
extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an
important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the
owner."4 2 Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices White and Bren-
nan.
The Court expanded the category of per se takings in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council,413 adding circumstances "where regulation denies
all economically beneficial or productive use of land" as the "second situa-
tion in which we have found categorical treatment appropriate. ,414 Justice
Kennedy concurred in the judgment; Justices Blackmun and Stevens filed
separate lengthy dissents; Justice Souter filed a statement to the effect that
certiorari should have been dismissed as improvidently granted.
The revision of takings law spawned other fairly dramatic and divisive
developments between the decisions in Loretto and Lucas. In First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 5 the Court held
that a county could be liable for a series of temporary takings when a pre-
enforcement challenge to a regulation was denied on grounds of ripeness.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the Court; only Justice Stevens
dissented, joined in part by Justices O'Connor and Blackmun. The Court
historically has refused to entertain pre-enforcement takings challenges, as
409. Id. at 191 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Government's interest in'vindicating
a public right of access to the pond is substantial.").
410. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Llocal law concerns rights of title and use between
citizen and citizen, or between citizen and state, but does not affect the scope or effect of the
federal nagivational servitude.").
411. 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
412. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982)
(citations omitted).
413. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
414. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992).
415. 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987).
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the courts of appeals did in the supervisory goodwill cases, on grounds that
because takings may be effected if compensation is paid, the proper means
of vindicating an affected party's rights are in a damages suit after the
challenged action has taken place.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,"6 the Court held that a
state requirement that the owner of a beachfront tract convey an easement
along the beach to the state as a condition of the grant of a construction
permit constituted the imposition of an unconstitutional condition on a valu-
able government benefit unless the owner was compensated for the easement.
Justice Scalia's opinion said that "our cases describe the condition for
abridgment of property rights through the police power as a 'substantial
advanc[ing]' of a legitimate state interest,"" 7 suggesting a tightening of the
traditional rationality standard for testing takings. The decision was 5-4,
with Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun dissenting.
The Court's most recent and most far-reaching revision of takings
doctrine was an expansion of Nollan that concerned the required justification
for government land use initiatives. The decision expands the "substantial-
ity" idea of Nollan in ways distinctly reminiscent of Kaiser Aetna. In Dolan
v. City of Tigard,418 Justice Rehnquist's opinion expressly rejected a "reason-
able relationship" test for the required "nexus" between a condition imposed
on development and the state interest sought to be advanced, on grounds that
it was "confusingly similar to the term 'rational basis' which describes the
minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. "419 In its stead, the Court substituted a "rough propor-
tionality" test, which it said "best encapsulates what we hold to be the re-
quirement of the Fifth Amendment."42' The Court stated that "[n]o precise
mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development. "421
b. Regulatory Takings. The Court's regulatory takings cases seem to
follow a different track, engendering considerably less division on the Court
and involving rather different Justices as protagonists. The Supreme Court
has on at least five occasions since 1981 granted certiorari to review facial
416. 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987).
417. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987).
418. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
419. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 (1994).
420. Id.
421. Id. at 2319-20.
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Takings Clause challenges to complex federal regulatory schemes.' In four
of the cases, the Court rejected the challenges. In one case, Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co. ,' the Court upheld the challenge. Although the other cases
upheld the schemes against the facial attacks, in virtually all of the other
cases, the Court at least implicitly, and Justice O'Connor explicitly, indi-
cated that "as applied" challenges to the schemes might be appropriate under
the Takings Clause.
i. Monsanto and Investment-Backed Expectations in Fields Occupied
by Legislation. Monsanto involved data disclosure and data consideration
provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA).424 As originally adopted in 1947, FIFRA provided protection for
"information relative to formulas of products, "' but was silent about health
and safety information. In 1972, the statute was amended to provide for the
use of data, submitted by one applicant for registration of a pesticide, in
consideration of later applicants, provided the later applicant agreed to
compensate the first applicant4 26 - what the Supreme Court characterized as
a "mandatory data-licensing scheme. "' The amount of compensation was
to be negotiated by the parties or, if they could not agree, was to be deter-
mined by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), subject to judicial
review. The amended provision protected trade secrets or commercial or
financial information, but did not define the term.' s The statute also did not
specify an effective date for the data consideration provision; a 1975 amend-
ment added a January 1, 1970 effective date.429
In 1978, Congress amended FIFRA to give applicants a ten-year period
of exclusive use for data on new active ingredients in pesticides registered
422. Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113
S. Ct. 2264 (1993); Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1 (1990); Connolly
v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986 (1984); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981).
423. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
424. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act [hereinafter FIFRA], 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136-136(y) (1994).
425. FIFRA, ch. 125, § 8(c), 61 Stat. 163, 170 (1947), amended by FIFRA, 86 Stat. 973
(1972).
426. Id. § 3(c)(1)(D), 86 Stat. 979-80 (1972) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 136(c)(1)(F)(ii)
(1994)).
427. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 999 (1984).
428. FIFRA, § 10(a)-(c), 86 Stat. 973, 989 (1972) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 136(h)
(1994)).
429. FIFRA, § 12, 89 Stat. 755 (1975).
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after September 30, 1978. The statute also allowed all other data submitted
after 1969 to be considered in support of another application for fifteen years
from the date of the original submission, provided that an applicant agreed
to compensate the applicant who submitted the original application. In the
absence of an agreement, the statute provided for a binding arbitration
proceeding, not subject to judicial review (absent fraud or misrepresen-
tation). Notwithstanding a statutory prohibition against disclosure of trade
secrets, a second amendment of the statute provided for the disclosure of all
health, safety, and environmental data to qualified requesters, subject to
restrictions on disclosure of manufacturing or quality control processes or
disclosure to foreign or multinational pesticide companies.
Monsanto, which had incurred costs in excess of $23.6 million in
developing health, safety, and environmental data submitted under FIFRA,
sought to enjoin the operation of these provisions. The district court granted
the injunction,4' and the government appealed. The Supreme Court vacated
the injunction, holding that there was no taking with respect either to infor-
mation submitted prior to the 1972 amendment or after the 1978 amend-
ment.431 However, the Court further held that the EPA's use of the data in
the period between the amendments constituted a taking compensable by a
Tucker Act damage remedy in the Claims Court. The Court found as a
preliminary matter that a trade secret could constitute property subject to the
Takings Clause, relying on earlier cases finding "other kinds of intangible
interests to be property" subject to the clause.43z On the question whether
there was a taking, the Court examined the three factors identified by Justice
Brennan's opinion in Penn Central:433 "the character of the governmental
action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-
backed expectations.""4 The Court rested its conclusion on the last of the
three factors, finding "that the force of this factor is so overwhelming, at
least with respect to certain of the data submitted by Monsanto to EPA, that
it disposes of the taking question regarding those data. " 435
430. Monsanto Co. v. Acting Administrator, U.S. EPA, 564 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Mo.
1983), vacated and remanded sub nom. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Corp., 467 U.S. 986
(1984).
431. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
432. See id. at 1003 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 44, 46 (1960));
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 596-602, reh'g denied, 296 U.S.
661 (1935); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934).
433. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
434. Monsanto, 467 at U.S. 1005 (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
435. Id.
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The Court's opinion, however, is unclear about the role "investment-
backed expectations" play in the takings area. The district court was rela-
tively straightforward in finding a taking based on a great disproportion
between the effect the regulation had on Monsanto's previous investment
commitment and the governmental benefit derived from the regulatory
scheme. The Supreme Court, by contrast, avoided expressions concerning
regulatory purposes or the relation of the scheme to those purposes. It first
held that there was no taking in the post-1978 period because the statute
placed the company on notice that data would be disclosed according to
certain procedures known to the company:
Monsanto argues that the statute's requirement that a submitter give
up its property interest in the data constitutes placing an unconstitutional
condition on the right to a valuable Government benefit. But Monsanto
has not challenged the ability of the Federal Government to regulate the
marketing and use of pesticides. Nor could Monsanto successfully make
such a challenge, for such restrictions are the burdens we all must bear in
exchange for "the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized
community." This is particularly true in an area, such as pesticide sale
and use, that has long been the source of public concern and the subject
of government regulation. That Monsanto is willing to bear this burden
in exchange for the ability to market pesticides in this country is evidenced
by the fact that it has continued to expand its research and development
and to submit data to EPA despite the enactment of the 1978 amendments
to FIFRA. Thus, as long as Monsanto is aware of the conditions under
which the data are submitted, and the conditions are rationally related to
a legitimate Government interest, a voluntary submission of data by an
applicant in exchange for the economic advantages of a registration can
hardly be called a taking."
The Court held that, for the period prior to 1972, neither FIFRA nor the
Trade Secrets Act437 created "a reasonable investment-backed expectation"
that data submitted to EPA would remain confidential. 438
However, for data submitted between 1972 and 1978, the'Court found
that the statutory provisions promised "an extensive measure of confidenti-
ality and exclusive use" that formed the "basis of a reasonable investment-
backed expectation. " 439 Furthermore, it held that Monsanto was not rele-
gated to the FIFRA arbitration procedure to recover its losses from the data
436. Id. at 1007 (citations omitted).
437. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1994).
438. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1009.
439. Id. at 1011.
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disclosure and consideration provisions during that period, but instead could
bring a damages action in the Claims Court.'
Justice O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part."' She dissented from the holding regarding the pre-1972 period. 442
She questioned whether "the degree of Government regulation determines
the reasonableness of an expectation of confidentiality" 443 and thought that
"the extent of Monsanto's pre-1972 expectations, whether reasonable and
investment-backed or otherwise, is a heavily factual question.""" Therefore,
she would have remanded for factual findings on the question." 5
The Monsanto decision, as applied to takings questions in the banking
context, is in many respects unsatisfying precisely because of its interpreta-
tion of "investment-backed expectations" as determined by the federal statu-
tory scheme. For instance, it is clear from the opinion that, although the
Court found that the federal statute created reasonable investment-backed
expectations, Monsanto was not limited to damages resulting from violations
of the statute, but, rather, it could receive compensation for all losses due to
the loss of control over its information, even those caused when the EPA
fully complied with the statutory provisions. 6  In this sense, Justice
O'Connor's view is more satisfactory than the Court's: She would have
based the right to just compensation under the Takings Clause on the sacri-
fice of rights created by state law, with the central question being the expec-
tations in fact of the burdened party.
However, the Court and Justice O'Connor agreed on the post-1978
period.' Still, the explanation - referring exclusively to reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations' - is unsatisfactory there as well because the
post-1978 provisions created as much of a government guarantee as did their
predecessors from 1972 to 1978. Yet, compliance by the EPA with the
later-enacted provisions would exhaust a burdened party's constitutional
440. Id. at 1017-20.
441. Id. at 1021 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
442. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
443. Id. at 1022 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
444. Id. at 1024 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
O'Connor was "puzzled" by the Court's statement that "an 'industry that long has been the
focus of great public concern and significant government regulation' can have no reasonable
expectation that the Government will not later find public disclosure of trade secrets to be in
the public interest." Id. at 1022 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
445. Id. at 1024 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
446. Id. at 1019-20.
447. Id. at 1021 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
448. Id. at 1005-07.
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rights. Without venturing into questions of the adequacy of the government
purpose, the Court seemed to be saying that the question was a matter of
degree: At some point, the government had to be able to extinguish Mon-
santo's rights without compensation in the interest of the regulatory scheme.
The more careful statutory procedures and the lesser substantive burdens
imposed in the later statute were enough to avoid a taking, although the
Court's opinion does not really explain why.
ii. Other Contemporary Regulatory Takings Cases. A series of
cases involving facial challenges to government regulatory schemes but-
tresses Monsanto's conclusion that the Takings Clause limits such schemes,
although Monsanto's ambiguities are not clarified. Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Assn'"9 upheld against a variety of constitutional
challenges the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 45
which enacted comprehensive federal environmental regulation of strip
mining. The Court reversed a district court judgment striking down, as
unconstitutional takings, provisions that required operators to restore steep-
slope surface mines to their original contour and provisions that prohibited
mining in certain locations.451 Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court stated
that the lower court decision "ignored this Court's oft-repeated admonition
that the constitutionality of statutes ought not be decided except in an actual
factual setting that makes such a decision necessary," a rule "particularly
important in cases raising allegations of an unconstitutional taking of private
property."452 Justice Powell, concurring, stressed that "[tihe 'taking' issue
remains available to, and may be litigated by, any owner or lessee whose
property interest is adversely affected by the enforcement of the Act."4I 3 In
connection with this observation, Justice Powell discussed the potential
deleterious effects of the Act on certain areas of his native Virginia. 4
In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. ,' a unanimous Court
upheld provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)456 and the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980
449. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
450. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994).
451. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 293-94
(1981).
452. Id. at 294-95.
453. Id. at 306.
454. Id. at 306-07 (Powell, J., concurring).
455. 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
456. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
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(MPPAA) 457 that impose monetary liabilities on an employer withdrawing
funds from a multiemployer pension plan. A unanimous Court held that
neither the imposition of monetary liability, nor the abrogation of contractual
provisions governing the plans that limited employers' liability, constituted
a taldng.1 Justice White's opinion sounded the tones of the era of deference
to the administrative state: "In the course of regulating commercial and other
human affairs, Congress routinely creates burdens for some that directly
benefit others."459 " [Tihe fact that legislation disregards or destroys existing
contractual rights does not always transform the regulation into an illegal
taking."46  "We are far from persuaded that fairness and justice require the
public, rather than the withdrawing employers and other parties to pension
plan agreements, to shoulder the responsibility for rescuing plans that are in
financial trouble."461  "Prudent employers then had more than sufficient
notice not only that pension plans were currently regulated, but also that
withdrawal itself might trigger additional financial obligations."462 However,
the case involved a facial challenge, and Justice O'Connor (joined by Justice
Powell) made explicit in her concurrence that her agreement with the Court's
opinion did not foreclose as-applied challenges:
I join the Court's opinion and agree with its reasoning and its result, but
I write separately to emphasize some of the issues the Court does not
decide today. Specifically, the Court does not decide today, and has left
open in previous cases, whether the imposition of withdrawal liability
under the MPPAA and of plan termination liability under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) may in some circum-
stances be so arbitrary and irrational as to violate the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. The Court also has no occasion to decide
whether the MPPAA may violate the Taling Clause as applied in particu-
lar cases, or whether the pension plan in this case is a defined benefit plan
rather than a defined contribution plan within the meaning of ERISA.
[B]oth statutes impose liability under certain circumstances on con-
tributing employers for unfunded benefits that accrued in the past under
a pension plan whether or not the employers had agreed to ensure that
benefits would be fully funded. In my view, imposition of this type of
retroactive liability on employers, to be constitutional, must rest on some
457. Id. §§ 1381-1461.
458. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 221-28 (1986).
459. Id. at 223.
460. Id. at 224.
461. Id. at 227.
462. Id.
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basis in the employer's conduct that would make it rational to treat the
employees' expectations of benefits under the plan as the employer's
responsibility.'
The Supreme Court in fact entertained an as-applied challenge to the
MPPAA in Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v. Construction
Laborers Pension Trust, an opinion written by Justice Souter.' In that
case, the Court refused to apply the "analytical framework... employed in
our cases dealing with permanent physical occupation or destruction of
economically beneficial use of real property."I6s Those cases articulated per
se rules governing takings.466 The Court held that attempts such as Concrete
Pipe's to "shoehorn" its claim into per se analysis by dividing its property
"into what was taken and what was left for the purpose of demonstrating the
taking of the former to be complete and hence compensable" had been
rejected previously 7 in Penn Central, 8 the case that first articulated the
three-factor approach.
The Court rejected Concrete Pipe's takings argument after an extended
application of the three factors to the facts before it. 9 As to the character
of the government action, the Court rejected the argument that the sole
purpose of imposing liability was to protect the solvency of the government
fund; as to the impact on the burdened party, the Court rejected the notion
that liability was out of proportion to the company's experience.47 Regard-
ing reasonable investment-backed expectations, the Court noted that at the
time the company entered the Plan, it "was already subject to ERISA, and
a withdrawing employer faced contingent liability up to 30% of its net
worth. "471 It further noted that "Concrete Pipe's reliance on ERISA's origi-
nal limitation of contingent liability to 30% of net worth is misplaced, there
being no reasonable basis to expect that the legislative ceiling would never
be lifted. "472
463. Id. at 228-29 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
464. 113 S. Ct. 2264 (1993).
465. Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust,
113 S. Ct. 2264, 2290 (1993) (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct.
2286, 2890-92 (1992)).
466. See supra notes 411-14 and accompanying text (discussing per se takings).
467. Concrete Pipe, 113 S. Ct. at 2290.
468. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
469. Concrete Pipe, 113 S. Ct. 2290-92.
470. Id. at 2290-91.
471. Id. at 2291.
472. Id. at 2292 (citations omitted).
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Justice O'Connor concurred except with respect to the Court's observa-
tion concerning reliance on the thirty percent limitation. 47' She quoted her
dissent in Connolly to the effect that imposition of liability requires a "basis
in the employer's conduct" and observed that the Concrete Pipe Court "does
not hold otherwise. "' She said that "petitioner has failed to adduce the two
features of this case that might have demonstrated why it did not 'accept' the
prospect of full withdrawal liability when it joined the Construction Laborers
Pension Trust. "I
Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission76 may clarify some of
the ambiguity of Monsanto. Preseault involved the National Trails System
Act, under which the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) has authority
to refuse to allow abandonment of railroad rights of way that have fallen out
of use and to cause the rights of way to be converted to use as recreational
trails. 4' The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected a Tak-
ings Clause challenge from owners of reversionary interests in the rights of
way, on the grounds that the ICC's authority to refuse to permit abandon-
ment prevented the vesting of any reversionary interest in the rights of
way.478 The Supreme Court affirmed in a unanimous opinion written by
Justice Brennan; however, the Court affirmed on grounds that the statute did
not eliminate a Tucker Act remedy, relying principally on the remedial
aspects of Monsanto.479 Justice Brennan's opinion makes little reference to
the Second Circuit's theory. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion,
stressing disagreement with the court of appeals's theory: "The scope of the
Commission's authority to regulate abandonments thereby delimiting the
ambit of federal power, is an issue quite distinct from whether the Commis-
sion's exercise of power over matters within its jurisdiction effected a taking
of petitioners' property. "' She noted the distinction between the majority's
theory and that of the court of appeals.!"
iii. Regulatory Takings and the Problem of Extraordinariness. Mon-
santo, Connolly, Preseault, and Concrete Pipe & Products at least suggest,
473. Id. at 2292 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
474. Id. at 2292 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
475. Id. at 2293 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
476. 494 U.S. 1 (1990).
477. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251 (1994).
478. See Presault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 10 (1990).
479. Id. at 11-17.
480. Id. at 22 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
481. Id. at 23-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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and probably establish, that the mere existence of a party in a heavily regu-
lated industry does not eliminate the possibility that a government action
seriously affecting the property rights of the industry members may be held
to constitute a taking. They also suggest, however, that in such instances the
standard imposed to determine whether a taking has occurred will be strict.
It is worth viewing these cases in the context of the development of takings
law in recent years to discern how the Supreme Court might view a takings
claim in the supervisory goodwill cases.
First, all of these cases were written by Justices whose views of the
regulatory state tend to be consistent with the dominant view of the post-New
Deal era - Justice Blackmun wrote Monsanto; Justice White, Connolly;
Justice Brennan, Preseault; and Justice Souter, Concrete Pipe & Products.
Justice O'Connor wrote separately in all four cases, expressing a consistent
and coherent view that is hospitable to the kind of challenge the thrifts will
make to the Winstar ruling. Her view is not disputed in the majority opin-
ions, but it should be remembered that the Justices writing those opinions may
be more hostile than the Court as a whole to Justice O'Connor's opinions.
Second, there are intermediate cases involving both land use problems
and regulatory takings problems. Foremost among those is Keystone Bitumi-
nous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, ' which revisited the problem addressed in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,4 3 a decision that "has for 65 years been the
foundation of [the Court's] 'regulatory takings' jurisprudence. "4 In Pennsyl-
vania Coal, the Court invalidated Pennsylvania's Kohler Act, which pre-
vented coal mining in land underneath homes if the mining would cause the
subsidence of those homes (and thus destroyed property and contract rights
of the miners).4" Pennsylvania Coal Co. is noted for its observations that "if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking"' and that "an
average reciprocity of advantage . . . has been recognized as a justification
of various laws. "" The case proceeded from the proposition that the inter-
ests of the surface owners was not "a public interest sufficient to warrant so
extensive a destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights. "'
In Keystone Bituminous Coal, an ideologically divided Court distinguished
482. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
483. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
484. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 508 (1987)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
485. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412-16 (1922).
486. Id. at 415.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 414.
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Pennsylvania Coal in upholding the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land
Conservation Act, a latter day version of the Kohler Act. 9 Justice Stevens's
opinion for the Court found that the "character of the government action...
lean[ed] heavily against finding a taking [because] the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania had acted to arrest what it perceives to be a significant threat to
the common welfare. "490 Furthermore, the Court found that in the later case,
unlike the earlier, there was no basis for a finding that the statute made it
"impossible for petitioners to profitably engage in their business, or that there
ha[d] been undue interference with their investment-backed expectations."491
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Powell,
dissented, noting that the public purposes of the Subsidence Act were not
distinguishable from those of the Kohler Act.49 Justice Rehnquist also argued
that the Subsidence Act effected a virtually "complete" taking of 27 million
tons of coal that were required to be left in the ground and of the support
estate held by the miners.493
Hodel v. Irving4" involved provisions of the Indian Land Conservation
Act that attempted to force consolidation of fractionated interests in land held
under Indian allotment statutes by restricting the rights of holders to transfer
their interests by descent and devise.495 Justice O'Connor, in her opinion for
the Court, noted that the holders' investment-backed expectations were attenu-
ated and that consolidation effected a weak "reciprocity of advantage" to the
affected holders.' However, the Court invalidated the statute because of the
complete destruction of both the rights of descent and of devise. 497 Citing
Kaiser Aetna, the Court found that "the character of the Government regula-
tion here is extraordinary" and observed that "the right to pass on property -
to one's family in particular - has been part of the Anglo-American legal
system since feudal times. ""4 Justice O'Connor noted that "total abrogation
of the right to pass property is unprecedented and likely unconstitutional. ,499
489. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
490. Id. at 485.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 509-11 (Rehnqhist, C.J., dissenting).
493. Id. at 515-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
494. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
495. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 709 (1987) (describing relevant provisions of
Indian Land Consolidation Act).
496. Id. at 715.
497. Id. at 716-18.
498. Id. at 716.
499. Id.
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Thus, the Court found that "the extraordinary step of abolishing both descent
and devise of these property interests even when the passing of the property
to the heir might result in consolidation of property . . . in the words of
Justice Holmes, 'goes too far."'I
It is accepted in the commentary, if not the cases, that harmonizing
takings law, particularly the novel applications in the regulatory area, depends
upon an implicit theory of property rights and the relation of such rights to
the state. The minimum contours of such a theory include: First, the cases
on regulatory takings recognize a role for some sort of private rights sys-
tem - ordinarily associated with state law - that is exogenous and in some
sense prior to the system of rights governed by the regulatory system. This
point is implicit in Justice O'Connor's separate opinion in Monsanto,5° and
explicit in her opinion in Preseault, and in Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent
in Keystone Bituminous Coal; 3 it is reflected clearly in the Preseault major-
ity' and probably the Monsanto opinion as well.' s
Second, the system of rights is conditioned by the regulatory system, but
on an unamplified basis that might be called a "notice" basis. That is, the
party's rights are held subject to notice of variations in the regulatory system
that can modify those rights. The degree of modification that is permissible
is determined, it seems, by the nature of the regulatory system in general,
instead of by specific rules or by either general or specific attributes of af-
fected private rights. Connolly,' perhaps Virginia Mining & Reclamation
500. Id. at 718 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
501. 467 U.S. 986, 1022 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("If the degree of Government regulation determines the reasonableness of an expectation of
confidentiality, Monsanto had as little reason to expect confidentiality after 1972 as before,
since the 1972 amendments were not deregulatory in intent or effect.").
502. 494 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[S]tate law creates and defines
the scope of the reversionary or other real property interests affected by the ICC's actions
pursuant to § 208 of the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983.... In determin-
ing whether a taking has occurred, 'we are mindful of the basic axiom that "[p]roperty
interests... are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimen-
sions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law.""') (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984)
(quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980))).
503. 480 U.S. 470, 518-19 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting, inter alia,
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980), see supra note
502).
504. See494U.S. 1, 11-13 (1990).
505. 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984) (quoted at supra note 502).
506. 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986) ("It was also plain enough that the purpose of imposing
withdrawal liability was to ensure that employees would receive the benefits promised them.
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Ass'n,5°7 Keystone Bituminous Coal,"0 s and Monsanto imply this; however,
Preseault1 ° may be in conflict with this point, as may Nollan5 '" and Doan5t2
(all of which involve realty). Timing may matter. Under Monsanto, that is,
a sharp change in regulation may be a taking," 's but, as Connolly and Con-
crete Pipe & Products suggest, the private party may be subject to an expecta-
tion that it adjust after some period of notice.5"4 Reliance and, more particu-
larly, capital investment matter under Kaiser Aetna,515 Monsanto,516 and even
Penn Central.117 Given Kaiser Aetna 18 and Monsanto,"1 9 too, there is little
point in pretending that the magnitude of a prior investment matters.
Finally, and most problematically, the nature of the public interests
involved do matter and are subject to some scrutiny. Kaiser Aetna stands for
the proposition that the magnitude of the public interest will be measured, at
least in land cases;' Nolan and Dolan stand for the proposition that the
When it became evident that ERISA fell short of achieving this end, Congress adopted the
1980 amendments. Prudent employers then had more than sufficient notice not only that
pension plans were currently regulated, but also that withdrawal itself might trigger additional
financial obligations.")
507. See 452 U.S. 264, 296-97 & nn.37-38 (1981).
508. See 480 U.S. 470, 499-500 (1987).
509. 467 U.S. 986, 1008-09 (1984) ("In an industry that long has been the focus of great
public concern and significant government regulation, the possibility was substantial that the
Federal Government, which had thus far taken no position on disclosure of health, safety, and
environmental data concerning pesticides, upon focusing on the issue would find disclosure
to be in the public interest.").
510. 494 U.S. 1, 13 ("[A] Tucker Act remedy exists unless there are unambiguous
indications to the contrary.").
511. See 483 U.S. 825, 840-42 (1987).
512. See 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316-17, 2317-18 (1994).
513. See 467 U.S. 986, 1010-11 (1984).
514. See Connolly, 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986), quoted supra note 506; Concrete Pipe &
Products, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2287-88 (1993).
515. 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1993) ("We think, however, that when the Government makes
the naked assertion it does here, that assertion collides with not merely an 'economic advan-
tage' but an 'economic disadvantage' that has the law back of it to such an extent that courts
may 'compel others to forbear from interfering with [it] or to compensate for [its] inva-
sion.'"); id. at 180 ("This is not a case where the Government is exercising its regula-
tory power in a manner that will cause an insubstantial devaluation of petitioners' private
property ..... ).
516. See 467 U.S. 986, 1007 & n.11, 1011 & n.15 (1984).
517. See 438 U.S. 104, 129 & n.26 (1978).
518. See supra note 515.
519. See supra note 516.
520. 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979) ("Mihe Government's attempt to create a public right of
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scrutiny will not be relaxed terribly, at least in local land cases;" and Lucas
and Loretto stand for the proposition that no public interest will suffice to
justify some incursions on land.' It is Justice O'Connor's opinions, consis-
tent throughout, however, that clearly indicate a demand for some showing
of the presence of a general regulatory purpose in specific context, notwith-
standing the demonstrable facial validity of a given regulatory scheme. All
of Justice O'Connor's opinions are concurrences, with which the majority
opinions express no discomfort.
Additionally, the conceptions in Pennsylvania Coal of "reciprocity of
advantage" and of public schemes benefiting predominantly private parties
or of regulation going "too far" are important. These ideas touch on the
"extraordinariness" problem in Hodel v. Irving and Kaiser Aetna (and possi-
bly Dolan and Lucas),' but implicate in particular some inquiry into the
relative roles of private and definably public interests in the regulation in
question. Pennsylvania Coal bears this implication, 4 and even the majority
in Keystone Bituminous Coal is not contrary to it;' Justice Rehnquist's
access to the improved pond goes so far beyond ordinary regulation or improvement for
navigation as to amount to a taking. .. ").
521. See Nollan, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987) ("That is simply an expression of the Com-
mission's belief that the public interest will be served by a continuous strip of publicly
accessible beach along the coast. The Commission may well be right that it is a good idea,
but that does not establish that the Nollans (and other coastal residents) alone can be com-
pelled to contribute to its realization.").
522. Loretto, 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982), quoted supra note 412; Lucas, 112 S. Ct.
2886, 2893 (1992), quoted supra note 414.
523. See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979), quoted supra note 520; Irving, 481
U.S. 704, 716 (1987) ("But the character of the Government regulation here is extraordinary.
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. at 176, we emphasized that the regulation de-
stroyed 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly character-
ized as property - the right to exclude others.' Similarly, the regulation here amounts to
virtually the abrogation of the right to pass on a certain type of property - the small undi-
vided interest - to one's heirs. In one form or another, the right to pass on property - to
one's family in particular - has been part of the Anglo-American system since feudal
times.").
524. 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an
implied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation
must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for consider-
ation in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain the act.").
525. 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987) ("The Court's hesitance to find a taking when the State
merely restrains uses of property that are tantamount to public nuisances is consistent with
the notion of 'reciprocity of advantage' that Justice Holmes referred to in Pennsylvania Coal.
Under our system of government, one of the State's primary ways of preserving the public
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dissent reinforces the point, as do his opinions in Kaiser Aetna and Dolan,-
as well as Justice Scalia's opinion in Nolan (if not Lucas).' The inquiry
into private interests and reciprocity of advantage has pointed, suggestive,
and potentially far-reaching implications if one perceives economic and
social trends that produce a Rhenification of the national economic structure
and if one stresses the role of constitutional tradition in modulating or chan-
neling any such process.
Three different strands in the cases - the examination of the impact of
the regulatory scheme on investment-backed expectations; the examination
of the rational basis for the presence of statutory purpose in as-applied
analysis; and the examination of private interests and reciprocity of advan-
tage within a regulatory scheme - all implicate considering the details of a
regulatory scheme in response to a claim of regulatory taking. Consider-
ation of the scheme is in fact rather different under each of these separate
inquiries, and there may be tensions between the governing ideas. However,
together these inquiries provide a basis for evaluating the nature and content
of state activity in relation to private rights that are defined to have a basis
exogenous to the scheme. From them can be seen the shadows, if not the
outlines, of a theory of property rights in relation to a theory of the state.
Moreover, the emerging picture is one that is ideologically more ambig-
uous - more value ambiguous' - than is characteristically assumed by the
academic (or political) commentary that decries decisional law rediscovering
the role of property rights, particularly in relation to an evolving, if not
swiftly changing, economic order.
This theory fits into the three-factor approach inherited from Penn
Central Transportation and Monsanto. It is useful to apply the three-factor
standard to the supervisory goodwill cases, under which a substantial argu-
ment can be made for compensation. That argument implicates the consider-
ations that define a state-property rights interface, suggested above, in ways
applicable to other areas of the banking law and potentially to a broader
range of regulatory issues as well.
weal is restricting the uses individuals can make of their property. While each of us is
burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that -
are placed on others.") (citations omitted).
526. Id. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("The nature of these purposes may be
relevant, for we have recognized that a taking does not occur where the government exercises
its unquestioned authority to prevent a property owner from using his property to injure
others without having to compensate the value of the forbidden use.").
527. Nollan, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987), quoted supra note 521.
528. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text and paragraph following note 43.
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First, the nature of the governmental action is extraordinary. As the
discussion in Part II details, the forbearance program was part of a legiti-
mate, though peculiar, government effort that had widespread political
support. The program reflected the initiatives pursued under the regulators'
bill that were incorporated in Garn-St Germain. The objective of the regula-
tors' bill was to minimize the cost of the "first" thrift crisis without appropri-
ation of substantial public funds, by combining troubled thrifts with healthy
ones. The belief was that time would tide the thrifts through the period of
very high interest rates in the early 1980s. The regulatory accounting prac-
tices were not pure gimmicks; at least at the time they were adopted, sub-
stantial grounds existed for regarding them as proper accounting. The view
of the "right" method of accounting shifted throughout the thrift crisis.
However, those shifts were motivated more by political concerns - the
effort to "buy time" in the early 1980s, in the expectation that time would
heal the problem, and the effort to enact a bailout quickly in 1989, to move
the entire issue from public consciousness at as safe a distance from an
election as possible - than by objective accounting theory.
The second factor, the impact of the government action, may vary from
case to case. However, this factor clearly seems to weigh in the thrifts'
favor in those cases in which the abrogation of the goodwill agreements
resulted in the insolvency of the institution and where the forbearance had
been extended in connection with an acquisition transaction, as opposed to
a conversion. For these institutions, the consequence of the government
action has not only been the loss of the troubled institutions that they ac-
quired at a price determined by the expectation that they would receive a
regulatory forbearance - it has resulted in the loss of their investment in
what had been a healthy institution prior to their agreeing to actions that
benefited the government. In many takings contexts, the Court analyzes the
"impact" factor by reference to a reciprocity of advantage implicit in the
regulatory scheme. The concept, which derives from Justice Holmes's
opinion in Pennsylvania Coal, 9 is important in the cases that uphold general
zoning ordinances against Takings Clause challenge.530 The reciprocity idea
is important in the multiemployer plan withdrawal cases as well. In the
banking context, such a principle would uphold, for instance, a requirement
that institutions have deposit insurance or exit or entrance fees imposed upon
conversions. However, it is difficult to understand what reciprocal advan-
tage an institution gains from the abrogation of the capital standards, particu-
larly when the change in capital standards renders the institution insolvent.
529. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
530. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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The final factor, reasonable investment-backed expectations, is ordi-
narily the critical factor in the regulatory takings cases. The argument,
descended from Monsanto, Connolly, and Concrete Pipe & Products, is that
one who is engaged voluntarily in a heavily regulated industry has no expec-
tation that the regulations will not be changed. In the context of the supervi-
sory goodwill cases, however, there are reasons this view should not block
recovery. At a minimum, the Supreme Court decisions hold that the inquiry
should be made on a case-by-case basis, and there should be defined circum-
stances in which recovery is allowed. Justice O'Connor suggests in Mon-
santo that the question of expectations is a factual one.53" ' In Connolly, she
explicitly conditions the constitutionality of withdrawal liability on some
connection between the employer's conduct and an expectation that it would
be responsible for the employee's benefits.53 In the supervisory goodwill
cases, by analogy, the constitutionality of the retroactive abrogation of the
supervisory goodwill agreements should be conditioned on some basis in the
thrifts' conduct that would make it rational to hold them accountable for the
"poison" regulatory goodwill allegedly injected into the regulatory system.
Such a basis might be shown by reckless conduct on the part of thrift insid-
ers, actual knowledge on their part or on the part of the regulators that the
forbearances were inappropriate in the circumstances and masked a condition
of true insolvency, or some other similar inappropriate conduct. It is un-
likely this showing will be possible in many cases, particularly with courts
appearing in recent months to take a more tolerant view of the conduct of
bank officers, directors. and representatives.
An outcome to the supervisory goodwill litigation that imposes substan-
tial monetary liability on the government is an unpleasant one and would be
the culmination of a series of what, at least in retrospect, look like poor
choices on the part of Congress. However, the Claims Court in a recent
case in another context has held that "Congress may not remedy the prob-
lems now confronting the federal banking system by placing the financial
burden on the backs of innocents, ""' and the Supreme Court's takings cases
recognize that the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall
not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice should be borne by the public as a whole."I In
531. 467 U.S. 986, 1024 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
532. 475 U.S. 211, 229 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
533. Branch ex rel. Maine Nat'l Bank v. United States, 31 CI. Ct. 626, 637 (1994), rev'd,
69 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
534. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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light of such principles, an outcome in the supervisory goodwill litigation
that imposes compensation liability on the government would be a just one.
Those principles also should influence consideration of other aspects of
FIRREA that singled out parties on the basis of convenience to contribute to
the rescue of the savings and loan industry.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court in the Winstar case faces a challenge to a far-reach-
ing encroachment, effected by FIRREA, on the rights of private interests in
the banking industry. Although the case was decided in the lower courts on
contract grounds, the decision raises questions concerning the status as
property of rights in contracts with the federal government or government
bodies, the abrogation of which may constitute a taking of property requiring
compensation under the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court should
consider the case seriously as a takings case and should employ it to formu-
late a new doctrine: Even in a heavily regulated industry, government ac-
tions having extraordinary consequences for private rights that serve com-
plex government programs in which benefits and burdens among private
groups are distributed in a deliberately uneven manner can constitute a
taking requiring compensation. Ample precedent for such a result reposes
particularly in the Court's decisions in Kaiser Aetna and Hodel v. Irving, and
in the line of regulatory takings cases descended from Monsanto.
